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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Human capital is gained throughout a person’s life. Most of those human capital 
investments are made in childhood, because the returns to these investments take time to 
materialize. There are different activities, conditions, and policies that can either boost or 
reduce human capital investments. Schooling is a fundamental dimension of human 
capital formation, and the activities that children perform during their school years yield 
consequences throughout their adult lives. School-age children residing in poor 
households in developing countries spend their time not only attending school, studying, 
and doing homework, but also performing additional activities such as work. The time 
devoted to work activities might have effects on these children’s learning (negative or 
positive), and will affect their human capital accumulation.  
The first two essays of this dissertation (Chapters 2 and 3) study two aspects of 
children’s acquisition of human capital in Ethiopia. 
Chapter 2 begins by exploring the effects of child work on academic achievement 
in Ethiopia. The goal of this chapter is to measure the effects of different types of work 
on test scores for children aged 8, 12, and 15 years old. Child work should be treated as 
endogenous in the process of human capital formation, so in Chapter 2, I propose to 
instrument child work with a set of variables related to sibling composition and 
household and environmental shocks faced by the child’s household. This analysis is 
performed using three rounds of data from the Young Lives study for Ethiopia. 
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The Young Lives data are publicly available and well documented. This study has 
followed two cohorts of children since 2002. Since 2006 (Round 2 of the study), time use 
data have been collected as part of the survey, including the time spent in a typical day 
performing different activities that can be classified as domestic work or market work. In 
addition, the Young Lives study includes very detailed data on child, household, and 
community characteristics. The results of Chapter 2 show that child work negatively 
affects vocabulary test scores and that it has no effect on mathematics test scores.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the urban-rural test score gap in Ethiopia. Currently, more 
than 80 percent of the population of Ethiopia resides in rural areas, and there is very little 
rural to urban migration. This chapter is the first study that decomposes this educational 
gap for Ethiopia. The decomposition of the test score gap follows the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition method. This method allows one to decompose the test score gap into an 
explained portion (differences in endowments) and an unexplained portion (differences in 
coefficients). The main contributors to the explained portion of the test score gap are 
identified (hours of child work, parental education and socioeconomic status of the 
household). The chapter also presents some policies that could be implemented to 
increase the human capital accumulation process of the vast majority of the Ethiopian 
population that lives in rural areas.  
The last chapter of this dissertation is quite different from the first two, although it 
continues to examine social sector policies in developing countries.  More specifically, it 
explores the impact of gaining access to health insurance on different types on 
investments in Mexico. The program studied in Chapter 4 is Seguro Popular, a large 
subsidized health insurance program that currently covers more than 55 million persons. 
The study focuses on the impact of this program on human capital investment decisions. 
The chapter develops a model of consumption under uncertainty that is used to interpret 
the empirical results. It distinguishes between household expenditures that are liquid 
investments, which are useful for insurance purposes, and other, less liquid investments. 
The main hypothesis of the paper is that, upon obtaining access to public health 
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insurance, households will adjust their investment decisions. This analysis was performed 
using data from Mexico’s ENIGH household survey from 2008 to 2012 and suggests that 
there is a statistically significant increase in the allocation of savings to illiquid, high 
return investments, relative to liquid, low return investments for households that gained 
access to Seguro Popular compared to uninsured Mexican households.  
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Chapter 2 
Child Work and Academic Achievement: 
Evidence from Young Lives in Ethiopia 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Returns on human capital investments can take time to realize, so most human capital 
investments are made in the first stages of life. Schooling is crucial for human capital 
formation, and it is a human capital investment which mainly happens during childhood. 
As children grow, additional activities, such as work, start to gain importance in 
children’s time allocation decisions. Spending a considerable amount of time doing such 
activities that are not related to schooling might have effects on children’s learning 
processes (both negative or positive), with potential effects on their human capital 
accumulation. This Chapter studies the effect of child work on academic achievement in 
the context of Ethiopia. 
 Child work has been in the national and international agenda as a social issue for 
centuries. Bourdillon et al. (2010, chapter 3) summarize the history of regulation in child 
labor. The first labor laws that attempted to protect child workers were created in Britain: 
Act for the Better Regulation of Chimney Sweeper and their Apprentices (1788), Factory 
Health and Moral Act (1802),1 Cotton Mill and Factories Act (1819) and the Factory Act 
(1833). Regulations have been incorporated in many other countries since the nineteenth 
                                                            
1 For children working in textile mills. 
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century. In addition, international organizations, such as the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), have played a role mainly on minimum age conventions starting 
with industrial employment in 1929, and continuing with the 1973 Minimum Age 
Convention 138 and the 1999 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182.  
 Bourdillon et al. (2010), in a recent seminal book, explain the importance of 
understanding child work holistically. While the work that children do is often seen as 
detrimental to their welfare, it may or may not interfere with school and schoolwork; it 
could be complementary in some cases, or it could provide the means to afford schooling. 
Some work activities could provide a different set of skills that prepare children for the 
economic environment in which they live. Therefore, child work can affect children’s 
learning in both positive and negative ways.  
 The relationship between child work and schooling outcomes has been broadly 
studied by economists.2 But this research can be divided into two categories: one that 
analyses time in school (enrolment, attendance, dropouts) and another one that analyses 
learning (school attainment, test scores). Although these measures capture an important 
aspect of children’s development, they are somewhat limited. Other disciplines analyze 
complementary dimensions of child development, such as the psychological, physical and 
social.  
Research related to time in school provides evidence that children who perform 
working activities are less likely to attend school (Ray and Lancaster, 2003; Ravallion 
and Wodon, 2000). But social programs, such as the conditional cash transfers in 
developing countries, have aimed to keep children in school and increase enrollment 
rates. Saavedra and Garcia (2012), found that these programs were more effective for 
secondary than primary enrollment rates.  
                                                            
2 Edmonds (2007) provides a comprehensive review of the child work literature.  
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 On the other hand, studies analyzing the effects of child labor on school 
attainment have concluded that working children complete fewer years of schooling or 
have lower schooling for age (Ray, 2002; Psacharopoulos, 1997; Khanam and Ross, 
2008). Some authors have explored the relationship between child labor and school 
performance in Africa (as measured by test scores3); they conclude that children engaged 
in market activities4 perform worse in school (Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos, 1999; 
Heady, 2003), while studies of Latin America provide mixed evidence. On one hand, 
Gunnarsson, Orazem, and Sánchez (2006) show that child labor lowers test scores, yet 
other studies find little or no effect (Binder and Scrogin, 1999; Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos, 1997).  
Child work and school attendance are jointly determined outcomes of an 
individual's time allocation within the household: this implies that estimation of the effect 
of child work on schooling outcomes may suffer from simultaneity bias. Several studies 
have acknowledged this endogeneity problem, others have not addressed this issue. 
Endogeneity could make estimation of the impact of child work on academic 
achievement challenging; endogeneity could be a result of simultaneity bias or 
measurement error. 
Simultaneity in the context of this paper can come from omitted variables (which 
will be absorbed by the error term) or from endogeneity, the latter of which can be 
illustrated with an example. On the one hand, a child that works in his/her parents’ 
business could gain numeracy skills that might increase his/her math test scores. In 
contrast, the household might decide that a child who performs poorly at school should 
allocate more time to household farm work rather than studying or attending school 
because the expected future returns on the child’s human capital are low. Instrumental 
                                                            
3 From the economics perspective, in the context of developing countries, analyzing test scores could 
provide information on later human capital outcomes. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) showed that 
cognitive skills explain better than school attainment the impact of schooling on individual earnings, the 
distribution of income, and economic growth.  
4 These activities include farm activities and paid work, but do not include domestic work. 
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variables estimation has been the most commonly used empirical method to overcome 
endogeneity in the form of simultaneity (Orazem and Gunnarsson, 2004). Edmonds 
(2007) concludes that when instrumental variables are not used, the effect of child work 
on the education outcome will be underestimated. 
Another source of bias comes from measurement error. In the context of this 
paper, it can come from measurement error of the right-hand side variables. The key 
variable in this Chapter is reported hours performing different types of child work. The 
data used for the empirical results uses hours of child work reported by an adult in the 
household. This measure is available for all children included in the sample, and it is the 
most comparable variable measured in the dataset. For the oldest children in the 
household, self-reported data on hours of child work is available, thus, Appendix 1 
reports an alternative model specification using the self-reported data as the dependent 
variables. This allows one to verify if the coefficients of interest behave differently when 
using a different respondent for the same question.  
Very few studies have examined the relationship between child work and 
academic achievement in Ethiopia. The few that have used data from the 1990s. The few 
studies that do exist do not analyze the impact of child work on academic achievement in 
the context of a production function for learning, or how child work affects the quantity 
of schooling that children obtain. Instead they study the determinants of child work and 
its relationship with current school attendance. For example, Alvi and Dendir (2011) 
show that the oldest child in the household has a larger probability of simultaneously 
attending school and participating in market work; with a larger probability for boys 
residing in urban areas. They also show that domestic work is mainly performed by girls. 
Haile and Haile (2012) study the determinants of work participation and school 
attendance of rural children aged 7 to 15; they find that the educational attainment 
(measured as grade for age) of working children decreases when they work long hours. 
Cockburn and Dostie (2007) analyze the relationship between asset accumulation, child 
work, and schooling; they find that household composition and a household’s asset 
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profile are crucial determinants of the demand for child labor and conclude that 
households might be encouraged to withdraw their children from school when 
participating in asset accumulation-based poverty alleviation policies, such as a program 
that promote ownership of farm tools or adoption of perennial crops. Only one study 
includes test scores in the analysis: Cockburn (2002) shows that work activities do not 
prevent children from attending school, but the correlation between test scores and 
multiple work activities and weekend work hours is negative.  
These studies on child work and schooling in Ethiopia provide evidence of a 
negative correlation between hours of work and education outcomes, but none of them 
addressed endogeneity and thus they are unlikely to estimate the causal effect of child 
work on test scores. This Chapter contributes in three distinct ways to the existing 
literature on understanding the dynamics of the relationship between child work and 
learning in the Ethiopian context. First, it uses a more recent dataset. Second, it examines 
the causal effects of child work on academic achievement by considering the potential for 
reverse causality, which has rarely been addressed in previous studies. It also includes 
tests score data for children that are not enrolled in school. Finally, it differentiates the 
effects of performing two different types of work (domestic work and market work) on 
learning (as measured by test scores). 
This Chapter uses the term child work instead of child labor. The term child labor 
is usually associated with types of work that are harmful for children. But in this Chapter, 
I consider a broader range of work activities: i) paid work outside the household; ii) 
unpaid labor force work for the household; iii) domestic chores; and iv) time spent caring 
for other household members. Human capital formation is measured through vocabulary 
and mathematics test scores, which capture literacy and numeracy skills, which is just 
one aspect of children’s development. 
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2.2 Child Work and Education in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia has ratified the United Nations convention on the Rights of the Child, has signed 
the ILO convention on required minimum working age (Minimum Age Convention, 
1973, No. 138), and has prohibited employing persons under 14 years of age 
(Proclamation No 42/1993, Chapter II, Section 89, (2)), but child work is still widespread 
in the country and has been a topic of interest in the national policy agenda. 
Since 1993, Ethiopia has been implementing a series of educational reforms in 
order to provide better access to education, which include: i) Proclamation 41, in 1993; ii) 
the Education and Training Policy and the Education Sector Strategy adopted in 1994; iii) 
the Teacher’s Career Structure was established in 1995 (Unesco, 2006). The Constitution 
was amended in 1995 to state that education should be provided without religious, 
political and cultural considerations, and that the state has the obligation to allocate 
resources to provide educational services. Primary school enrollment rates have increase 
dramatically since these reforms were implemented, but access to higher levels of 
education, the quality of education, and gender and urban-rural education gaps are still a 
serious problem. This section describes in more detail the most recent trends for child 
work and some education indicators in Ethiopia. 
2.2.1 Child Work 
This Chapter uses two different measures of child work: market work (which 
combines paid work outside the household with unpaid labor force work for the 
household) and domestic work (which includes domestic chores and time spent caring for 
other household members). 
The most comprehensive survey of child work in Ethiopia, the Child Labor 
Survey, was carried out by the Central Statistical Authority of Ethiopia (CSA) in 2001.5 
                                                            
5 The 2001 is the only national child labor survey that has been carried out in Ethiopia. The survey was 
funded by the International Labor Organization and the Government of Ethiopia. 
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The survey showed that 85 percent of the country's children aged 5 to 17 performed 
market or domestic (housekeeping) activities during the reference week. Boys were more 
likely to participate in market activities, while domestic activities were mainly performed 
by girls (CSA, 2002). 
The report showed that most children started working at a very early age: 39.1 
percent of the children started at or by the time they had reached 5 years of age and 
another 43.3 percent started between the ages of 6 and 7 years old (CSA, 2002).6 
Children participating in market activities were mainly unpaid family workers engaged in 
agriculture, which in the context of Proclamation No. 42/1993 is legal. More than one 
third of children aged 5 to 17 participating in market activities worked for 40 or more 
hours per week. They spent, on average, 32.8 hours a week in productive activities. In 
addition, the report shows that 77 percent of the children who were engaged in domestic 
activities spent more than 3 hours per day on these tasks. Girls spent more hours working 
on domestic activities than boys.  
Using the 2013 (Round 4) data from the Young Lives study,7 it is clear that 
Ethiopian children are still actively engaged in both market and domestic work activities, 
Figures 2.1a-c show the average number of hours worked in a typical day (including 
children that reported zero hours on any of these activities), first for all children living in 
households that were surveyed by the Young Lives study and then separately for boys 
and girls. On average, children aged 5 years old worked at least one hour per day. The 
number of hours worked per day rapidly increases for children between 5 to 8 years old, 
and stabilizes at around 4 hours of work per day when children reached 10 years of age. 
Consistent with the data from the 2001 Child Labor Survey, Figures 2.1b and 2.1c show 
that girls spend most of their working time on domestic chores, while boys spend most of 
their time on market work. At the time of the ILO survey, Ethiopian schools functioned 
                                                            
6 The survey asked whether the child started to work when he/she was “5 or less years”, so it is not possible 
to know how many children started to work at exactly age 5. 
7 The Young Lives data will be described in detail in section 2.3. 
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in 4-hour shifts (morning and afternoon groups of students), but in 2005 the government 
implemented a reform to lengthen the school day to 6 hours.  
2.2.2 Education 
In 1994, Ethiopia adopted a new Education and Training Policy, which introduced 
free primary education.8 Ethiopia’s commitment to expand access to education is 
reflected by the increase in public expenditure on education as a percent of GDP, which 
almost doubled in 10 years from 2.4 percent of the GDP in 1993 to 4.5 percent in 2013. 
During these decades, the school aged population almost doubled, while the economy 
was growing at a faster rate (real GDP tripled during the same period). 
Public expenditure on education represented 10.8 percent of total government 
expenditures in 1993 and 27 percent in 2013. This expenditure focused on primary 
schooling (75.8 percent in 2010). Some of the most recent policies include: increasing the 
number of primary schools from 6,958 in 2000 to 32,048 in 2013 (as a result of the 
government’s effort to provide all children a primary school option within walking 
distance from their homes), providing instruction in each student’s mother tongue (23 
languages), and increasing the minimum qualifications to become a primary school 
teacher (Unesco, 2015).  
Ethiopia's primary school enrollment rate is currently high. In 2013, according to 
UNESCO (2015), the gross primary school enrollment rate was 101.3 percent and varied 
widely by region, ranging from 74.4 percent in Afar to 154.6 in Addis Ababa.9. The gross 
primary enrollment rate for boys was slightly higher than that for girls (104.8 percent vs. 
                                                            
8 Compulsory schooling in Ethiopia lasts for 8 years (from 7 to 14 years old) and comprises two cycles of 
primary education: 1st cycle (grades 1 to 4) and 2nd cycle (grades 5 to 8). 
9 This paper uses data from five regions of the country, while the UNESCO report presents data for 11 
regions. The gross primary enrollment rates from the regions included in this paper are: Addis Ababa 
(154.6 percent), Amhara (106.7 percent), SSNPR (102 percent), Oromia (91.2 percent), and Tigray (106.2 
percent). 
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97.8 percent). Historically, the gross secondary enrollment rate has been much lower, but 
it also increased from 10.5 percent in 1995 to 39.3 percent in 2013.10 
In addition to low enrollment rates in higher grades, there are still disparities in 
educational attainment between girls and boys. Although the difference in the primary 
completion rate by gender has decreased, in 2014 there was still a small gap: 53.3 percent 
for girls and 54.0 percent for boys.11 This education gender gap is much larger for older 
generations: in 2015, the youth literacy rate (ages 15-24) was 67.8 percent for young 
women and 71.1 percent of young men, while for adults 25 years or older the literacy rate 
was approximately 26.4 percent for women and 33.3 percent for men.12 
A final problem is that, despite the government’s efforts to improve education 
outcomes, the quality of education remains one of the main challenges in Ethiopia; the 
pupil-teacher ratio is 64.3 for primary education, and the percentage of trained teachers in 
primary education is low (56.8 percent in 2012), which are likely due to the rapid 
expansion of coverage of the primary level. A further sign of a reduction in education 
quality is that the National Learning Assessment (NLA) test scores fell from 2000 to 
2008, and more than half of the grade 12 students (secondary education seniors) did not 
attain basic competencies (Joshi, 2012). Therefore, for upcoming generations, school 
enrollment does not seem to be the biggest challenge, but given the recent trends, school 
quality remains a challenge that has serious consequences for learning.  
 
 
                                                            
10 Secondary education is composed of two cycles: general secondary education (grades 9-10) and 
preparatory classes (grades 11-12). At the end of grade 10, students take the Ethiopian General Secondary 
Education Certificate Examination in order to select students to continue on to the preparatory classes or to 
technical and vocational education (UNESCO, 2015). 
11 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
12 http://www.uis.unesco.org/das/Country/Literacy?code=ETH&regioncode=null&SPSlanguage=EN 
Retrieved in January 8, 2016. 
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2.3 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy 
 
This section presents the theoretical framework followed by this Chapter, which serves as 
a reference to the empirical strategy used to estimate the impact of child work on 
academic achievement.  
2.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Academic achievement is assumed to be the result of a human capital production 
function, so it reflects how much a child learns and not only attendance or enrollment. I 
follow a model developed by Orazem and Gunnarson (2004) that shows the relationship 
between a child’s time allocation and education outcomes. 
Some children transition from school to the labor market only after they become 
adults, but most children go through a transition period during which they devote time to 
both school and work (performing different chores as children or teenagers). Orazem and 
Gunnarsson (2004) modelled a child’s time allocation decision using a three-period 
model. The key assumptions of the model are: i) returns to years of schooling are 
positive, but are a decreasing function of the number of years of schooling; and ii) 
households decide how to allocate their child’s time between labor (L) and school 
attendance (A) to maximize the present value of the child’s lifetime earnings. The first 
assumption seems reasonable for the case of Ethiopia, in fact, Montenegro and Patrinos 
(2014) showed that Ethiopia is one of the countries with the highest returns to schooling 
in the world, especially for women. The second assumption need to be considered with 
caution; it assumes that households are altruistic and that even if the future is unknown 
for them, they are considering it when making time allocation decisions. Chuta (2017), in 
a recent study of young married women in Ethiopia, shows that the intra-household 
dynamics varied by area of residence (urban-rural) and by whether these women were 
living in their parents’ house or with their husband. Urban women have more bargaining 
power in relation to education, work and education decisions when living with their 
parents; in the case of rural women, parents are the main decision makers, and sometimes 
 
14 
 
they do not consider the women’s best interests when making decisions regarding 
education or work. Rural women also have less bargaining power than urban women 
when married; decisions regarding education and work are mainly made by their 
husbands. Taking into account Chuta’s (2017) findings, it is likely that Orazem and 
Gunnarson’s second assumption does not hold, especially for girls. In the case of 
Ethiopia parents might not maximize the present value of their child’s lifetime earnings; 
parents might give a larger weight to the present and not maximize the lifetime earnings 
of each member of the household, but the overall household present welfare. 
Orazem and Gunnarson’s model includes two additional assumptions: households 
do not face any constraints to borrowing against future returns of schooling, and leisure 
time is ignored. Since 1994, public education is tuition fee-free in Ethiopia. 13 Recent data 
from the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household survey shows that 
more than 50 percent of the households spend less than 100 Birr on annual primary 
school expenses (CSA and World Bank, 2017).14 Except for Addis Ababa, more than 90 
percent on households spend less than 500 Birr on primary school expenses per year. In 
the case of secondary school education, school expenses are higher; the LSMS data show 
that more than 90 percent of the households spent more than 150 Birr on secondary 
school expenses per enrolled child in the academic year preceding the survey. Therefore, 
although returns for school are high in the country, households may face borrowing 
constraints to make investments in secondary and tertiary education, as fees increase for 
higher levels of education. 
In the model, the time constraint for each period is given by: ܣ ൅ ܮ ൌ 1. During 
childhood (period 1), the child spends all his or her time in school: ܣ ൌ 1. Period 2 is the 
                                                            
13 A consequence of the educational reform in Ethiopia in the 1990s, Proclamation No. 41 of 1993 and the 
Education Training Policy of 1994, is that education from grades 1 to 10 would be fee-free (Chicoine, 
2016). 
14 One hundred Birr represent about 1 percent of Ethiopia’s per capita income. 
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transition period in which the child divides her time between attending school and 
working: 0 ൏ ܣ ൏ 1. Finally, in period 3, adulthood, the child works full time: ܣ ൌ 0.15  
The model is solved by considering the wage that the child can claim in periods 2 
and 3, as a function of the total marketable skills accumulated (H), and the interest rate r. 
If the present value of the wage differential attributable to schooling exceeds the marginal 
cost of the child’s time in school, the child will attend school. In this model, human 
capital accumulation (H) depends on years spent attending school, following the work of 
Mincer. Recent research has shown that cognitive skills explain better than school 
attainment the impact of schooling on individual earnings (Hanushek and Woessmann, 
2008), especially in the context of a developing country. Thus, the human capital 
production function should include a measure of academic achievement, instead of a 
measure of school attendance. The structural relationship between child work and human 
capital is defined by the following production function:  
ܪ௜௝ ൌ ܪሺܮ௜௝, ௜ܺ௝, ௝ܼ , ܪ଴௜௝ሻ     (2.1) 
where Hij stands for a measure of academic achievement of child i in household j, child 
work (defined below) is captured by Lij; Xij is the child’s characteristics, Zj includes 
attributes of the parents and household, and Hoij is the past accumulation of human 
capital. The goal of this Chapter is to estimate the effect of child work (Lij) on different 
measures of academic achievement.  
This paper extends the framework presented in this section by making a clear 
distinction between the effect on school achievement of two types of child work: 
domestic work and market work. Thus, child work (L) is determined by the time spent on 
domestic activities and market work: L = Dom + Mkt. 
                                                            
15 As mentioned in section 2.2.1, most children start working at young ages, even before going to school. 
Almost 40 percent of children started to work before they were 5 years old. Therefore, for the case of 
Ethiopia, period 1 of the model might not exist, the time constraint should start with period 2. 
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2.3.2 Effects of Child Work on Test Scores 
Equation (2.2) shows a linear specification of equation (2.1). In this specification, 
the dependent variable is a test score 
ܪ௜ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯ݇ݐ௜ ൅ ߚଶܦ݋݉௜ ൅ ∑ ߩ௞ܺ௞௜௡௞ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௟ܼ௟௜௡௟ୀଵ ൅ ߠܪ଴௜ ൅ ߬஼ ൅ ߝ௜ (2.2) 
Test scores are a function of the daily hours allocated to market (Mkt) and domestic 
(Dom) work on a “typical” day,16 a vector of child characteristics X (gender and age in 
months), a vector of parent/caregiver and household characteristics Z (whether a parent is 
the primary caregiver, educational attainment, absence of one or both parents, household 
size and composition, wealth quintile, and geographic location), and the child’s past 
accumulation of human capital (H0i). The variable τC allows for community-specific 
fixed effects and εI is an error term. Community-specific fixed effects represent the 
unobserved differences among communities that influence education, such as school and 
teacher quality. Equation (2) includes all the variables of the production function, thus the 
error term represents measurement error of the dependent or control variables, or omitted 
variables in the production function.  
The coefficients of interest are ߚଵ and ߚଶ, which capture the effects of an increase 
in the number of hours devoted to market or domestic work on academic performance. 
The sign of the coefficients is uncertain, when taking into consideration the existing 
literature. But one might expect that, given the differences in the type of activities 
performed by boys and girls and the time allocated to each of them, the coefficients for 
each type of child work will be different between boys and girls and those coefficients 
could also vary with age. Therefore, equation (2) will be estimated separately for boys 
and girls.  
                                                            
16 The Young Lives data defines a typical day as follows: “Typical day: typical means ‘usual’, so it does 
not include something the child does irregularly, for example during festivals. Therefore, a typical day is a 
day from Monday to Friday, excluding holidays, festivals, days of rest during the weekend, etc.” Extract 
taken from the Fieldworker Manual, Ethiopia, Round 4, pg. 34. 
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2.3.3 Effects of Child Work on School Performance using 2SLS 
The household’s decision on the allocation of a child’s time to different types of 
work could be influenced by the parents’ observation of the child’s performance in 
school. For example, a child performing poorly in school might have his/her hours of 
house work or work on the family business increased because of the parents’ perception 
that the skills gained by performing these types of activities might yield higher returns in 
the future than those that come from schooling. Therefore, there is potential for reverse 
causality in the estimation of child work on schooling outcomes, which implies that OLS 
estimates of equation (2.2) may yield biased estimates. Endogeneity has been widely 
recognized in the child work literature, but not necessarily incorporated in the empirical 
analysis, mainly because of lack of valid instruments in most data sets. Previous analyses 
of the relationship between child work and schooling outcomes have used instrumental 
variables estimation to overcome endogeneity. Orazem and Gunnarsson (2004) provided 
examples of instruments that have been traditionally used: child wages and legal 
variation.17 Additionally, they pointed out that when correcting for endogeneity of child 
work using instrumental variables, the estimated impact of child work on test scores 
usually might become more negative. Gunnarsson (2003) found larger child labor effects 
on test scores for 3rd and 4th graders in 10 countries of Latin America, Bezerra et al 
(2009) estimates on test scores for secondary school Brazilian children are larger after 
controlling for endogeneity, and Beegle et al. (2008) found larger effects of hours of 
work on schooling years after instrumenting child labor for children in a longitudinal data 
set in Tanzania.  
Finding a valid instrument is the main challenge for an instrumental variables 
approach. As discussed above, daily hours allocated to market and domestic work are 
endogenous variables in equation (2.2), the equation for academic achievement. Thus, the 
time allocation decision is modeled using a first stage equation. The first stage has the 
                                                            
17 Legal variation includes differences in school starting age, preschool programs in the country, as well as 
the capacity to enforce laws on child labor in the country. (Orazem and Gunnarsson, 2004, pp. 19) 
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same equation for both market and domestic work. I propose to instrument the time 
allocation decisions for the child with a set of variables included in a vector of sibling 
composition variables (ܾ݈ܵ݅݅݊݃ܥ݋݉݌ሻ, a vector of household shocks (ܪ݄݈݄݀ܵ݋ܿ݇ݏ), and 
a vector of environmental shocks (ܧ݊ݒ݄ܵܿ݋ܿ݇ݏ). These instruments will be discussed in 
detail in subsection 2.4.2.  
ܪݎݏܹ݇௜௖௥ௌ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅෍ ߝ௟ܾ݈ܵ݅݅݊݃ܥ݋݉݌௟௜௖௥
௡
௟ୀଵ
൅෍ ߮௟ܪ݄݈݄݀ܵ݋ܿ݇ݏ௟௜௖௥
௡
௟ୀଵ
 
൅∑ ߤ௟ܧ݊ݒ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇ݏ௟௜௖௥௡௟ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߩଵ ௟ܺ௜௖௥௡௟ୀଵ ∑ ߛ௟ܼ௟௜௡௟ୀଵ ൅ ߬௖ ൅ ߝ௜௖௥, ݏ א ሼܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ, ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿሽ 
(2.3) 
The dependent variable, HrsWkicr, indicates the daily hours allocated on a typical day to 
market or domestic (separately) work by child i, who resides in community C, in round r.  
The variables included in the set of sibling composition instruments are proportions of 
older sisters, older brothers, younger sisters, and younger brothers, relative to the total 
number of siblings. It is expected that the way these instruments affect domestic and 
market work will differ by the child’s age and gender. Emerson and Souza (2002) show 
that, in Brazil, earlier-born boys and girls with younger siblings are more likely to work 
in the labor market (and family farm). This might be explained by the fact that when 
families cannot afford to send their oldest son/daughter to school, those children start to 
work. So, when families have more resources, they could start sending their youngest 
children to school. Edmonds (2006) shows that in Nepal, having a larger number of older 
sisters decreases the probability of domestic work for younger boys and girls. Other 
authors have shown that girls spend more hours on domestic work when there is a larger 
number of younger siblings (Edmonds, 2006; Parish and Willis, 1993).  
The first set of shocks includes household shocks that could affect the household 
labor supply such as illness or death of a household member, or a new member of the 
household. These shocks could affect the time allocation of the children in different 
ways. On one hand, if a household member gets ill, the number of hours of domestic 
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work of other household members might increase (hours spent taking care of other 
household members).18 Moreover, the effect could vary by gender and age of the child; 
girls are most likely to take over activities that are traditionally performed by women 
(cooking, cleaning), while boys are most likely to take over family farms or businesses. 
The second set of shocks include the following environmental shocks faced by the 
household in the past 4 years: drought, flood, frost, and death of livestock. The 
relationship between these types of shocks and child work relies on the fact that one of 
the dimensions of child work is that it can serve as a self-insurance strategy of the 
household. Kochar (1999) and Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find that hours of market 
work increase when households in India face crop shocks. When households face these 
types of shocks, and they are credit constrained, it is difficult to borrow to mitigate the 
effect of the shock, but households can reallocate the time of their children to maintain 
the production levels in the farm or business affected by the shock. 
Similar to equation (2.2), the first stage regression includes a vector of child 
characteristics X and a vector of parent and household characteristics Z, but the 
coefficients are different to those in equation (2.2). 
The relevance assumption of the instruments is tested in section 2.5 by analyzing 
the first stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification. F-statistics of the first 
stage serve as a test for weak instruments, and the Hansen J-statistic is reported as an 
overidentification test of the exclusive restriction on the instruments.  
                                                            
18 There is a direct effect that could happen if the person who dies or gets ill helps the child with his/her 
homework. Data on who helps the Young Lives child with homework is available for Round 4; it shows 
that children mainly rely on their older siblings (36 percent) if they need help with homework; followed by 
nobody (34 percent), father (10 percent), other family members (8.5 percent) and mother (5.3 percent). 
Thus, any bias in the IV estimates due to this direct effect is likely to be minor. 
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2.4 Data 
2.4.1 The Young Lives Study in Ethiopia 
This Chapter uses data from the Young Lives study,19 a research program at Oxford 
University that studies childhood poverty in four developing countries.20 The Young 
Lives study has implemented surveys of 12,000 children, their households, and their 
communities over a span of eleven years. Currently, four rounds of the survey data are 
available for Ethiopia (2002, 2006, 2009, and 2012). In each round, two cohorts were 
surveyed: children born in 2000/01 (the “younger cohort”) and children born in 1994/95 
(the “older cohort”). There are approximately 3,000 observations per country for each 
round: about 2,000 for the younger cohort and about 1,000 for the older cohort. 
Data on time use for the Young Lives children and other children aged 5 to 17 in 
the household have been collected since the second round of the survey, thus this Chapter 
uses data from Round 2 (2006), Round 3 (2009), and Round 4 (2013). More specifically, 
this analysis uses the time use data from Rounds 3 and 4 for the younger cohort and from 
Rounds 2 and 3 for the older cohort. These children were surveyed when they were 8 
years old (younger cohort, Round 3), 12 years old (younger cohort, Round 4 and older 
cohort, Round 2), and 15 years old (older cohort, Round 3). In Round 4, children from the 
older cohort were around 18 years old, as this study focuses on child work, they are 
excluded from the analysis. See Table 2.1, which summarizes the survey rounds and 
children included in this analysis. 
The Young Lives study surveys children residing in five (out of nine) regions of 
Ethiopia: Addis Ababa; Amhara; Oromia; Tigray; and the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities, and People's Region (SSNP). 21 This is shown in Figure 2.2. When 
                                                            
19 http://www.younglives.org.uk/ 
20 Young Lives has similar data for India (state of Andhra Pradesh), Peru, and Vietnam; therefore, the 
analysis could be replicated for these countries. 
21 Some of the children interviewed in Round 4 had migrated to other regions of the country, as shown in 
Table 2.1b, they represent less than 1 percent of the sample. 
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surveying children in these regions, Young Lives intentionally oversampled the poor 
population in order to build a “comprehensive picture of what poverty means for children 
in Ethiopia today.”22 
The Young Lives questionnaire includes different sections to be answered by the 
children and adults in the household. The child-level section includes demographic and 
educational variables of the child and his/her parents, test scores, and information on 
different types of activities, such as school, market work, and domestic work. The 
household section, answered by the caregiver or one of the adults present in the 
household, includes variables on household composition, dwelling infrastructure, and 
expenditure on different items, such as education. Very importantly for the purposes of 
this paper, the Young Lives data also include time use data for all children aged 5 to 17 
residing in the household (as reported by the caregiver or one of the adults in the 
household).  
For the younger cohort's empirical analysis, 1,875 children were interviewed in 
Round 4. Of those 1,875 children, 396 did not complete the vocabulary test (Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test, or PPVT) and 185 additional children did not complete the 
Mathematics test in Round 3 or 4. In addition, 86 children were dropped from the sample 
because of missing data on the control variables. Thus, the total number of children 
included in the younger cohort analysis is 1,208.23 There is potential selection bias, due to 
the fact that a large percentage of children whose first language is one of the language 
minorities did not complete the vocabulary test (see Table 2.2). For example, in Round 4, 
more than 97% of the children whose first language is Hadiyigna or Sidamigna did not 
complete the PPVT test.  
                                                            
22 http://www.younglives-ethiopia.org/ 
23 For Round 3, 165 children did not complete the PPVT test and 211 children did not complete the 
mathematics test. For Round 4, 274 children did not complete the PPVT test and 291 children did not 
complete the mathematics test. The results for the PPVT test score use the sub-sample of children who took 
the vocabulary test (1,527 for Round 3 and 1,346 for Round 4) and the results for the Mathematics test 
score use another sub-sample of children who took the corresponding test (1,489 for Round 3 and 1,328 for 
Round 4). 
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From the 1,000 children included at the beginning of the study for the older 
cohort, 29 children were not interviewed in Rounds 2 and 3. Of the remaining 971 
children in Round 3, 51 children did not take the Mathematics Achievement Test in either 
round and 35 did not took the PPVT test in either round.  Finally, 103 children were 
dropped from the sample because of missing data on the control variables. Thus, the total 
number of children included in the older cohort analysis is 782. 24 Tables 2.3a-d report the 
summary statistics for the final samples by survey round, cohort, and child work category 
(domestic and market work). Columns 1 and 2 report the means and standard deviations 
of the all variables included in the analysis. For the purposes of the descriptive analysis, 
additional columns are reported on Tables 2.3a-d to show differences in the variables of 
interest between the whole sample and children who worked more than three hours per 
day or per each type of work. The statistical analysis is not restricted to these children. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the means and standard deviations for children working more than 
three hours per day.25 Summary statistics for children engaged in market work for at least 
three hours per day are reported in columns 5 and 6,26 and columns 7 and 8 show the 
means and standard deviations of the variables for children working more than three 
hours on domestic activities.27 
 
                                                            
24 For Round 2, 26 children did not complete the PPVT test and 31 children did not complete the 
mathematics test. For Round 3, 10 children did not complete the PPVT test and 35 children did not 
complete the mathematics test. The results for the PPVT test score use the sub-sample of children who took 
the vocabulary test (826 for Round 3) and the results for the mathematics test score use another sub-sample 
of children who took the mathematics test (810 for Round 3). 
25 Which represent 60.3 percent of children aged 8 years, 69.4 percent of children aged 12 years of the 
younger cohort, 75.1 percent of children aged 12 years of the older cohort, and 82.5 percent of children 
aged 15 years. 
26 Which represent 27.5 percent of children aged 8 years, 31.7 percent of children aged 12 years of the 
younger cohort, 27 percent of children aged 12 years of the older cohort, and 28.3 percent of children aged 
15 years. 
27 Which represent 34.8 percent of children aged 8 years, 38.5 percent of children aged 12 years of the 
younger cohort, 49.1 percent of children aged 12 years of the older cohort, and 60.4 percent of children 
aged 15 years. 
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2.4.1.1 Schooling Outcomes 
 
Test scores are the academic achievement measure used in this analysis. More 
specifically, the analysis focuses on two of the cognitive tests administered as part of the 
Young Lives survey: the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) and the Mathematics 
Achievement Test. This section describes the raw test scores; however, test scores were 
standardized for the statistical analysis; therefore, the estimated impacts of child work on 
academic achievement from the statistical analysis are measured in terms of the standard 
deviations of the test score variable. 
The PPVT is a vocabulary test which was administered in all rounds to children in 
both cohorts. The test consists of selecting a picture that best represents the meaning of a 
word presented orally by the examiner. For Rounds 2 and 3 it included 204 words and for 
each correct answer the child received one point (Cueto and Leon, 2012). For the younger 
cohort in Round 3, the average test score was 84.9; for the older cohort, in Round 2 the 
average score was 77 and for Round 3, the average score was 152. For Round 4, the 
PPVT test that was administered to the younger cohort included only 55 words, and the 
average score was 39.3. In Ethiopia, this test could be taken in fifteen different languages.  
The format of the Mathematics Achievement Test for the younger cohort in 
Round 3 included 29 items, divided into two sections. The first section included nine 
questions on basic quantitative and number notions, while the second section of 20 
questions measured the ability to perform basic mathematics operations with numbers 
(see Cueto and Leon, 2012, for further details) The average test score for this cohort in 
Round 3 round was 7.4. The format of the test was similar in Round 4 but included 28 
items divided into a first section that was comprised of 19 items dealing with addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, division, and square roots; the second section included 9 
items on mathematics problem solving. The average test score for the younger cohort in 
Round 4 was 10.8. Columns 3, 5 and 7 of Tables 2.3a and 2.3b show that children who 
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worked more than 3 hours per day had much lower average mathematics test scores, but 
recall that this cannot be interpreted as a causal impact.  
The format of the Mathematics Achievement Test for the older cohort differed 
from Round 2 to Round 3. In Round 2, the test consisted of 10 items evaluating topics of 
number and number sense (Cueto, Leon, and Munoz, 2009). The average test score for 
this round was 5. In Round 3, the test consisted of 30 items divided into two sections. The 
first section was comprised of 20 items dealing with addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
division, and square roots; the second section included 10 items on mathematics problem 
solving. (Cueto and Leon, 2012). 28 The average test score was 5.9. 
2.4.1.2 Child Work 
 
This Chapter uses direct measures of child work, distinguishing between market 
and domestic work. As mentioned before, most of the previous studies analyzing the 
relationship between child work and test scores have used market labor as the child work 
measure. Assad, Levison, and Zibani (2010) showed that lower school attendance of girls 
in Egypt is associated with the intensity of domestic work; thus, incorporating domestic 
work into the analysis of school performance could unmask some aspects of child work 
that were not captured in most previous studies.  
In the Young Lives study, data on child work are reported in hours of work on a 
“typical” day for four different categories of work: i) paid work outside the household; ii) 
unpaid labor force work for the household (work on family farm, cattle herding, 
shepherding or other family business); iii) domestic chores (fetching water, firewood, 
cleaning, cooking, washing or shopping); and iv) time spent caring for other household 
members (younger siblings, elderly or ill household members).  
                                                            
28 The last 10 questions of the Mathematics Achievement Test for the older cohort in Round 3 were 
multiple choice. 
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For the purposes of this analysis, child work is measured by two variables: market 
work (paid work outside the household and unpaid labor force work for the household) 
and domestic work (domestic chores and time spent caring for other household 
members). In the case of market work, the two types of activities included in the measure 
could have completely different working conditions, Orkin (2012) provides a clear 
description of these conditions for the children in the Young Lives older cohort residing 
in rural sites. Paid work usually involved planting or harvesting, with the condition of 
finishing the day’s work to be paid or to be able to leave to attend school. In contrast, 
work in the family business had a more flexible and the task could be divided in small 
periods of time. The percentage of children reporting hours of work of paid work was less 
than 4 percent in the sample, therefore the sample size was too small to perform a 
statistical analysis of the different types market work separately. 
Hours of work on a “typical” day were reported separately by one adult present in 
the household and by the Young Lives child participant. The main results reported in this 
Chapter used hours of work reported by the adult in order to have a comparable measure 
for children of different ages (different cohorts and different rounds), but data reported by 
the child were used to account for potential measurement error, given that older children 
might have a better idea on how they spend their time.29 The measure of paid work 
outside the household might be underestimated given that the reference period was a 
typical day. As discussed by Orkin (2012), children involved in paid work usually engage 
in the activity during the weekends or school holidays.  
Tables 2.3a-d report the average hours spent working on a typical day, overall and 
conditional on doing more than 3 hours of work. For all children aged 8 years old 
(including children that did not work), 92 percent of worked at least 1 hour per day, on 
average, and they spent 3.6 hours per day working, distributed between market work (1.4 
                                                            
29 Although the answers might differ, the self-reported data is highly correlated with the data reported by an 
adult in the household. For the older cohort, Round 2, the correlation coefficient for domestic work is 0.756 
and for market work is 0.807; for the older cohort, Round 3, the correlation coefficient is 0.888 for 
domestic work and 0.928 for market work. 
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hours) and domestic work (2.2 hours). As children grow, more of them work, and they 
work for more hours. Children of the younger cohort in Round 4 (12 years) spent 3.8 
hours per day working, keeping the average hours of domestic work constant, but 
increasing their market work time to 1.6 hours. For the older cohort, Round 2 (12 years), 
97 percent of the children worked at least one hour per day, and they spent 4.1 hours per 
day working, on average, distributed between market work (1.4 hours) and domestic 
work (2.7 hours). The oldest sample in the database is comprised of the older cohort in 
Round 3, when children were 15 years old. Ninety-nine percent of them worked at least 
one hour per day and the average number of hours increased to 4.8, distributed between 
market work (1.6 hours) and domestic work (3.2 hours).  
For the purposes of the descriptive analysis, Tables 2.3a-d also report the 
variables of interest for children who spent more than three hours a day performing 
market and domestic activities. The percentage of boys engaged in market work for three 
or more hours per day ranges from 75 percent to 81 percent. In contrast, girls’ 
engagement in market work (for three or more hours per day) ranges from 19 percent to 
25 percent. The descriptive statistics in the case of domestic work show that girls are 
more engaged in this activity than boys. Girls’ participation ranges between 65 percent to 
70 percent and boys’ participation represents 30 percent to 35 percent. This reaffirms the 
fact that the activities performed by boys and girls differed; domestic work is mainly 
performed by girls and market work is performed by boys (Assad, Levison and Zibani, 
2010; Levison and Moe, 1998; Levison, Moe and Knaul 2001).  
2.4.1.3 Child and Household Characteristics 
The Young Lives data include detailed information about the child and his/her 
household and community. The empirical analysis includes, as additional controls, 
characteristics of the child (sex, age in months, and highest grade attained), 
characteristics of the child’s parents (whether the caregiver is a parent, highest level of 
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education attained by either of the parents,30 and absence of the parents in the household), 
household composition (number of household members), household classification 
according to its wealth quintile, and geographic location.  
Edmonds (2007) emphasized the importance of analyzing urban-rural differences; 
children in rural areas tend to work more often, and for longer hours. As shown in Tables 
2.3a-d, 55 percent of the younger cohort children resided in rural areas, while 59 percent 
of children of the older cohort were in rural areas. In addition, the region in which the 
child resides was included in the analysis, using Addis Ababa as the reference category. 
2.4.2 Instrumental Variables 
 
In addition to the education and child work variables, as well as other controls, a 
set of instrumental variables will be used to address the endogeneity issues discussed in 
the empirical strategy section. These instruments were selected taking into account that 
they should not belong to the academic achievement equation (equation 2), and at the 
same time they must have explanatory power regarding the hours spent on domestic 
and/or market work, (equation 3). The instruments can be grouped in the following 
categories: sibling composition, household shocks, and environmental shocks. 
The sibling composition instruments reflect the proportion of co-resident 
older/younger sisters/brothers relative to the total number of siblings present in the 
household. The survey does not include information about siblings living elsewhere. 
Although many demographers may argue that family structure is endogenous, in this case 
the instrument “sibling composition” takes into account two aspects, one is the number of 
                                                            
30 For children without data on the highest level of education attained by the parents, the information on the 
educational attainment of the caregiver was used. As shown in Tables 2.1a-d, sixteen percent of the 
children aged 8 years old had one parent absent and one percent had both parents absent from the 
household. In the case of children aged 12 years, for the younger cohort 22 percent of the children had one 
parent absent and five percent had both parents absent; for the older cohort 14 percent of the children had 
one parent absent and two percent had both parents absent from the household. Finally, 19 percent of the 
children aged 15 years old had one parent absent and two percent had both parents absent from the 
household. Only in Round 2, did the Young Lives questionnaire ask about the parental education when the 
parent is not present in the household. 
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brothers and sisters, and also the birth order of the Young Lives child. The importance of 
these variables relies on the fact that hours of domestic and market work could be 
affected by sibling composition. For example, a boy who has a large proportion of older 
sisters might be less likely to perform domestic chores, while a girl with a large 
proportion of older brothers might be less likely to take care of cattle in the fields. Table 
2.3a-d reports the average number of older sisters, younger sisters, older brothers, and 
younger brothers for the different rounds and cohorts. The data reported in Tables 2.3a-d 
show that, in general, there is a smaller number of older brothers residing in the 
household, this could be explained by the practice of Qenja. Qenja is a practice in which 
only boys aged 8 to 18 years are involved. Boys are sent to either relatives or non-
relatives to work in agricultural labor for a period of time after the child’s family and the 
foster family develop an oral or written agreement. Kassa and Abebe (2016) studied the 
practice of Qenja in northern Ethiopia (Amhara region) and concluded that this practice 
also contributes to develop farming skills that children use later in life and allows 
children to save to either attend school or to use savings as a start-up capital later on. 
The set of instruments related to household shocks includes dichotomous 
variables representing shocks faced by the household in the past 4 years that could affect 
the overall household’s labor supply: illnesses of the mother, the father, or other 
household members, death of a household member, and births/new household members.31 
As seen in the bottom of Tables 2.3a-d (instruments section), most of the household 
shocks are related household members that that do not help with the homework,32 
therefore the test scores are unlikely to be directly impacted by these shocks. But the 
absence or inability to perform activities that these household members traditionally 
perform, might result on the reassigning tasks at home, and depending on the age and 
gender this could affect girls and boys differently. Chuta (2017, pp20) provides an 
example of how a household chore might be reallocated for a Young Lives girl whose 
                                                            
31 This last shock includes birth of a household member or other people currently living in the household 
that were not living in the household in the previous round. 
32 See footnote 18. 
 
29 
 
mother was severely ill and this resulted on her dropping school and beginning to work in 
a stone crushing factory. Another way this could affect the child’s time allocation of 
work is if the child’s father gets ill: older boys might take over his duties in the field, 
while girls might have to take care of the father at home. The data reported on the 
instruments section of Tables 2.3a-d suggest that the children interviewed in Round 3 
were affected by relatively few household shocks. For the younger cohort, the 
proportions of children living in households facing household shocks increased from 
Round 3 to Round 4. In contrast, the proportion of children living in household facing 
illnesses of a household member decreased from Round 2 to Round 3 for the older 
cohort. 
The last set of instruments is the one that includes dichotomous variables 
representing environmental shocks faced by the household in the past 4 years. The 
bottom of Tables 2.3a-d reports the proportion of children facing environmental shocks. 
Environmental shocks can have an effect on the child’s labor supply because most of the 
households included in the survey depend on agriculture. These types of shocks do not 
affect test scores directly, for example, when a drought happens it does not immediately 
have an impact on academic achievement, but it is through the reallocation of hours of 
work that it might influence test scores. Chuta (2017, pp20) provides an example that 
could illustrate this for another Young Lives girl: after a drought struck her village, the 
girl had to drop out of school and started to work at a stone crushing factory, do weeding 
at a farm, and sell cactus fruit. For all ages and rounds, the most common environmental 
shock is drought (ranging from 15 to 37 percent), followed by death of livestock (ranging 
from 18 to 30 percent), and flood (ranging from 7 to 12 percent).  
2.5 Results 
The estimates of the impact of child work on academic achievement for the Young Lives 
children in Ethiopia are presented in Tables 2.4-2.7. Each table summarizes the OLS and 
instrumental variables (IV) specifications using community fixed effects. Tables “a” 
 
30 
 
summarize results for the standardized Vocabulary (PPVT) test scores and tables “b” for 
standardized Mathematics test scores. 33 Estimations using self-reported child work data 
are reported in Appendix 1.  
The tables provide estimates for each age-group of children, both overall and 
disaggregated by gender. Some additional control variables are not reported in the tables: 
some parent’s characteristics, number of household members, wealth quintile, and the 
community-specific fixed effects. The discussion will focus on the IV specifications; in 
most cases the direction of the OLS estimates is the same but, as expected, the IV 
coefficients are larger. When the direction of the OLS and IV estimator are different, this 
will be mentioned in the discussion. 
2.5.1 Results for children aged 8 years­ Younger Cohort 
Tables 2.4a-b summarize the results for children in the younger cohort who were 
8 years old at the time of the survey. In general, the results do not provide evidence of the 
direction of the effects and most of them are not significant.  
The results of the first stage regressions estimating the determinants of domestic 
and market work are summarized in Table A.1 of Appendix 1. Sibling composition (a 
larger proportion of younger sisters or brothers) is the main determinant of domestic 
work for girls, while environmental shocks, such as drought and frost, are the instruments 
that explain market work for girls. In the case of boys, having a larger proportion of 
younger brothers living in a household and having faced flood are the main determinants 
of domestic work for boys, while sibling composition (a larger proportion of younger 
sisters or brothers) and environmental shocks such as drought and death of livestock are 
key determinants of market work for boys.  
                                                            
33 Estimates for the average test score were also computed. The results do not differ from the main 
conclusion of this Chapter. The average test score measure does not provide insights of the type of skills 
that children were improving or worsening because of hours of child work, it was computed as part of the 
the statistical analysis in order to gain power to have more variance in the dependent variable. 
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The Hansen J-Statistics and the F-tests reported in the bottom of Tables 2.4a-b 
show that, in general, the instruments are not weak and that there is little evidence that 
they violate the overidentification restriction. The F-statistic for domestic and market 
work is greater than 10 in most cases, therefore the instruments are not weak. The F-
statistic for domestic work for boys ranges between 6.32 and 10.86, in which case the 
instruments for domestic work are weaker than those for market work. In addition, the p-
value for the Hansen (overidentification) test is greater than 0.10 in most cases, which 
provides evidence that the instruments are valid. For the PPVT estimations for all 
children, and the mathematics estimations for all children and boys, the results fail the 
overidentification test at the 5 percent level, although not at the 1 percent level (see p-
values for the Hansen test). 
Table 2.4a reports the effect of child work on the vocabulary (PPVT) test score. 
The evidence shows that domestic work has a negative effect on the PPVT test scores for 
all children (-0.151 standard deviations, significant at the 5 percent level), which appears 
to be driven by girls’ results (-0.144 standard deviations, significant at the 10 percent 
level). In contrast, the effects of market work are mostly small and always insignificant 
when using IVs. As hours of domestic work include taking care of smaller children, this 
could lead to slower language development for the children (mainly girls) that perform 
this chore. 
Table 2.4b summarizes the results for the case of the Mathematics test score. The 
results provide weak evidence of a negative effect of additional hours of market or 
domestic work on mathematics skills for boys (and thus for all children). This could 
reflect low numeracy levels for children in Ethiopia at a young age. Looking closely at 
the IV results, an additional hour of domestic work lowers girls’ mathematics test scores 
by 0.128 standard deviations (significant at the 10 percent level), which is a relatively 
moderate effect.  
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In all the specifications, a higher initial level of human capital and a higher 
educational level of the child and the parents translate into an increase in the child test 
scores. Also, children residing in rural areas have a lower academic performance than 
children residing in urban areas, perhaps due to lower school quality.  
2.5.2 Results for children aged 12 years – Younger Cohort 
The analysis of the impact of domestic and market work for the younger cohort 
when they were 12 years old is summarized in Tables 2.5a-b.  
Tables 2.5a-b include a series of statistics that test the validity of the instruments 
used in the analysis. In the case of boys, the results show evidence of valid and non-weak 
instruments. The p-value of the Hansen (overidentification) test is large (greater than 
0.10), which mean that the instruments are valid. The F-statistic for market work is 
greater than 10 in all cases, therefore the instruments for this type of work are not weak; 
but the F-statistic for domestic work in ranges between 4.11 and 8.19, in which case the 
instruments for domestic work are weaker than those for market work. The results for 
girls fail the overidentification test at the 5 percent level, although not at the 1 percent 
level (see p-values for the Hansen test) for the vocabulary test score estimates. The F-
statistic for market work is greater than 10, therefore the instruments for this type of work 
are not weak, but the F-statistic for domestic work ranges between 3.15 and 3.21, so that 
the instruments for domestic work are weak. 
In addition, when analyzing the first stage for hours of domestic and market work, 
(Table A.2 of Appendix 1) the results suggest that some instruments work for both boys 
and girls, while others are gender-specific. The key determinants of domestic work are 
related to sibling composition, such as the proportion of younger sisters or brothers, while 
the key determinants of market work are those related to environmental shocks faced by 
the household in the past 4 years, such as death of livestock and drought. 
When analyzing the effect on the scores for the two different tests (Tables 2.5a 
and 2.5b), the magnitude of the child work effect when using IVs becomes larger in most 
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of the cases, perhaps as a result of correcting for attenuation bias. Table 2.5a shows that 
additional hours of market work have a negative and significant effect on vocabulary test 
scores. The IV results show that the effect for girls is -0.193 standard deviations 
(significant at the 5 percent level) and for boys is -0.370 standard deviations (significant 
at the 1 percent level). The effect of domestic work on the PPVT test score has different 
signs when using OLS and IVs, is not significant at the 10 percent level in all cases, and 
relatively small. When analyzing the effects of child work on the mathematics test scores, 
most of the effects when using IVs are insignificant, except for additional hours of 
market work for boys, which have a negative effect of -0.145 standard deviations 
(significant at the 10 percent level).  
The IV results show that the negative effect of market work is larger for boys than 
for girls for both the PPVT and the Math test scores, although the differences are not 
statistically significant. In all the specifications, a higher initial level of human capital 
and a higher educational level of the parents translates into an increase in the child test 
scores. Children residing in rural areas have a lower academic performance than children 
residing in urban areas, maybe due to lower school quality. 34 
2.5.3 Results for children aged 12 years – Older Cohort 
Tables 2.6a-b summarize the results for children of the older cohort who were 12 
years old at the time of the Round 2 survey in 2006.  
Tables 2.6a-b include a series of statistics that test the validity of the instruments 
used in the analysis. The p-value of the Hansen (overidentification) test is large (greater 
than 0.10) in most cases, which means that the instruments are valid. The exception to 
                                                            
34 Young Lives has school level data available for Round 4. When analyzing the differences between urban 
and rural schools, the data show that teachers of urban schools have more experience teaching (12.3 vs 7.4 
years), more experience teaching in the grade they currently teach (6.8 vs. 3.7), and, on average have a 
higher level of education (47.4 percent): 46.5 percent of rural teachers hold a post-secondary diploma and 
0.9 percent of the rural teachers hold a university degree, compared to 64.8 of urban teachers that have a 
high level of education: 51.6 percent hold a post-secondary diploma and 13.0 percent hold a university 
degree. 
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this general rule are the results for girls for the vocabulary test score estimates; they fail 
the overidentification test at the 5 percent level but not at the 1 percent level (see p-values 
for the Hansen test). The older cohort estimations present weaker IVs than the younger 
cohort one; a possible explanation is a smaller sample size (see F-statistic values).  
Table A.3.a, in Appendix 1, shows the first stage regression results for domestic 
and market work. The results suggest that, for all children, a larger proportion of older 
brothers or sisters will decrease the amount of domestic work per child, but the father’s 
illness increases the hours of domestic work performed by the children residing in a 
household that faced that shock. On the other hand, the determinants of market work are: 
a larger proportion of younger sisters and environmental shocks such as drought, flood, 
frost or death of livestock.  
Similar to the findings for children of the younger cohort at the same age, the 
results provide weak evidence that market work has negative effects on vocabulary skills 
(PPVT), but provide no evidence of effects of child work on mathematics test scores.  
As shown in Table 2.6a, the results for the effect of child work on vocabulary 
skills provide evidence of a negative and significant effect of additional hours of market 
work on PPVT scores. The coefficients are stable among specifications and the effects of 
market work are significant at the 10 percent level for girls and boys separately. An 
additional hour of market work has a larger effect on PPVT for girls than for boys (-0.373 
vs. -0.241). Note that the results for girls have to be interpreted with caution considering 
that the instrumental variables fail the overidentification test. Table 2.6b shows that there 
are no significant effects of additional hours of domestic or market work on the average 
test score or mathematics skills; except for additional hours of domestic work for boys 
and girls combined, which have a positive and significant effect of 0.173 standard 
deviations (significant at the 10 percent level). The evidence suggests that additional 
hours of domestic and market work could lead to higher mathematics test scores, when 
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using the instrumental variables approach, but as mentioned before, the results are not 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
The Young Lives study for the older cohort includes self-reported data on the 
number of hours allocated to different types of work, school, and leisure activities; thus, 
these additional data are used to test for measurement error. Table A.3.b summarizes 
results for the OLS estimations using self-reported data on domestic and market work. 
The results for PPVT scores confirm the negative relationship between both domestic and 
market work and vocabulary skills, but they are not significant.  
2.5.4 Results for children aged 15 years – Older Cohort 
The last group of children included in the analysis is the one that includes 15-
year-old youth at the time of the survey; these are children that have already reached the 
age where school is not compulsory in Ethiopia.35 Tables 2.7a-b summarize the findings 
for this sample. Although most of the effects are not significant at the 10 percent level, 
the results suggest that there is a negative effect of additional hours of domestic and 
market work on academic achievement.  
Tables 2.7a-b report a series of statistics that test the validity of the instruments 
used in the analysis. The p-value of the Hansen (overidentification) test is large (greater 
than 0.10) in the different specifications, which means that the instruments are valid. The 
F-statistics show that the instruments are weak for boys, especially for the case of 
domestic work, but for girls, the instruments are not weak when using a threshold of 5 for 
the F-statistic. 
The results of the first stage regressions estimating the determinants of domestic 
and market work are summarized in Table A.4.a of Appendix 1. The key determinants of 
                                                            
35 Data on marital status was not directly included in this survey. But some additional questions show that 
most likely, children surveyed in Round 4 were not married. Two questions related to migration show that 
just one child moved in the last three months because of marriage, and one question in relation to reasons 
for not attending school show that just two children were not attending school because of marriage. 
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domestic work for girls are a larger proportion of younger sisters, having an ill mother, 
and death of livestock. Similarly, the determinants of market work for boys include death 
of livestock and drought. 
The results show that the relationship between hours of domestic work and the 
PPVT test score is negative and relatively small. For the case of girls, the effect of market 
work is large and significant (at the 1 percent level), an additional hour of market work 
lowers the PPVT test score by 0.323 standard deviations (Table 2.7a). The effects of 
child work on mathematics test scores are negative and significant when using the OLS 
approach, but the IV results are non-significant and in some cases the direction of the 
effect differs between OLS and IV estimations. As in all the other analyzed samples, the 
magnitude of the effect is larger when using an IV approach.  
The estimations were also performed using self-reported data on time use, 
summarized in Table A.4.b. The effects are similar than those found using the adult 
reported data and are mainly not significant.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The statistical analysis confirms Orazem and Gunnarsson’s (2004) statement in relation 
to correcting for endogeneity of child work by using instrumental variables. The 
estimated impacts of the different types of child work are more negative when using the 
instrumental variables approach, as shown in Figure 2.3 for the case of vocabulary test 
scores coefficients. In my estimates, the OLS specifications underestimated the effect of 
child work on school performance.  
In the context of the Young Lives households in Ethiopia, the instrumental 
variables results presented in section 2.5 suggest that the negative effects of child work 
are mainly concentrated in vocabulary skills and there is weak evidence of effects of 
child work on mathematics test scores. Both domestic and market work have negative 
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effects on the vocabulary test scores for children at all ages, and the effects are larger for 
children aged 12 and 15.  
Domestic work has statistically significant negative effects on vocabulary skills 
for the youngest and oldest girls in the Young Lives sample: -0.144 standard deviations 
for an additional hour of domestic work (significant at the 5 percent level) for 8-year-old 
girls, and -0.323 standard deviations for an additional hour of market work (significant at 
the 10 percent level) for 15-year-old girls. Market work has a large effect for 12-year-old 
boys and girls in both cohorts, with effects ranging from -0.193 to -0.373 standard 
deviations.  
The direction of the effect of child work on the mathematics test scores was not as 
clear and statistically significant when compared to the effects on vocabulary skills. An 
additional hour of domestic work results in declines of 0.128 standard deviations 
(significant at the 10 percent level) for 8-year-old girls, and -0.145 standard deviations 
(significant at the 10 percent level) for 12-year-old boys from the younger cohort. The 
only positive and statistically significant effect in the analysis was found when pooling 
12-year-old boys and girls of the older cohort: a 0.173 standard deviation increase for an 
additional hour of market work (significant at the 10 percent level). In this analysis, I 
included 36 different estimations, where 15 of them are statistically significant at least at 
the 10 percent level, and the evidence strongly suggest that the effect of child labor is 
generally negative; therefore, this could be a random significant effect.  
One possible explanation for the relative magnitudes of the effects when 
comparing 8-year-old children to older children could be related to school enrollment. In 
Ethiopia, children start working at young ages, but they start attending school relatively 
late at age 8. Children aged 12 years old attend school, but are also performing different 
types of working activities in the household, which compete with time in school and time 
for studying. This result is consistent with Cockburn's (2002) findings which showed that 
test scores appeared to be lower for children with multiple work activities. 
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The results are also in line with the conclusions from Akabayashi and 
Psacharopoulos (1999), Heady (2003) and Orazem and Gunnarsson (2006); children 
engaged in market activities perform worse in school. This Chapter presents new 
evidence that domestic work also has negative effects on learning, especially in 
vocabulary skills. The results also present evidence of the rural-urban gap on test scores, 
especially for children aged 8 to 12, which could reflect the differences in the quality of 
education. 
Even if the results show that child work has negative effects in student academic 
achievement, test scores are just one dimension of the child’s development. Suggesting 
policies prohibiting work for children in their school years could also be harmful for their 
future. On one hand, the activities that children perform outside of school can prepare 
them for the economic and cultural environment of their communities, and one the other 
hand, some children work in order to be able to attend school. A longer-term analysis of 
the effects of child work in the Ethiopian context is needed to propose policies that could 
enhance both student academic achievement and the acquisition of additional skills that 
will be useful in the future.  
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2.7 Figures 
 
Figure 2.1a- All Children- Average number of hours worked in a typical day 
 
Source: Author's estimates using Young Lives, Round 4 (2013). 
 
Figure 2.1b - Boys - Average number of hours worked in a typical day 
 
Source: Author's estimates using Young Lives, Round 4 (2013). 
 
Figure 2.1c – Girls - Average number of hours worked in a typical day 
 
Source: Author's estimates using Young Lives, Round 4 (2013). 
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Figure 2.2 – Young Lives Study sites in Ethiopia 
 
 
Source: Young Lives 
Retrieved from: http://www.younglives.org.uk/where-we-work/ethiopia-1 
 
 
Figure 2.3 OLS vs. IV child work coefficients for Vocabulary Test Scores 
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2.8 Tables 
 
Table 2.1 – Young Lives Rounds and Cohorts 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 – Child’s First Language and PPVT Test Completion (Round 4) 
 
 
  
Round 2 
(2006)
Round 3 
(2009)
Round 4 
(2013)
Older Cohort
Age 12          15          
Number of children in the survey 980        971        
Number of children in the PPVT analysis 782        826        
Number of children in the Math analysis 782        810        
Younger Cohort
Age 8            12          
Number of children in the survey 1,884      1,875      
Number of children in the PPVT analysis 1,527      1,346      
Number of children in the Math analysis 1,489      1,328      
Number of 
children in the 
survey
Number of 
children NOT 
taking the 
PPVT test
Percentage of 
children that did 
not take the 
PPVT test
Afarigna 5
Amarigna 804 4 0.5%
Guraghigna 93 2 2%
Hadiyigna 99 97 98%
Oromifa 302
Sidamigna 94 91 97%
Siltigna 4
Tigrigna 378 1 0.3%
Welayitegna 90 38 42%
Total 1869 233 12%
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Table 2.3a – Round 3 (Children aged 8 years old) -Younger Cohort 
 
Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD
Schooling Outcomes
Currently enrolled in school 0.87 0.34 0.83 0.37 0.80 0.40 0.81 0.40
PPVT Test score 84.87 45.39 70.35 37.84 61.67 31.24 74.90 40.29
Math Test score 7.37 5.39 5.73 4.65 4.90 4.03 6.05 4.97
Highest grade attained 2.31 1.21 2.12 1.26 2.05 1.30 2.05 1.29
Time in school (hours)* 2.25 3.34 0.78 2.08 0.27 1.19 1.02 2.41
Time studying at home (hours)* 0.30 0.58 0.10 0.40 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.49
Child Labor
Works (total hours of work >= 1) 0.92 0.27 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Total hours of work 3.61 2.47 5.19 1.85 5.97 1.88 5.19 1.97
Total hours of market work 1.40 2.10 2.30 2.29 4.44 1.54 0.96 1.62
Total hours of domestic work 2.21 1.80 2.89 1.95 1.53 1.40 4.23 1.38
Child's Characteristics
Female 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.25 0.43 0.65 0.48
Male 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.75 0.43 0.35 0.48
Age in months 97.54 3.69 97.53 3.73 97.28 3.87 97.77 3.64
Parents' Characteristics
Caregiver is one of the parents 0.93 0.25 0.95 0.22 0.97 0.18 0.94 0.23
Highest educational level of the parents (in years) 4.03 4.52 2.69 3.69 1.90 3.04 3.22 3.92
One parent absent 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34
Both parents absent 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Household Composition
Number of household members 6.13 1.98 6.37 1.85 6.50 1.69 6.28 1.92
Wealth
Household in the lowest urban quintile (reference) 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.24
Household in 2nd lowest urban quintile 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.26
Household in the top 3 urban quintile 0.29 0.45 0.12 0.32 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.38
Household in the lowest rural quintile (reference) 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.32
Household in 2nd lowest rural quintile 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.42 0.10 0.30
Household in the top 3 rural quintile 0.36 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.48 0.50
Geography
Addis Ababa (reference) 0.18 0.38 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.23
Amhara 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45
Oromia 0.22 0.42 0.27 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.30 0.46
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNP) 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.19 0.15 0.35
Tigray 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.47 0.42 0.50 0.22 0.42
Rural 0.55 0.50 0.80 0.40 0.95 0.21 0.69 0.46
Instruments
Sibling Composition
Number of older sisters 1.07 1.20 1.19 1.24 1.31 1.27 1.10 1.17
Number of younger sisters 1.13 1.29 1.23 1.32 1.32 1.33 1.19 1.32
Number of older brothers 0.49 0.67 0.64 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.70
Number of younger brothers 0.50 0.67 0.66 0.72 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.73
Household Shocks
Mom Ill past 4 years 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42
Dad Ill past 4 years 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.36 0.19 0.40 0.14 0.35
Other Ill past 4 years 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
Death in the Household past 4 years 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23
New Household Member past 4 years 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.39
Environmental Shocks
Drought past 4 years 0.31 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.37 0.48
Flood past 4 years 0.11 0.32 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38
Frost past 4 years 0.11 0.32 0.17 0.37 0.27 0.45 0.11 0.32
Death of Livestock past 4 years 0.30 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.34 0.47
Observations
* For the time in school and time studying variables, 835 out of the 1,208 children reposponded these questions.
All
Work more than 
three hours per 
day
Market work more 
than three hours 
per day
Domestic work 
more than three 
hours per day
1,208 729 332 420
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Table 2.3b – Round 4 (Children aged 12 years old) -Younger Cohort 
Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD
Schooling Outcomes
Currently enrolled in school 0.97 0.16 0.96 0.19 0.94 0.24 0.97 0.18
PPVT Test score 39.34 8.15 37.04 8.08 34.67 7.70 38.27 8.17
Math Test score 10.84 5.94 9.47 5.47 8.53 4.81 9.95 5.70
Highest grade attained 4.82 1.67 4.56 1.75 4.34 1.95 4.60 1.70
Time in school (hours) 5.88 1.56 5.49 1.37 5.25 1.53 5.58 1.35
Time studying at home (hours) 1.58 0.92 1.46 0.88 1.32 0.88 1.53 0.85
Child Labor
Works (total hours of work >= 1) 0.94 0.24 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Total hours of work 3.76 2.17 4.87 1.59 5.63 1.68 4.78 1.60
Total hours of market work 1.55 2.05 2.20 2.15 4.15 1.52 0.89 1.50
Total hours of domestic work 2.21 1.61 2.67 1.66 1.48 1.21 3.89 1.02
Child's Characteristics
Female 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.25 0.44 0.70 0.46
Male 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.75 0.44 0.30 0.46
Age in months 145.47 3.89 145.34 3.92 145.23 3.95 145.54 3.85
Parents' Characteristics
Caregiver is one of the parents 0.93 0.25 0.95 0.21 0.97 0.18 0.94 0.23
Highest educational level of the parents (in years) 4.60 4.78 3.46 4.17 2.31 3.32 4.23 4.45
One parent absent 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.39
Both parents absent 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.20
Household Composition
Number of household members 5.82 1.90 6.05 1.84 6.26 1.74 5.95 1.91
Wealth
Household in the lowest urban quintile (reference) 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.30
Household in 2nd lowest urban quintile 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.26
Household in the top 3 urban quintile 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.37 0.06 0.24 0.22 0.42
Household in the lowest rural quintile (reference) 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25
Household in 2nd lowest rural quintile 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.08 0.28
Household in the top 3 rural quintile 0.39 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.45 0.50
Geography
Addis Ababa (reference) 0.18 0.38 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.25
Amhara 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.38 0.49 0.22 0.41
Oromia 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.20 0.40 0.32 0.47
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNP) 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.03 0.16 0.17 0.38
Tigray 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.23 0.42
Other region 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
Rural 0.54 0.50 0.71 0.45 0.89 0.32 0.60 0.49
Instruments
Sibling Composition
Number of older sisters 1.08 1.20 1.18 1.24 1.34 1.28 1.04 1.18
Number of younger sisters 1.15 1.29 1.24 1.31 1.32 1.29 1.15 1.28
Number of older brothers 0.68 0.86 0.83 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.82 0.89
Number of younger brothers 0.70 0.85 0.82 0.89 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.91
Household Shocks
Mom Ill past 4 years 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.31
Dad Ill past 4 years 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
Other Ill past 4 years 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.32
Death in the Household past 4 years 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
New Household Member past 4 years 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.19
Environmental Shocks
Drought past 4 years 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.41 0.31 0.46 0.14 0.35
Flood past 4 years 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.27
Frost past 4 years 0.14 0.34 0.19 0.39 0.30 0.46 0.13 0.34
Death of Livestock past 4 years 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.20 0.40
Observations
All
Work more than 
three hours per 
day
Market work more 
than three hours 
per day
Domestic work 
more than three 
hours per day
1,208 838 383 465
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Table 2.3c – Round 2 (Children aged 12 years old) -Older Cohort 
Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD
Schooling Outcomes
Currently enrolled in school 0.98 0.14 0.98 0.15 0.96 0.20 0.98 0.14
PPVT Test score 76.99 25.96 72.68 24.88 67.67 23.96 73.29 25.23
Math Test score 5.03 2.39 4.83 2.40 4.76 2.52 4.76 2.41
Time in school (hours) 5.64 1.54 5.42 1.47 5.21 1.60 5.41 1.45
Time studying at home (hours) 1.78 1.01 1.68 0.98 1.56 0.97 1.71 0.95
Child Labor
Works (total hours of work >= 1) 0.97 0.17 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Total hours of work 4.10 2.03 4.97 1.51 5.54 1.55 5.04 1.54
Total hours of market work 1.42 1.83 1.86 1.90 4.00 1.23 0.90 1.29
Total hours of domestic work 2.69 1.79 3.11 1.83 1.54 1.32 4.14 1.28
Child's Characteristics
Female 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.22 0.42 0.69 0.46
Male 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.78 0.42 0.31 0.46
Age in months 145.19 3.73 145.28 3.77 145.15 3.76 145.33 3.81
Parents' Characteristics
Caregiver is one of the parents 0.89 0.32 0.90 0.30 0.91 0.28 0.89 0.32
Highest educational level of the parents (in years) 3.43 4.16 2.94 3.85 1.99 2.97 3.28 3.99
One parent absent 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.34
Both parents absent 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.10
Household Composition
Number of household members 6.59 2.04 6.73 2.00 7.03 1.86 6.51 2.03
Wealth
Household in the lowest urban quintile (reference) 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.29
Household in 2nd lowest urban quintile 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.26
Household in the top 3 urban quintile 0.25 0.43 0.16 0.37 0.08 0.27 0.19 0.39
Household in the lowest rural quintile (reference) 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33
Household in 2nd lowest rural quintile 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Household in the top 3 rural quintile 0.36 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.37 0.48
Geography
Addis Ababa (reference) 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.17 0.11 0.32
Amhara 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41
Oromia 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNP) 0.24 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43
Tigray 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.34 0.48 0.18 0.38
Rural 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.45 0.89 0.31 0.64 0.48
Instruments
Sibling Composition
Number of older sisters 1.08 1.18 1.07 1.16 1.29 1.21 0.91 1.07
Number of younger sisters 0.81 0.93 0.90 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.85 0.89
Number of older brothers 1.10 1.18 1.09 1.18 1.20 1.18 1.04 1.16
Number of younger brothers 0.84 0.95 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.98
Household Shocks
Mom Ill past 4 years 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38
Dad Ill past 4 years 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37
Other Ill past 4 years 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.40
Death in the Household past 4 years 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36
New Household Member past 4 years 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Environmental Shocks
Drought past 4 years 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.32 0.47
Flood past 4 years 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.35
Frost past 4 years 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.33 0.06 0.24
Death of Livestock past 4 years 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46
Observations
All
Work more than 
three hours per 
day
Market work more 
than three hours 
per day
Domestic work 
more than three 
hours per day
782 587 211 384
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Table 2.3d – Round 3 (Children aged 15 years old) -Older Cohort 
Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD
Schooling Outcomes
Currently enrolled in school 0.92 0.27 0.90 0.29 0.79 0.41 0.91 0.29
PPVT Test score 152.03 35.66 148.10 36.60 140.56 37.57 149.32 36.48
Math Test score 5.92 4.87 5.44 4.68 5.17 4.48 5.47 4.79
Time in school (hours) 5.69 2.08 5.40 2.05 4.51 2.46 5.49 2.02
Time studying at home (hours) 1.95 1.19 1.86 1.17 1.49 1.23 1.87 1.13
Child Labor
Works (total hours of work >= 1) 0.99 0.12
Total hours of work 4.76 2.47 5.44 2.15 6.76 2.55 5.43 2.17
Total hours of market work 1.61 2.34 1.92 2.45 4.79 1.98 1.03 1.91
Total hours of domestic work 3.15 1.95 3.52 1.93 1.96 1.63 4.40 1.40
Child's Characteristics
Female 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.19 0.39 0.68 0.47
Male 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.81 0.39 0.32 0.47
Age in months 180.30 3.49 180.18 3.50 180.37 3.42 180.15 3.47
Parents' Characteristics
Caregiver is one of the parents 0.90 0.31 0.91 0.29 0.93 0.25 0.90 0.30
Highest educational level of the parents (in years) 3.36 4.12 3.01 3.91 2.28 3.35 3.20 4.03
One parent absent 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36
Both parents absent 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12
Household Composition
Number of household members 6.48 2.03 6.59 2.00 6.78 1.91 6.49 2.02
Wealth
Household in the lowest urban quintile (reference) 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.26
Household in 2nd lowest urban quintile 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.26
Household in the top 3 urban quintile 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.21 0.41
Household in the lowest rural quintile (reference) 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32
Household in 2nd lowest rural quintile 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35
Household in the top 3 rural quintile 0.36 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.38 0.49
Geography
Addis Ababa (reference) 0.16 0.37 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.28
Amhara 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39
Oromia 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNP) 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.29 0.46
Tigray 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.42 0.29 0.46 0.21 0.41
Rural 0.59 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.83 0.38 0.64 0.48
Instruments
Sibling Composition
Number of older sisters 1.19 1.21 1.22 1.18 1.30 1.23 1.18 1.15
Number of younger sisters 0.72 0.88 0.78 0.91 0.93 1.00 0.73 0.86
Number of older brothers 1.24 1.24 1.25 1.26 1.36 1.21 1.19 1.26
Number of younger brothers 0.71 0.85 0.78 0.87 0.89 0.96 0.75 0.84
Household Shocks
Mom Ill past 4 years 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43
Dad Ill past 4 years 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38
Other Ill past 4 years 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44
Death in the Household past 4 years 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27
New Household Member past 4 years 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Environmental Shocks
Drought past 4 years 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.41 0.49
Flood past 4 years 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.34
Frost past 4 years 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34
Death of Livestock past 4 years 0.29 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47
Observations
All
Work more than 
three hours per 
day
Market work more 
than three hours 
per day
Domestic work 
more than three 
hours per day
782 472221645
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Table 2.4a – PPVT Test Score for children aged 8 years old (Round 3, younger cohort) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4b – Mathematics Test Score for children aged 8 years old (Round 3, younger 
cohort) 
 
 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.027* ‐0.151** ‐0.023 ‐0.144* ‐0.026 ‐0.126
(0.014) (0.069) (0.014) (0.074) (0.021) (0.095)
Total hours of market work ‐0.033** ‐0.001 0.001 0.146 ‐0.043** ‐0.005
(0.011) (0.083) (0.023) (0.133) (0.015) (0.055)
Cognitive Test Score Round 2 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.121*** 0.149*** 0.178*** 0.217***
­0.020 ­0.020 ­0.028 ­0.033 ­0.023 ­0.022
Highest educational level of the parents 0.024** 0.023*** 0.018 0.017 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Rural ‐0.306 ‐0.340 ‐0.326 ‐0.598 ‐0.313 ‐0.405
(0.340) (0.439) (0.349) (0.374) (0.342) (0.344)
Constant ‐4.718*** ‐4.982*** ‐4.379*** 0.360* ‐4.746*** 0.273
(0.691) (0.661) (1.090) (0.205) (0.844) (0.251)
Observations 1,527 1,527 708 708 819 819
Hansen J‐Stat 20.18 15.58 9.81
p­value 0.06 0.21 0.63
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Domestic Work 19.91 19.18 6.32
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Market Work 64.88 11.74 56.31
R‐squared 0.469 0.417 0.44 0.303 0.512 0.448
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Female Male
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.031** ‐0.057 ‐0.035*** ‐0.128* ‐0.028 0.017
(0.012) (0.054) (0.012) (0.065) (0.024) (0.109)
Total hours of market work ‐0.025 ‐0.006 ‐0.013 0.085 ‐0.027 ‐0.082
(0.015) (0.071) (0.027) (0.115) (0.017) (0.085)
Cognitive Test Score Round 2 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.105** 0.126** 0.074** 0.093***
­0.025 ­0.025 ­0.047 ­0.049 ­0.028 ­0.029
Highest educational level of the parents 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.018* 0.016
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Rural ‐0.945*** ‐0.985*** ‐1.145*** ‐1.317*** ‐0.765*** ‐0.582*
(0.208) (0.310) (0.240) (0.320) (0.230) (0.305)
Constant ‐1.561** ‐1.608** ‐1.467* 0.993*** ‐1.696** 0.639***
(0.689) (0.650) (0.832) (0.170) (0.795) (0.175)
Observations 1,489 1,489 690 690 799 799
Hansen J‐Stat 19.72 10.66 21.97
p­value 0.07 0.56 0.04
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Domestic Work 21.64 20.28 6.69
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Market Work 124.10 19.46 58.19
R‐squared 0.472 0.47 0.479 0.41 0.495 0.47
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Female Male
 
47 
 
Table 2.5a – PPVT Test Score for children aged 12 years old (Round 4, younger cohort) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5b – Mathematics Test Score for children aged 12 years old (Round 4, younger 
cohort) 
 
 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.020 0.090 ‐0.021 0.111 ‐0.005 0.130
(0.023) (0.129) (0.028) (0.140) (0.031) (0.128)
Total hours of market work ‐0.100*** ‐0.390*** ‐0.121*** ‐0.193** ‐0.104*** ‐0.370***
(0.022) (0.083) (0.026) (0.091) (0.025) (0.105)
CDA Score Round 2 0.142*** 0.120*** 0.107*** 0.113*** 0.175*** 0.149***
(0.0260) (0.0400) (0.0310) (0.0330) (0.0350) (0.0450)
Highest educational level of the parents 0.021*** 0.009** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.007
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Rural ‐1.078*** ‐0.434* ‐1.118*** ‐1.202*** ‐0.954** 0.013
(0.307) (0.250) (0.288) (0.302) (0.356) (0.473)
Constant ‐1.155 ‐0.367 ‐0.492 0.156 ‐1.511 ‐1.537
(0.950) (1.106) (0.934) (1.068) (1.166) (1.489)
Observations 1,346 1,346 628 628 718 718
Hansen J‐Stat 12.34 20.03 10.01
p­value 0.34 0.05 0.53
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Domestic Work 5.05 3.15 8.19
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Market Work 580.70 83.44 65.21
R‐squared 0.556 0.239 0.574 0.512 0.56 0.301
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Female Male
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.037 0.057 ‐0.051* ‐0.072 ‐0.007 0.007
(0.022) (0.118) (0.027) (0.136) (0.026) (0.120)
Total hours of market work ‐0.056*** ‐0.09 ‐0.044* ‐0.009 ‐0.071*** ‐0.145*
(0.015) (0.082) (0.024) (0.116) (0.022) (0.086)
CDA Score Round 2 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.104* 0.105** 0.127** 0.124***
(0.0330) (0.0340) (0.0540) (0.0530) (0.0470) (0.0420)
Highest educational level of the parents 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Rural ‐0.721*** ‐0.652** ‐0.774*** ‐0.798*** ‐0.644* ‐0.444
(0.214) (0.276) (0.192) (0.276) (0.356) (0.397)
Constant ‐1.065 ‐0.867 ‐0.587 ‐0.714 ‐1.541 ‐1.447
(0.977) (1.068) (1.633) (1.616) (1.374) (1.336)
Observations 1,328 1,328 622 622 706 706
Hansen J‐Stat 6.61 16.74 13.70
p­value 0.83 0.12 0.25
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Domestic Work 3.66 3.21 4.11
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Market Work 98.25 46.85 52.69
R‐squared 0.331 0.309 0.36 0.356 0.332 0.318
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Female Male
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Table 2.6a – PPVT Test Score for children aged 12 years old (Round 2, older cohort) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6b – Mathematics Test Score for children aged 12 years old (Round 2, older cohort) 
 
 
 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.041** ‐0.098 ‐0.024 ‐0.115 ‐0.073* ‐0.196
(0.020) (0.111) (0.023) (0.100) (0.035) (0.213)
Total hours of market work ‐0.079*** ‐0.265 ‐0.101*** ‐0.373* ‐0.077** ‐0.241*
(0.025) (0.192) (0.029) (0.208) (0.032) (0.135)
Highest educational level of the parents 0.023** 0.020* 0.017 0.01 0.027* 0.03
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021)
Rural ‐0.947*** ‐0.642 ‐1.228*** ‐0.833* ‐0.685** ‐0.295
(0.230) (0.425) (0.366) (0.442) (0.290) (0.437)
Constant ‐3.091*** ‐3.466*** ‐1.486 ‐1.874 ‐4.406** ‐4.584**
(0.956) (1.065) (1.535) (1.773) (1.709) (1.830)
Observations 782 781 391 391 391 390
Hansen J‐Stat 11.47 24.28 10.80
p­value 0.49 0.02 0.55
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Domestic Work 8.62 6.44 5.66
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Market Work 9.47 4.75 6.64
R‐squared 0.391 0.326 0.493 0.394 0.374 0.32
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MaleAll Female
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Total hours of domestic work 0.003 0.173* 0.021 0.099 ‐0.024 0.121
(0.024) (0.099) (0.024) (0.124) (0.039) (0.184)
Total hours of market work ‐0.019 0.071 0.02 0.28 ‐0.03 0.048
(0.025) (0.159) (0.040) (0.233) (0.025) (0.151)
Highest educational level of the parents 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.028** 0.035*** 0.035** 0.028
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
Rural ‐0.776*** ‐1.108** ‐0.982** ‐1.341*** ‐0.470** ‐0.716
(0.262) (0.462) (0.404) (0.486) (0.211) (0.449)
Constant ‐1.518* ‐1.449* 1.123 1.492 ‐3.808** ‐3.980**
(0.814) (0.771) (1.782) (1.802) (1.508) (1.625)
Observations 782 781 391 391 391 390
Hansen J‐Stat 11.56 10.58 11.09
p­value 0.48 0.57 0.52
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Domestic Work 8.62 6.44 5.66
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Market Work 9.47 4.75 6.64
R‐squared 0.225 0.159 0.301 0.21 0.222 0.181
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Female Male
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Table 2.7a – PPVT Test Score for children aged 15 years old (Round 3, older cohort) 
 
 
 
Table 2.7b – Mathematics Test Score for children aged 15 years old (Round 3, older cohort) 
 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.036** ‐0.252 ‐0.072* ‐0.218 ‐0.004 ‐0.134
(0.016) (0.170) (0.037) (0.157) (0.025) (0.165)
Total hours of market work ‐0.048*** ‐0.494* ‐0.072* ‐0.323*** ‐0.032* ‐0.088
(0.014) (0.283) (0.037) (0.112) (0.017) (0.098)
PPVT Test Score Round 2 0.234*** 0.159* 0.218*** 0.187** 0.233*** 0.197***
(0.045) (0.081) (0.062) (0.076) (0.061) (0.052)
Highest educational levelof the parents 0.016** 0.007 0.012 0.003 0.015 0.015
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Rural ‐0.859*** 0.342 ‐0.795*** ‐0.153 ‐0.944*** ‐0.717***
(0.162) (0.733) (0.268) (0.399) (0.121) (0.244)
Constant 0.887 ‐2.692 4.321** 3.864** ‐2.248 ‐3.333
(1.194) (3.006) (1.994) (1.896) (2.123) (2.178)
Observations 826 826 405 405 421 421
Hansen J‐Stat 4.09 15.92 6.27
p­value 0.94 0.10 0.79
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Domestic Work 6.45 8.12 3.90
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Market Work 3.17 6.24 4.30
R‐squared 0.431 0.449 0.273 0.472 0.435
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MaleAll Female
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.005 ‐0.164 ‐0.043* ‐0.184 0.035 ‐0.023
(0.017) (0.124) (0.023) (0.140) (0.038) (0.232)
Total hours of market work ‐0.036*** ‐0.254 ‐0.029* 0.054 ‐0.050** ‐0.205
(0.012) (0.283) (0.014) (0.153) (0.023) (0.170)
Math Test Score Round 2 0.448*** 0.394*** 0.403*** 0.400*** 0.465*** 0.432***
(0.050) (0.073) (0.044) (0.058) (0.065) (0.076)
Highest educational levelof the parents 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008)
Rural 0.025 0.652 ‐0.205 ‐0.201 0.235 0.696
(0.124) (0.718) (0.195) (0.483) (0.261) (0.615)
Constant ‐1.768 ‐3.153 ‐0.028 0.608 ‐3.929 ‐6.224*
(1.547) (2.477) (2.363) (2.557) (2.601) (3.535)
Observations 810 810 408 408 402 402
Hansen J‐Stat 5.59 3.37 9.76
p­value 0.85 0.97 0.46
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Domestic Work 5.90 6.04 2.48
First Stage F‐Stat ‐ Market Work 3.79 5.47 7.40
R‐squared 0.412 0.229 0.457 0.364 0.416 0.332
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Female Male
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Chapter 3 
Decomposing the Urban-Rural Schooling 
Gap in Ethiopia (2006-2013) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In 1994 Ethiopia adopted a new constitution, and the following year the first multiparty 
elections were held. The new government was established after almost two decades of 
military government, two severe famines, and a civil war. When democracy was first 
established, the gross primary school enrollment was 25 percent and the adult literacy 
rate was 27 percent.36 The new government took several steps toward providing better 
access to education: i) Proclamation 41, in 1993, defined the responsibilities of the 
central and regional governments, decentralizing the role of government in the provision 
of education services; ii) in 1994, the Education and Training Policy and the Education 
Sector Strategy were adopted; iii) in 1995, the Constitution stated that education should 
be provided without religious, political and cultural considerations, and that the state has 
the obligation to allocate resources to provide educational services; and iv) in 1995, the 
Teacher’s Career Structure was established (Unesco, 2006). Twenty years later, in 2014, 
the gross primary school enrollment was above 100 percent and the adult literacy rate 
reached 49 percent.37  
                                                            
36 Data from the World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
37 Idem. 
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 Since 1994, a new structure of the education system has been implemented. It 
changed the number of years of primary and secondary school education,38 provided 
access to primary education in the student’s mother tongue, and adopted a new structure 
of fiscal relations. The latter implied that each level of government would be responsible 
for providing different education services, for instance the woredas39 are responsible of 
provision of primary education (World Bank, 2005). All these changes have resulted in 
an improvement in indicators of access to education.  
Currently, more than 80 percent of the population resides in rural areas, and the 
country has a low level of rural-urban migration due to land tenure regulations. In 
addition, the average household size in rural areas in 5.2, while in urban areas it is 3.7. In 
rural areas, 46.4 percent of the population is between 0-14 years. In contrast, in urban 
areas that share is 29.4 (CSA and World Bank, 2017). Taking into account these factors, 
educational gaps between the urban and rural populations of the country should be 
analyzed, and the main contributors to those gaps should be identified in order to 
formulate policies that can benefit the vast majority of the population, particularly the 
rural population. This Chapter estimates the urban-rural schooling gap and decomposes it 
between the gap that can be explained by differences in endowments (explained portion) 
and differences due to the coefficients (unexplained portion). 
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the urban-
rural education differentials in Ethiopia. Section 3.3 provides a brief review of the 
literature. Section 3.4 describes the conceptual framework. In section 3.5, the data of used 
in the empirical analysis is described. Section 3.6 presents the main results of the 
empirical analysis, and section 3.7 concludes. 
                                                            
38 From 1962 to 1994, the education system followed a 6-2-4 structure; with the implementation of the 
1994 Education and Training Policy and Education Sector Strategy, the system was restructured to a 4-4-2-
2 structure (two 4-year cycles of primary education and two 2-year cycles of secondary school education).  
39 Ethiopia is divided in nine regions; the regions are subdivided into 68 zones. A woreda is a smaller 
subdivision, followed by kebele which is the smallest geographical subdivision. There are 800 woredas and 
15,000 kebeles (5,000 urban and 10,000 rural).  
http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/regional-states 
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3.2 Urban­Rural Education Differentials in Ethiopia 
 
Evidence on the urban-rural education gap in Ethiopia is scarce. Two reports that 
compiled different education indicators for 2000 and 2015 are summarized in Tables 
3.1a-b (World Bank, 2005; CSA and World Bank, 2017). The data show that in 2000 
there was a large education gap between rural and urban children. The first set of 
indicators included in Table 3.1a indicate the gross enrollment rate for rural and urban 
populations widens as the level of education increases. For instance, gross enrollment 
rates in grades 1-4 were 122.9 percent for urban areas and 65.3 percent for rural areas in 
2000, while enrollment rates for secondary education were 76.3 percent in urban areas 
and 0.4 percent in rural areas. The low enrollment rates for secondary education in rural 
areas could reflect the lack of school facilities in rural areas. The Ministry of Education 
Annual Report (2015) reports that in 2013 the country had 32,048 primary schools 
(27,597 in rural areas) and 2,329 secondary schools (693 in rural areas).40 Although the 
enrollment rates have increased, the secondary education enrollment rate is still low, and 
the urban-rural gap persists in 2015; as shown in Table 3.1b, enrollment in secondary 
school of children aged 7-18 for boys was only 2.7 percent in rural areas, compared to 
22.5 percent in urban areas (large towns), and for girls they were 2.6 and 21.7, 
respectively. The Ministry of Education Annual Report (2015) reports that in 2013 out of 
the 1’969,576 students enrolled in secondary school, less than 20 percent were students 
enrolled in rural areas (368,918).41 
In 2000, there was a significant difference in a set of student flow indicators 
reported in Table 3.1a. The percentage of the cohort ever enrolled in Grade 1 in rural 
areas was almost half of the one for urban areas (45.3 percent vs. 90 percent). Another 
indicator is related to distance to the nearest primary school: as the distance increases, 
enrollment decreases, but the differences between urban and rural areas are evident. For 
example, urban children living between 1-2 kms from the closest primary school have a 
                                                            
40 The number of schools in the five regions included in the Young Lives survey were: had 29,291 primary 
schools (25,509 in rural areas) and 2,078 secondary schools (611 in rural areas). 
41 The gender disaggregation of the number of students enrolled in secondary school in 2013 is: 1,041,855 
boys (196,262 in rural areas) and 927,721 girls (172,656 in rural areas). Tables 5.17.1 and 5.17.5. 
 
53 
school enrollment rate of 83.1 percent while the enrollment rate for children in rural areas 
living at the same distance to the closest primary school was 38.8 percent. Finally, the 
urban rural differences in enrollment are evident by the child’s mother tongue group too. 
Data for 2015 confirm that the urban-rural educational gap continues to persist. 
Table 3.1b shows that the youth and adult literacy rates have increased for the newer 
generations, but there are still large rural and urban differences. For example, 32.5 
percent of children aged 7 to 18 years residing in rural areas are not enrolled in school, 
while this percentage drops to 19 in small towns and 16.4 in large towns.  
Evidence on the urban-rural test score gap in Ethiopia is even more scarce. Using 
Young Lives data, Figures 3.1-3.8 show the distributions of language and mathematics 
test scores for children ranging from ages 8 to 15. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that both the 
distribution of the vocabulary (PPVT) and mathematics test scores of children residing in 
rural areas are skewed to the left (the same pattern is observed for the mathematics test 
score for children aged 12 years old and 15 years, as shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.8). 
Figure 3.1 shows that children residing in urban areas have a more uniform distribution 
of their test scores. For children aged 12 years old, vocabulary test scores distributions 
are shown in Figure 3.3 and 3.5, in both cases the distribution of test scores of children 
residing in rural areas seem to follow a normal distribution, while in the case of children 
residing in urban areas the distribution is skewed to the right. Section 3.5.2 describes the 
test score gap between urban and rural Ethiopian children. 
3.3 Literature Review 
 
School achievement disparities for children for different comparison groups have been 
studied in developed and developing countries. Most of these studies used the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition (described in section 3.4). Ammermueller (2007) estimates the 
PISA test score gap between children in Germany and Finland. He finds that better 
performance of Finnish students is mainly explained by the differences in observable 
characteristics (which is often referred to as the explained portion). Additionally, he 
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concludes that the role of school types is ambiguous. Myers et al (2004) estimated the 
racial test score gap in Minnesota and concluded that school and student’s characteristics 
do not explain most of the test score gap, therefore, the gap can be attributed to racial 
differences in coefficients (often referred to as the unexplained portion). 
 In developing countries, the educational attainment (measured by years of 
education) gender gap was studied in India by Kingdon (2002), who concluded that the 
main factors contributing to the gap were parental background, wealth, individual ability, 
age-at-marriage and quality of primary school attended. Twenty-five percent of the 
gender gap was explained by student, household and school characteristics, thus most of 
the gap is attributed to gender differences in coefficients. Nieto and Ramos (2014) 
decompose the PISA test score gaps by income groups42 for 10 middle income and 2 high 
income countries. Their results suggest that the explained portion of the test score gap is 
around 50 percent. Within the explained portion of the gap, individual characteristics 
have lower explanatory power than school and teacher quality variables. 
The educational gap between children residing in urban and rural areas has been 
studied in different developing countries. Hannum (1999) describes the trends in 
enrollment rates of the urban and rural populations of China between 1949 and 1990 and 
shows how the political context of the country was linked to the rural-urban education 
inequalities. The “Great Cultural Revolution” raised education levels in rural areas and 
narrowed the urban-rural educational differentials.43 Note, however, that the reduction of 
the gap was not entirely driven by an increase of educational attainment in rural areas; it 
was also due to a decrease of educational attainment in urban areas. Lounkaew (2013) 
estimated the PISA test score urban-rural gap in Thailand. His estimations were 
calculated for different points on the achievement distributions, and he concluded that 
school characteristics explained a lower proportion of the gap (12-15 percent) for lower 
performing students than for higher performing students (61-69 percent of the gap). In 
                                                            
42 They compared test scores for the top and bottom quartiles of the economic, social and cultural status 
index. 
43 Measured through number of schools, student enrollment and progression ratios. 
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addition, he found that the unexplained portion of the gap is higher for boys than for girls. 
Rural-urban decompositions estimated for test scores in Colombia and Zambia show that 
the explained portion of the gap is larger than the unexplained portion (Ramos et al., 
2016; Burger, 2011). In the case of Colombia, Ramos et al. found that most of the 
differential is explained by family characteristics instead of school characteristics. 
There are no studies decomposing the school achievement gap between urban and 
rural Ethiopian children. As discussed in section 3.1, with the vast majority of the 
population reside in rural areas, with some internal migration from rural to urban areas. 
Given that Ethiopia has one of the largest returns to education (as reported in Montenegro 
and Patrinos, 2014) it is important to investigate the main drivers of the urban-rural 
educational gap, to serve as a diagnosis for future education policies in the country. In 
addition, none of the studies referenced in this section have examined how the gap 
evolves over time for a specific cohort of children, which can be used to investigate 
whether urban-rural education disparities are narrowing or broadening in the country. 
Therefore, this Chapter contributes to the existing literature by estimating the school 
achievement gap between urban and rural children of Ethiopia for the first time, and it 
shows how this achievement gap changes over time for the same children. 
3.4 Conceptual Framework 
 
This section presents the empirical strategy used in this Chapter to decompose the urban-
rural academic achievement gap in Ethiopia. As mentioned on Chapter 2, I follow 
Orazem and Gunnarson’s (2004) model of the human capital production function. The 
structural relationship is given by the following production function:  
ܪ௜௝ ൌ ܪሺܮ௜௝, ௜ܺ௝, ௝ܼ , ܪ଴௜௝ሻ     (3.1) 
where Hij stands for a measure of academic achievement of child i in household j, child 
labor is captured by Lij; Xij is a vector with different child characteristics, Zj includes 
attributes of the child’s parents and household, and H0ij is the past accumulation of 
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human capital. For this Chapter, the dependent variable Hij is a test score. Equation (3.2) 
shows a linear specification of equation (3.1). 
ܪ௜ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯ݇ݐ௜ ൅ ߚଶܦ݋݉௜ ൅ ∑ ߩ௞ܺ௞௜௡௞ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௟ܼ௟௜௡௟ୀଵ ൅ ߠܪ଴௜ ൅ ߬஼ ൅ ߝ௜ (3.2) 
Test scores are a function of the daily hours allocated to market and domestic 
work (ܯݎ݇ݐ and ܦ݋݉), a vector of child characteristics X (gender and age in months), a 
vector of parent and household characteristics Z (caregiver’s educational attainment, 
absence of one or both parents and household composition), and past accumulation of 
human capital (H0i). The variable τC allows for Region44 fixed effects and ε୧ is an error 
term. Region-specific fixed effects represent the unobserved differences among the 
different Regions of the country that influence education, such as school and teacher’s 
quality. Equation (2) includes all the variables of the production function, thus the error 
term represents measurement error of the dependent or control variables. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, child work and school attendance are jointly determined outcomes of a child's 
time allocation within the household: this implies that estimation of the effect of child 
work could be endogenous. Building on the empirical strategy used in Chapter 2, the 
estimates presented in this Chapter will also use instrumental variables to correct for 
endogeneity. 
The results presented in Chapter 2 showed a significant difference between urban 
and rural test scores for children. Therefore, the goal of this Chapter is to decompose the 
urban-rural academic achievement gap, and explore how much each factor contributes to 
the gap. The decomposition follows the Blinder-Oaxaca method which is explained in the 
following sub-section. 
 
 
                                                            
44 Similar to Chapter 2, this Chapter includes five (out of nine) regions of Ethiopia: Addis Ababa; Amhara; 
Oromia; Tigray; and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region (SSNP). These are the 
regions included in the Young Lives data, and the population of these regions represent approximately 90 
percent of the country’s population. 
 
57 
3.4.1 Blinder­Oaxaca Model 
 
The Blinder-Oaxaca model has been widely used to analyze differences in labor 
market outcomes between two groups: male vs. female, white vs African Americans, etc. 
(Blinder, 1973; Darity and Mason, 1998; Ñopo, 2008; Oaxaca, 1973; Oaxaca and 
Ransom, 1994; O’Neill and O’Neill, 2006, Reimers, 1983). The method allows one to 
decompose group differences into an explained portion (differences in the magnitudes of 
the determinants) and an unexplained portion (differences in the effects of those 
determinants). For example, in the context of this Chapter, rural children could have a 
lower academic achievement not only because they spend more hours of their day 
working, but also because the effect of that time on academic achievement is larger.  
In the context of the human capital production function described in equation 
(3.2), the differences between urban and rural outcomes can be expressed as follows: 
ܪ௎ െ ܪோ ൌ ∑ߚ௞௎ݔ௞௎ െ ∑ߚ௞ோݔ௞ோ   (3.3) 
where HU corresponds to the mean of the human capital outcome for children living in 
urban areas and HR denotes the same outcome but for children residing in rural areas. In 
this case. the vectors of β parameters include intercepts and the vector of determinants x 
includes those groups of determinants included in equation (3.2): child work, child’s 
characteristics, parent and household attributes, and past accumulation of human capital. 
Building on the model and empirical strategy followed in Chapter 2, the human capital 
production function is estimated using instrumental variables estimation to correct for 
endogeneity.45 
 To clearly show the different components of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, 
equation (3.3) can be expressed as follows:  
ܪ௎ െ ܪோ ൌ ∑ߚ௞௎ݔ௞௎ െ ∑ߚ௞௎ݔ௞ோ െ ∑ߚ௞ோݔ௞ோ ൅ െ∑ߚ௞௎ݔ௞ோ  (3.4) 
                                                            
45 For more detail on the model, see section 2.3 of Chapter 2. For a discussion of the instrumental variables 
see subsections 2.3.3 and 2.4.2 of Chapter 2. 
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ܪ௎ െ ܪோ ൌ ∑ߚ௞௎∆ݔ௞ െ ∑∆ߚ௞ݔ௞ோ  (3.5) 
where 
∆ݔ௞ ൌ ݔ௞௎െ ݔ௞ோ and ∆ߚ௞ ൌ ߚ௞௎ െ ߚ௞ோ 
Equation (3.5) corresponds to the gap in academic achievement, the first term on the right 
hand side of equation (3.5) corresponds to the portion of the gap is attributable to 
differences in the magnitudes of the determinants (x), the explained portion, and the 
second term on the right hand side of equation (3.5) corresponds to the portion of the gap 
that is attributable to differences in the parameters (β), the unexplained portion.46 
In equation (3.5) the differences in the magnitudes of the determinants are 
weighted by the coefficients of the urban group, while the differences in coefficients are 
weighted by the x’s of the rural group. Following O’Donnell et al. (2008, pp150), 
equation (3.5) is a special case of a more general decomposition:  
ܪ௎ െ ܪோ ൌ ∑ߚ௞ோ∆ݔ௞ െ ∑∆ߚ௞ݔ௞ோ ൅ ∑∆ݔ∆ߚ   (3.6) 
where 
෍ߚ௞ோ∆ݔ௞ ൌ ܧ 
෍∆ߚ௞ݔ௞ோ ൌ ܥ 
෍∆ݔ∆ߚ ൌ ܥܧ 
Therefore, the gap could be decomposed into a gap in endowments (E), a gap in 
coefficients (C), and a gap that comes from the interaction between endowments and 
coefficients. 
                                                            
46 There are some other ways to present this decomposition. This way to present it was chosen to emphasize 
the rural areas. 
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3.5 Data 
 
3.5.1 The Young Lives Study in Ethiopia 
 
This Chapter uses data from the Young Lives study,47 a research program at 
Oxford University that studies childhood poverty. The Young Lives study follows 12,000 
children since 2002 in four developing countries: Ethiopia, India (in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh), Perú, and Vietnam. Two cohorts have been followed in each country: a younger 
cohort (children born in 2000-01, approximately 2,000 children per country) and an older 
cohort (children born in 1994/95, approximately 1,000 children per country). Currently, 
four rounds of the survey data are available for Ethiopia (2002, 2006, 2009, and 2013). 
This Chapter uses data from both cohorts; data from Rounds 2 and 3 are used for the 
older cohort, and data from Rounds 3 and 4 is used for the younger cohort.  These 
children were surveyed when they were 8 years old (younger cohort, Round 3), 12 years 
old (older cohort Round 2, and younger cohort, Round 4), and 15 years old (older cohort, 
Round 3).  
By using different ages at different rounds off the survey, the analysis aims to 
understand the evolution of the urban-rural academic achievement gap. As mentioned in 
section 3.2, the urban-rural education gap becomes wider at higher levels of schooling, 
therefore it is expected that the test score gaps will be larger for older than for younger 
children. 
The Young Lives study in Ethiopia surveyed children residing in five out of nine 
regions of the country, where more than 96 percent of the population lives: Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNP48, and Tigray, plus the capital city Addis Ababa (see Figure 3.9). In each 
region, three to five woredas were selected for the sample. This selection process took 
into consideration having a balance of poor and less poor households and a balance of 
urban and rural areas. In addition, within the urban areas, there is a variety of urban site 
types: cities, intermediate cities and small urban areas. Twenty sentinel sites were 
                                                            
47 http://www.younglives.org.uk/ 
48 Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region. 
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included in the sample. As the study focuses on poverty, the sentinel sites are in food 
deficit woredas and the households included in the study are poorer than the average 
Ethiopian household (Young Lives, 2014). Table 3.2 provides a detailed description of 
the different sentinel sites included in the Ethiopian Young Lives sample. 
Tables 3.3a-d report the summary statistics for the final samples by survey round, 
cohort, and separately for children residing in urban and rural areas. Columns 1 and 2 
report the means and standard deviations of the all variables included in the analysis. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the means and standard deviations for children residing in urban 
areas. Summary statistics for children residing in rural areas are reported in columns 5 
and 6. As shown in Tables 3.3a-d, 61 percent of the younger cohort children resided in 
rural areas in 2009 (53 percent in 2013)49, while 61 percent of children of the older cohort 
lived in rural areas when surveyed in 2006 (62 percent in 2009). These proportions do not 
reflect the reality of the country, where more than 80 percent of the population still 
resides in rural areas. The results have to be interpreted with caution, given that the 
Young Lives data oversamples the poor population, therefore the urban-rural gaps 
estimated in this Chapter are specific to the poor population of Ethiopia and are not 
representative of the country as a whole. 
3.5.2 Schooling Outcomes 
 
The data used for the empirical analysis of this chapter is the same as the data 
used for Chapter 2. The outcome of interest is academic achievement, which is measured 
by cognitive test scores: the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) and the 
Mathematics Achievement Test. This section discusses the raw test scores, but the 
statistical analysis is performed using standardized test scores. 
                                                            
49 The reduction in the percentage of children who lived in rural areas reflects a tendency for children who 
migrate to more urban areas. An analysis for the sample of 905 children that were surveyed in Rounds 3 
and 4 of the younger cohort made by Gavonel (2017), shows that from the 298 children that reported 
moving to another location, 37 percent moved within the rural areas, 23 percent moved from rural to urban 
areas, 12 percent moved from urban to rural areas and the remaining 28 percent moved to within urban 
areas. 
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The PPVT is a vocabulary test which was administered in all rounds to children in 
both cohorts. The test consists of selecting a picture that best represents the meaning of a 
word presented orally by the examiner. For Rounds 2 and 3 it included 204 words and for 
each correct answer the child received one point (Cueto and Leon, 2012). As shown in 
Tables 3.3a-d, for the younger cohort in Round 3, the average test score was 79.7; for the 
older cohort, in Round 2 the average score was 75.5 and for Round 3, the average score 
was 149.9. For Round 4, the PPVT test that was administered to the younger cohort 
included only 55 words, and the average score was 39.3. For all Rounds and cohorts, the 
average test score for children residing in urban areas is higher than the average test 
scores of children living in rural areas. For example, the difference in test scores for 
children aged 8 years old is 44.75 points (107 urban vs. 62.25 rural). In Ethiopia, this test 
could be taken in fifteen different languages.  
The format of the Mathematics Achievement Test for the younger cohort in 
Round 3 included 29 items, divided into two sections. The first section included nine 
questions on basic quantitative and number notions, while the second section used 20 
questions to measure the ability to perform basic mathematics operations with numbers 
(see Cueto and Leon, 2012, for further details). The average test score for this cohort in 
Round 3 round was 6.5 (10.1 urban vs. 4.2 rural). The format of the test was similar in 
Round 4 but included 28 items divided into a first section that was comprised of 19 items 
dealing with addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and square roots; the second 
section included 9 items on mathematics problem solving. The average test score for the 
younger cohort in Round 4 was 10.8. Columns 3 and 5 of Tables 3.3b show that children 
who lived in urban areas had higher average mathematics test scores (13.9 vs. 8.1).  
For the older cohort, the format of the Mathematics Achievement Test differed 
from Round 2 to Round 3. In Round 2, the test consisted of 10 items evaluating topics of 
number and number sense (Cueto, Leon, and Munoz, 2009). The average test score for 
this round was 4.9 (5.7 urban vs. 4.4 rural). In Round 3, the test consisted of 30 items 
divided into two sections. The first section was comprised of 20 items dealing with 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and square roots; the second section 
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included 10 items on mathematics problem solving. (Cueto and Leon, 2012).50 The 
average test score was 5.9 (7.7 urban vs. 4.7 rural). 
The test scores were standardized by round and cohort; therefore, the results of all 
estimations are presented in standard deviations. 
3.5.3 Additional variables 
 
The Young Lives data include detailed information about each child and his/her 
household and community. The empirical analysis includes a set of variables used as the 
determinants of the test scores. These variables are grouped into characteristics of the 
child (sex, age in months, and child work), characteristics of the parents (highest 
educational attainment of the parents51 and absence of the parents from the household), 
household characteristics (number of household members, number of siblings, wealth 
index), and geographic location (Addis Ababa is the reference category).  
In relation to the child work variables, Edmonds (2007) emphasized the 
importance of analyzing urban-rural differences; children in rural areas tend to work 
more often, and for longer hours. In this Chapter, child work is captured by hours 
performing domestic and market activities. For a detailed explanation of these variables, 
please refer to subsection 2.4.1.2 of Chapter 2. For the purposes of this analysis, child 
work is measured by two variables: market work (paid work outside the household and 
unpaid labor force work for the household) and domestic work (domestic chores and time 
spent caring for other household members). Building on the results and discussion of 
Chapter 2, I will instrument child work to control for bias due to reverse causality. The 
                                                            
50 The last 10 questions of the Mathematics Achievement Test for the older cohort in Round 3 were 
multiple choice. 
51 For children without data on the highest level of education attained by the parents, the information on the 
educational attainment of the caregiver was used. Educational attainment is divided into four categories: 
parents with 0 years of education, parents with 1-3 years of education (corresponds to lower primary level 
not completed), parents with 4-7 years of education (corresponds upper primary level completed), parents 
with more than 8 years of education (corresponds to incomplete secondary education or more). Only in 
Round 2 the Young Lives questionnaire include a question on parental education for a parent is not present 
in the household. 
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selected instruments can be grouped in the following categories: sibling composition, 
household shocks, and environmental shocks. 
 Tables 3.3a-d show the descriptive statistics for these variables by cohort and 
Round. There are significant differences between urban and rural areas on the number of 
hours that children spend performing market work. For example, younger cohort children 
living in rural areas spend more than two additional hours on market work per day (i.e. 
for Round 3: 2.5 hours rural vs. 0.2 hours urban). For the older cohort, the difference is 
smaller, but still significant: children residing in rural areas spend at least 1.5 hours 
performing market work.  
 In addition, there are significant differences in parental education. For example, 
for the younger cohort in Round 3, 27 percent of urban parents had no years of education, 
but 62 percent of rural parents had no education. Moreover, 43 percent of urban parents 
had more than eight years of education, but just six percent of rural parents had the same 
level of education. 
3.5.4 Resulting sample 
 
For the younger cohort's empirical analysis, 1,875 children were interviewed in 
Round 4. Of those 1,875 children, 274 did not complete the PPVT test and 291 children 
did not complete the Mathematics test in Round 4. 52 For Round 3, 165 children did not 
complete the PPVT test and 211 children did not complete the mathematics test. In 
addition, 172 children were dropped from the Round 3 sample because of missing data on 
the control variables (201 for Round 4). As the PPVT and Mathematics estimations are 
performed separately, the total number of children included in the analysis ranges from 
1,316 to 1,423.  
From the 1,000 children included at the beginning of the study for the older 
cohort, 29 children were not interviewed in Rounds 2 and 3. Of the remaining 971 
                                                            
52 For Round 4, 90 percent of the children that did not complete the tests could not read the language in 
which the test was administered.  
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children in Round 3, 35 children did not complete the Mathematics Achievement Test 
and 10 did not complete the PPVT test in either round. For Round 2, 26 children did not 
complete the PPVT test and 31 children did not complete the mathematics test. Finally, 
96 children were dropped from the sample because of missing data on the control 
variables.  As the PPVT and Mathematics estimations are performed separately, the total 
number of children included in the analysis ranges from 713 to 728.  
3.6 Results 
 
The urban-rural academic achievement gap decompositions for the Young Lives children 
in Ethiopia are presented in Tables 3.4-3.7. Each table corresponds to a test score for the 
younger or older cohort. The tables provide estimates for each age-group of children, 
both for all children and disaggregated by gender. In addition, each table reports results 
for both OLS and IV specifications of the model. Test scores were standardized; thus, the 
estimated impacts are measured in terms of the standard deviations of the test score 
variable.  
Each table consists of two sections: section “a” presents the decomposition of the 
total academic achievement, reporting the explained and unexplained portions. In 
addition, section “a” of each table reports the contribution of each set of variables (child, 
parents, and household characteristics, and regional fixed effects) to the explained portion 
of the gap. Section “b” reports the contribution of each individual variable to the 
explained portion of the gap (differences in endowments).  
The discussion will focus on the IV specifications for all children; in most of the 
cases the conclusions of the decompositions for the full sample is similar to the results for 
boys and girls separately. When there are gender differences, they will be highlighted in 
the discussion. 
3.6.1 Tests Score Decomposition for the Younger Cohort 
Table 3.4a summarizes the PPVT decomposition results for children in the 
younger cohort who were 8 and 12 years old at the time of the survey. The test score gap 
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was one standard deviation in Round 3 and 1.12 in Round 4. Most of the gap is explained 
due to differences in endowments (58.7 percent for Round 3 and 51.9 percent for Round 
4). The child and household characteristics are the ones that contribute most to the 
explained portion of the gap, and in most cases the regional fixed effects contribution has 
a negative sign. Table 3.4b reports the variables with the largest magnitudes that 
significantly contribute to the differences in endowments are: the socioeconomic level of 
the household “wealth index” (0.18 in Round 3, 0.50 in Round 4), the proportion of 
parents that have more than eight years of education (0.10 in Round 3), hours of market 
work (0.24 in Round 3, 0.62 in Round 4), and hours of domestic work (-0.12 in Round 4); 
all of them are significant at least at the 10 percent level. These variables represent 88 
percent of the explained portion of the test score gap in Round 3, and 172 percent in 
Round 4.53 Although the results show that the PPVT test score gap widens for the same 
cohort as they get older, it important to be cautious with the interpretation given that the 
PPVT test differs from Round 3 to Round 4.  
 Table 3.4 also present results separately for boys and girls. The results are similar; 
the test score gap increases from age 8 to age 12, the main contributors to the explained 
portion are the child and household characteristic (regional fixed effects have a negative 
contribution), although the significance levels decrease for parental education and hours 
of market work. 
 The decomposition results for the mathematics test scores are summarized in 
Table 3.5a. In this case, the test score gap narrows from Round 3 to Round 4 (1.10 
standard deviations in Round 3 to 0.97 in Round 4). The explained portion of the test 
score gap increases from Round 3 (49.6 percent) to Round 4 (60.2 percent). In the case of 
Round 4, similar to the PPVT results, child and household characteristics are the main 
contributors to the explained portion of the gap; while for Round 3 child, parent, and 
household characteristics contribute to the explained portion of the gap in similar 
proportions. Differences in the socioeconomic level “wealth index” (0.20 in Round 3 and 
                                                            
53 In the case of Round 4, the region fixed effects contribute with -0.464 to the explained portion of the gap. 
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0.31 in Round 4), and the initial level of human capital (0.04 in Round 3 and 0.08 in 
Round 4), have a significant contribution to the explained portion of the test score gap in 
both rounds, and proportion of parents with more than 8 years of education (0.14 in 
Round 3), also has a significant contribution in Round 3. This set of variables represents 
70 percent of the explained portion in Round 3 and 67 percent in Round 4. 
 The results for boys and girls are similar. The test score gap decreases from 
Round 3 to Round 4, the portion of the test score gap explained by differences in 
endowments increases for the case of girls (and slightly decreases for the case of boys), 
and the main contributors to the explained portion of the gap are the socioeconomic level 
and the proportion of parents with more than 8 years of education (this one for Round 3). 
In the case of boys, hours of market and domestic work and initial level of human capital 
also contribute to the explained portion of the test score gap.  
 In 2012, Young Lives added a school survey as part of its data collection. The 
school survey was conducted for a sub-sample of the younger-cohort children studying in 
Grades 4 and 5 in all the sentinel sites. The selected schools had to be located within the 
geographic boundary of the sentinel site. The survey included data about the Young Lives 
child, his/her peers (20 children per class), class teacher, head teacher and school.54 While 
these school variables have the potential to provide additional information on urban-rural 
education gaps, they are available for only a small sub-sample of the children; analysis of 
the PPVT includes only 458 children and analysis of the mathematics score includes only 
462 children. Some additional regressions, including teacher’s characteristics,55 were 
estimated for this sub-samples, but the results are generally insignificant due to the small 
sample size. Moreover, few significant results were somewhat unusual and may reflect 
random variation in the data. For example, having a teacher who specialized in language 
had a negative effect on the PPVT test score, but having a teacher who specialized in 
                                                            
54 http://www.younglives.org.uk/content/ethiopia-school-survey 
55 The teacher’s characteristics that were considered included gender, number of years teaching, whether 
the teacher is specialized on language/mathematics instruction and his/her educational attainment.  
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mathematics had a positive effect on the PPVT test score. Because of these difficulties, 
the exploratory regressions using the school survey are not included in this chapter. 
3.6.2 Tests Score Decomposition for the Older Cohort 
 
Table 3.6a summarizes the PPVT decomposition results for children in the older 
cohort who were 12 and 15 years old at the time of the survey. The test score gap was 
0.96 standard deviations in Round 2 and 0.94 in Round 3. In both rounds, most of the gap 
is explained by differences in endowments (61.6 percent in Round 2 and 163.5 percent in 
Round 3). Hours in market work is the only variable that has a statistically significant 
contribution to the explained portion of the gap (0.51 in Round 2, significant at the 10 
percent level; 1.42 in Round 3, significant at the 5 percent level). This represents 86.7 
percent of the explained portion of the gap in Round 2 and 92.7 percent in Round 3. As 
shown in Table 3.3d, children residing in rural areas were working on average 5.7 hours 
per day and 86 percent were enrolled in school, in contrast to their urban counterparts 
who worked on average 3.6 hours per day and 99 percent were enrolled in school. Data 
from Round 3 show that the two main reasons why children do not attend school are: they 
were needed for domestic or agricultural work (21 percent), and they had to do paid work 
to earn money (17 percent).56 Children aged 15 should be attending grades for which 
education is not free, so this could also be contributing to the differences in enrollment 
rates. 
 The PPVT decompositions for the older cohort boys and girls are also presented 
in Table 3.6a. The test score gap increases slightly from one round to another in the case 
of boys (0.89 in Round 2 and 0.91 in Round 3) and decreases slightly for the case of girls 
(1.02 in Round 2 and 0.97 in Round 3). The proportion of the test score explained by 
differences in endowments significantly increases for boys (66.4 percent to 127.8 
percent) and girls (16.6 percent to 107.4 percent). Differences in hours spend on market 
work are significant for boys and girls and in both rounds, and in the case of girls, 
differences in hours of domestic work, also have a significant contribution in Round 3.  
                                                            
56 This reason was reported by one of the parents or the main caregiver.  
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Table 3.7a summarizes the decomposition results for the mathematics test scores 
for the older cohort. The test score gap increases from Round 2 to Round 3 (0.48 standard 
deviations in Round 2 to 0.59 in Round 3). The explained portion of the test score gap 
increases from round to round, going from -6.7 percent of the test score gap in Round 2 
to 84.6 percent in Round 3. Differences in the socioeconomic level “wealth index” have a 
significant contribution to the explained portion to the test score gap in Round 2 (0.29, 
significant at the 5 percent).  
 The results for boys and girls are similar to those for all children. The test score 
gap increases between rounds, and the portion of the test score gap explained by 
differences in endowments decreases (in Round 3 it is less than a third of the total gap). 
The main contributor to the explained portion of the test score gap for boys in Round 3 is 
hours of market work. For girls, the socioeconomic level is the main contributor to 
explained portion of the test score gap, which is off-set by a negative and significant 
effect of parental education in Round 3. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The results of this analysis show that there is a wide test score gap between children 
residing in urban and rural areas of Ethiopia. This test score gap widens as the children 
age. The test score gap is generally around one standard deviation, with the exception of 
the mathematics test score gap of the older cohort of children, which is 0.48 standard 
deviations in Round 2 and 0.59 standard deviations in Round 3.  
The explained portion of the PPVT is always positive and contributes more than 
50 percent of the test score gap. For the mathematics test score, the explained portion is 
mainly positive and contributes more than 40 percent of the test score gap, with the 
exception of the older cohort in Round 2, where the explained portion of the gap is -6.7 
percent. In general, the explained portion of the gap is higher for boys than for girls. 
 The analysis included in this Chapter could not incorporate data on school and 
teacher’s characteristics, i.e. school quality. Among the variables considered in the 
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analysis, the characteristics that consistently contribute to the explained portion of the 
gap are: hours of work, parental education and the socioeconomic status of the family, 
which is in line with the findings of Kingdon (2002) and Ramos et al. (2016), who 
concluded that child, parent, and household characteristics are the main determinants of 
the urban-rural educational gaps in India and Colombia, respectively.  
 Leaving aside policies that can improve the provision of educational services, 
such as construction of new schools to teacher training, policies that affect hours of work, 
parental education and socioeconomic status are needed. One example is short-term 
policies directing at decreasing child work, such as Conditional Cash Transfers programs, 
which would increase children’s academic performance, especially in rural areas where 
children spend twice as much time as their urban counterparts performing domestic and 
market work. In fact, a recent evaluation of the Social Cash Transfer Pilot Programme in 
the Tigray region Berhane et al. (2015), found that this program increased the likelihood 
on enrollment by 13.3 percentage points and grade attainment by half of a grade. It also 
showed that the program helped reduce the hours that children spend on farm and family 
chores by over one hour per day. These effects could potentially translate into more time 
available for attending school and studying, which can contribute to higher test scores 
and educational attainment and thus reduce rural-urban education gaps.  
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3.8 Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – PPVT Score Distribution - 
Younger Cohort, Round 3 (8 years) 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Math Test Score Distribution 
Younger Cohort, Round 3 (8 years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – PPVT Score Distribution- 
Younger Cohort, Round 4 (12 years) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Math Test Score Distribution 
Younger Cohort, Round 4 (12 years) 
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Figure 3.5 – PPVT Score Distribution 
Older Cohort, Round 2 (12 years) 
 
 
Figure 3.6 – Math Test Score Distribution 
Older Cohort, Round 2 (12 years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 – PPVT Score Distribution 
Older Cohort, Round 3 (15 years) 
 
 
Figure 3.8 – Math Test Score Distribution 
Older Cohort, Round 3 (15 years) 
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Figure 3.9 – Young Lives Study communities in Ethiopia 
 
 
Source: Young Lives 
Retrieved from: http://www.younglives.org.uk/where-we-work/ethiopia-1 
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3.9 Tables 
 
Table 3.1a – Selected Education Indicators by Area of Residence -Ethiopia 2000 
 
Urban Rural
Index         
(urban = 1)
Primary Education
Grades 1‐8 111.6 46.2 0.41
Grades 1‐4 122.9 65.3 0.53
Grades 5‐8 101.1 22.0 0.22
Secondary Education
Grades 9‐12 76.3 0.4 0.01
Higher Education 3.7 0.02 0.01
Percentage of cohort ever 
enrolled in grade 1 90.0 45.3 0.50
Composite cohort survival rate 
from grade 1
To grade 4 76.9 55.3 0.72
To grade 8 79.8 19.7 0.25
Distance from home to nearest 
primary school
Less than 1 km. 85.5 43.6 0.51
1‐2 km. 83.1 38.8 0.47
3‐4 km. 78.9 32.6 0.41
+5 km. 71.0 19.8 0.28
Amrigna 88.1 31.5 0.36
Ormigna 83.7 25.1 0.30
Tigrigna 85.5 24.8 0.29
Somaligna 35.7 11.4 0.32
Afarigna ‐ 12.9 ‐
Other 69.6 27.7 0.40
Gross Enrollment Rates
Student Flow Indicators
School Participation Rates by Distance to Nearest Primary School
Percentage of Children Ages 7‐14 Years registered for school, by mother's 
native language
Source: World Bank (2005). Tables 4.2, 4.5, 4.9, and 4.10; using data from 1999‐2000 Ethiopia 
Welfare Monitoring Survey, Ethiopia Household Income and Consumption Expenditure Survey, 
Education Management Information System Panel (Ministry of Education), and 2000 
Demographic and Health Survey.
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Table 3.1b – Selected Education Indicators by Area of Residence - Ethiopia 2015 
 
Rural
Small town 
(Urban)
Large town 
(Urban)
Males
All 58.5 76.2 90.0
15‐19 80.9 86.9 98.2
20‐29 76.7 92.4 96.8
30+ 51.1 73.1 90.9
Females
All 39.0 62.1 79.7
15‐19 77.5 90.0 95.8
20‐29 45.9 77.4 92.6
30+ 14.0 39.0 64.2
Males
Not Enrolled 32.5 19.0 16.4
Primary 64.8 63.1 61.1
Secondary 2.7 18.0 22.5
Females
Not Enrolled 33.0 16.4 17.7
Primary 64.4 68.9 60.7
Secondary 2.6 14.7 21.7
Government 99.0 94.7 71.6
Non Government 1.0 5.3 28.4
LiteracyA Rates
School Enrollment (ages 7‐18)
School Type
Source: CSA and World Bank (2017). Tables 2.5, 2.6,  and 2.7 ; using data from the Ethiopia 
Socioeconomic Survey 2015‐2016.
A: Literacy is self‐reported and is defined as the ability to read and write in any language.
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Table 3.2 – Young Lives Sentinel Sites 
 
 
 
Source : http://www.younglives-ethiopia.org/files/country-reports/ethiopia-r4-survey-design 
  
Cluster 
ID
District
Anonymised 
name*
Short description
1 Addis Ababa Bertukan An overcrowded area in the centre of the capital city, Addis Ababa
2 Addis Ababa Duba An industrial area in the southern part of the city Addis Ababa
3 Addis Ababa Menderin A slum area in the capital city, Addis Ababa
4 Amhara Kok A tourist town in the Amhara region, with some extremely poor neighbourhoods
5 Amhara Muz A poor rural community in the Amhara region
6 Amhara Enkoy A rural area near Lake Tana in the Amhara region
7 Amhara Tach‐Meret A rural food‐insecure area in the Amhara region
8 Oromia Leki A rural area near lake Ziway in the Oromia region
9 Oromia Loki A drought‐prone rural area in the Oromia region
10 Oromia Ananas A fast‐growing town in the Oromia region
11 Oromia Dinich A relatively rich rural area in the outskirts of Debrezeit town in the Oromia region
12 SNNP Timatim A densely populated rural area growing enset (false banana) in the SNNP region
13 SNNP Shenkurt A densely populated town in the SNNP region
14 SNNP Leku A fast‐growing business and tourist town in the SNNP region
15 SNNP Buna A coffee‐growing rural area in the SNNP region
16 SNNP Weyn A poor and densely populated rural community in the SNNP region
17 Tigray Zeytuni A drought‐prone rural area highly dependent on government support in the Tigray region
18 Tigray Selata
An extremely poor rural area dependent on the 
Productive Safety Net Scheme and other 
government support in the Tigray region
19 Tigray Gomen A small, very poor town in the Tigray region
20 Tigray Beles A model rural area in the Tigray region known for its success in soil and water conservation
*Note: Pseudonyms are used for all site names in order to protect the children’s anonymity.
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Table 3.3a – Descriptive Statistics Younger Cohort Round 3 - (8-year-old) 
 
 
 
  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Test Scores
Currently enrolled in school 0.80 0.40 0.90 0.30 0.73 0.44
PPVT Test Score 79.70 43.97 107.00 47.18 62.25 31.10
Mathematics Test Score 6.54 5.31 10.14 5.55 4.24 3.61
Cognitive Test Score Round 2 ‐0.02 1.00 0.38 0.94 ‐0.27 0.96
Child's Characteristics
Female 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.50
Age in Months 97.36 3.70 97.58 3.62 97.23 3.75
Total hours of domestic work per day 1.60 2.24 0.24 0.82 2.46 2.42
Total hours of market work per day 2.42 1.92 1.97 1.63 2.70 2.04
Parents' Characteristics
Highest educational level of the parents:
No education 0.48 0.50 0.27 0.45 0.62 0.49
1‐3 years 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.38
4‐8 years 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.36
More than 8 years 0.20 0.40 0.43 0.50 0.06 0.23
One Parent Absent 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.42 0.11 0.31
Both Parents Absent 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13
Household Characteristics
Number of household members 6.22 1.96 5.85 2.07 6.45 1.85
Number of siblings living at home 3.39 2.13 2.53 2.03 3.95 2.01
Wealth Index 0.33 0.17 0.47 0.15 0.24 0.12
Area of Residence
Addis Ababa 0.14 0.34 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00
Amhara 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.33 0.29 0.45
Oromia 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.36 0.25 0.43
SNNP 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.40
Tigray 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.34 0.27 0.44
Rural 0.61 0.49
Observations 1300 507 793
All Children Urban Rural
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Table 3.3b – Descriptive Statistics Younger Cohort Round 4 - (12-year-old) 
 
 
  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Test Scores
Currently enrolled in school 0.97 0.17 0.99 0.09 0.95 0.22
PPVT Test Score 39.29 8.32 43.93 6.01 35.16 7.91
Mathematics Test Score 10.83 6.01 13.87 5.74 8.13 4.84
Cognitive Test Score Round 2 0.08 0.98 0.42 0.93 ‐0.22 0.93
Child's Characteristics
Female 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50
Age in Months 145.55 3.90 145.69 3.82 145.43 3.97
Total hours of domestic work per day 1.54 2.10 0.43 1.16 2.53 2.25
Total hours of market work per day 2.21 1.61 2.07 1.53 2.33 1.66
Parents' Characteristics
Highest educational level of the parents:
No education 0.39 0.49 0.21 0.41 0.56 0.50
1‐3 years 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.26 0.18 0.38
4‐8 years 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.35
More than 8 years 0.31 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.12 0.33
One Parent Absent 0.23 0.42 0.30 0.46 0.16 0.37
Both Parents Absent 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.33 0.06 0.23
Household Characteristics
Number of household members 5.71 1.90 5.37 1.95 6.02 1.81
Number of siblings living at home 3.52 2.21 2.64 2.01 4.30 2.08
Wealth Index 0.40 0.17 0.50 0.16 0.30 0.12
Area of Residence
Tigray 0.25 0.43 0.15 0.36 0.34 0.47
Amhara 0.24 0.43 0.14 0.35 0.32 0.47
Oromia 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.38 0.28 0.45
SNNP 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.06 0.23
Other 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00
Addis Ababa 0.17 0.38 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00
Rural 0.53 0.50
Observations 1263 597 672
All Children Urban Rural
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Table 3.3c – Descriptive Statistics Older Cohort Round 2 - (12-year-old) 
 
 
  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Test Scores
Currently enrolled in school 0.97 0.17 0.98 0.13 0.96 0.19
PPVT Test Score 75.49 25.82 90.19 23.69 66.18 22.61
Mathematics Test Score 4.88 2.42 5.66 2.17 4.39 2.45
Child's Characteristics
Female 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50
Age in Months 145.21 3.75 145.29 3.63 145.15 3.82
Total hours of domestic work per day 1.52 1.91 0.49 1.27 2.17 1.97
Total hours of market work per day 2.70 1.82 2.70 1.88 2.69 1.79
Parents' Characteristics
Highest educational level of the parents:
No education 0.54 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.69 0.46
1‐3 years 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
4‐8 years 0.16 0.37 0.22 0.41 0.12 0.33
More than 8 years 0.16 0.36 0.33 0.47 0.05 0.21
One Parent Absent 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.40 0.11 0.31
Both Parents Absent 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.12
Household Characteristics
Number of household members 6.55 2.06 6.03 2.03 6.89 2.02
Number of siblings living at home 3.84 2.12 3.10 2.04 4.30 2.04
Wealth Index 0.29 0.17 0.44 0.14 0.20 0.11
Area of Residence
Addis Ababa 0.14 0.35 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00
Amhara 0.18 0.38 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.41
Oromia 0.22 0.41 0.15 0.35 0.26 0.44
SNNP 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42
Tigray 0.22 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.30 0.46
Rural 0.61 0.49
Observations 707 274 433
All Children Urban Rural
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Table 3.3d – Descriptive Statistics Older Cohort Round 3 - (15-year-old) 
 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Test Scores
Currently enrolled in school 0.91 0.29 0.99 0.12 0.86 0.35
PPVT Test Score 149.86 36.90 170.87 24.13 137.02 37.47
Mathematics Test Score 5.85 4.88 7.68 5.03 4.72 4.43
Child's Characteristics
Female 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.50
Age in Months 180.32 3.48 180.62 3.38 180.13 3.53
Total hours of domestic work per day 1.74 2.48 0.76 1.77 2.35 2.65
Total hours of market work per day 3.18 1.96 2.85 1.62 3.38 2.12
Parents' Characteristics
Highest educational level of the parents:
No education 0.56 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.71 0.45
1‐3 years 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
4‐8 years 0.16 0.36 0.22 0.42 0.12 0.32
More than 8 years 0.15 0.36 0.34 0.47 0.04 0.20
One Parent Absent 0.19 0.40 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.36
Both Parents Absent 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.10
Household Characteristics
Number of household members 6.43 2.02 6.00 2.06 6.70 1.95
Number of siblings living at home 4.12 2.17 3.25 2.05 4.66 2.07
Wealth Index 0.34 0.16 0.48 0.14 0.26 0.12
Area of Residence
Addis Ababa 0.14 0.35 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00
Amhara 0.19 0.39 0.12 0.32 0.24 0.42
Oromia 0.22 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.26 0.44
SNNP 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44 0.22 0.42
Tigray 0.22 0.41 0.12 0.33 0.28 0.45
Rural 0.62 0.49
Observations 704 267 437
All Children Urban Rural
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Table 3.4a - PPVT Score Decomposition between Rural and Urban Children, Younger Cohort (Round 3 – 8-year-olds, Round 4 – 12-year-
olds) 
 
 
 
Notes : 
 
R : Raw differential 
E : Raw differential due to endowments 
C: Raw differential due to coefficients 
CE: Raw differential due to interaction 
D: Matrix of weights. For the case presented here D = 0 
R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4
Decomposition:
Mean Test Score (Urban) 0.612 0.609 0.612 0.609 0.646 0.62 0.646 0.620 0.573 0.597 0.573 0.597
Mean Test Score (Rural) ‐0.391 ‐0.513 ‐0.391 ‐0.513 ‐0.413 ‐0.469 ‐0.413 ‐0.469 ‐0.364 ‐0.564 ‐0.364 ‐0.564
Raw differential (R) {Urban‐Rural}: 1.003 1.122 1.003 1.122 1.059 1.089 1.059 1.089 0.937 1.161 0.937 1.161
‐ due to endowments (E): 0.692 0.595 0.589 0.583 0.713 0.688 0.638 0.839 0.398 0.522 0.327 0.702
‐ due to coefficients (C): ‐0.127 0.397 0.099 0.555 ‐0.39 0.411 0.105 0.597 ‐0.017 0.448 0.032 0.533
‐ due to interaction (CE): 0.438 0.131 0.315 ‐0.016 0.737 ‐0.01 0.316 ‐0.347 0.557 0.191 0.578 ‐0.074
0 0 0 0 0 0
Unexplained (U){C+(1‐D)CE}: 0.311 0.527 0.414 0.539 0.346 0.401 0.421 0.250 0.539 0.639 0.610 0.459
Explained (V) {E+D*CE}: 0.692 0.595 0.589 0.583 0.713 0.688 0.638 0.839 0.398 0.522 0.327 0.702
% unexplained {U/R}: 31.0 47.0 41.288 48.074 32.7 36.8 39.8 23.0 57.6 55.0 65.1 39.5
% explained (V/R): 69.0 53.0 58.712 51.926 67.3 63.2 60.2 77.0 42.4 45.0 34.9 60.5
Endowments:
Child's Charactristics 0.194 0.269 0.317 0.549 0.262 0.349 0.395 0.624 0.142 0.174 ‐0.013 0.340
Parents' Characteristics 0.094 ‐0.078 0.091 ‐0.081 0.087 ‐0.062 0.079 ‐0.059 0.104 ‐0.097 0.115 ‐0.089
Household Characteristics 0.272 0.570 0.207 0.578 0.240 0.531 0.185 0.430 0.295 0.599 0.357 0.563
Region Fixed Effects 0.133 ‐0.166 ‐0.027 ‐0.464 0.078 ‐0.083 ‐0.021 ‐0.156 ‐0.144 ‐0.154 ‐0.131 ‐0.112
Observations 1349 1423 1349 1423 730 760 730 760 619 663 619 663
All Children Males Females
OLSOLS IVOLS IVIV
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Table 3.4b – Endowment Contributions to the PPVT Score Decomposition, Younger Cohort (Round 3 – 8-year-olds, Round 4 – 12-year-
olds) 
 
 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4
Endowments:
Child's Charactristics
Female 0.000 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.017
Age in Months 0.022* 0.010* 0.022* 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.035* 0.013 0.032* 0.010
Cognitive Test Score Round 2 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.058***0.060** 0.087*** 0.072** 0.092*** 0.063** 0.032 0.045 0.029 0.055*
Total hours of domestic work 0.012 0.004 0.003 ­0.117* 0.008 ‐0.003 0.024 ‐0.021 0.016 0.010 ‐0.026 ‐0.013
Total hours of market work 0.104*** 0.199*** 0.237** 0.618*** 0.153*** 0.273*** 0.265** 0.574* 0.058* 0.106*** ‐0.047 0.288**
Parents' Characteristics
Parents Education: 1‐3 years ‐0.003 ‐0.011 ‐0.002 0.001 0.002 ‐0.011 0.002 ‐0.013 ‐0.011 ‐0.012 ‐0.012 ‐0.011
Parents Education: 4‐8 years 0.001 0.001 0.001 ‐0.014 0.003 ‐0.001 0.003 0.000 ‐0.001 0.003 0.000 0.002
Parents Education: more than 8 years 0.107*** ‐0.048 0.104** ‐0.052 0.114** ‐0.031 0.107** ‐0.024 0.106* ‐0.068 0.118* ‐0.074
One Parent Absent ‐0.011 ‐0.006 ‐0.012 ‐0.014 ­0.032** 0.003 ­0.033** ‐0.007 0.012 ‐0.016 0.010 ‐0.003
Both Parents Absent 0.001 ‐0.014 0.000 ‐0.002 0.000 ­0.022* 0.000 ‐0.015 ‐0.001 ‐0.005 ‐0.001 ‐0.003
Household Characteristics
Number of household members 0.008 0.031** 0.007 0.026 0.008 0.012 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.051** 0.003 0.040
Number of siblings living at home 0.030 0.059** 0.020 0.049 0.031 0.087** 0.025 0.077* 0.030 0.035 0.044 0.035
Wealth Index 0.234*** 0.480*** 0.181** 0.503*** 0.201*** 0.433*** 0.154** 0.349*** 0.262*** 0.513*** 0.311*** 0.488***
Observations 1349 1423 1349 1423 730 760 730 760 619 663 619 663
All Children Males Females
OLS IVOLS IVOLS IV
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Table 3.5a – Mathematics Test Score Decomposition between Rural and Urban Children, Younger Cohort (Round 3 – 8-year-olds, Round 
4 – 12-year-olds) 
 
 
Notes : 
 
R : Raw differential 
E : Raw differential due to endowments 
C: Raw differential due to coefficients 
CE: Raw differential due to interaction 
D: Matrix of weights. For the case presented here D = 0 
 
 
R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4
Decomposition:
Mean Test Score (Urban) 0.665 0.540 0.665 0.540 0.715 0.526 0.715 0.526 0.608 0.557 0.608 0.557
Mean Test Score (Rural) ‐0.433 ‐0.428 ‐0.433 ‐0.428 ‐0.419 ‐0.416 ‐0.419 ‐0.416 ‐0.451 ‐0.443 ‐0.451 ‐0.443
Raw differential (R) {Urban‐Rural}: 1.098 0.969 1.098 0.969 1.134 0.942 1.134 0.942 1.059 0.999 1.059 0.999
‐ due to endowments (E): 0.428 0.478 0.545 0.583 0.461 0.608 0.651 0.526 0.313 0.317 0.322 0.529
‐ due to coefficients (C): 0.163 0.336 0.305 0.443 ‐0.011 0.301 0.250 0.447 0.333 0.324 0.387 0.408
‐ due to interaction (CE): 0.507 0.155 0.249 ‐0.058 0.683 0.033 0.233 ‐0.032 0.413 0.359 0.351 0.062
Unexplained (U){C+(1‐D)CE}: 0.670 0.491 0.553 0.385 0.672 0.334 0.482 0.416 0.746 0.683 0.738 0.470
Explained (V) {E+D*CE}: 0.428 0.478 0.545 0.583 0.461 0.608 0.651 0.526 0.313 0.317 0.322 0.529
% unexplained {U/R}: 61.0 50.7 50.4 39.8 59.3 35.4 42.5 44.1 70.4 68.3 69.6 47.1
% explained (V/R): 39.0 49.3 49.6 60.2 40.7 64.6 57.4 55.9 29.6 31.7 30.4 52.9
Endowments:
Child's Charactristics 0.158 0.211 0.150 0.183 0.237 0.270 0.369 0.164 0.103 0.160 ‐0.037 0.264
Parents' Characteristics 0.122 0.037 0.129 0.038 0.135 0.032 0.138 0.031 0.117 0.025 0.125 0.026
Household Characteristics 0.199 0.280 0.188 0.322 0.138 0.342 0.064 0.381 0.242 0.200 0.301 0.191
Region Fixed Effects ‐0.052 ‐0.050 0.079 0.040 ‐0.049 ‐0.035 0.080 ‐0.050 ‐0.148 ‐0.068 ‐0.067 0.048
Observations 1316 1388 1316 1388 714 747 714 747 602 641 602 641
OLS IV
All Children Males Females
OLS IVOLS IV
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Table 3.5b – Endowment Contributions to the Mathematics Test Score Decomposition, Younger Cohort (Round 3 – 8-year-olds, Round 4 
– 12-year-olds) 
 
 
  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4 R3 R4
Endowments:
Child's Charactristics
Female 0.000 0.000 ‐0.002 ‐0.003
Age in Months 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.015 0.006 0.013 0.005
Cognitive Test Score Round 2 0.045*** 0.076*** 0.043** 0.080*** 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.023 0.070** 0.021 0.074**
Total hours of domestic work 0.033*** 0.014* 0.004 ‐0.059 0.023** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.039* 0.044* 0.022 0.050
Total hours of market work 0.074*** 0.116*** 0.098 0.162 0.137*** 0.185*** 0.288* 0.077 0.025 0.040 ‐0.093 0.135
Parents' Characteristics
Parents Education: 1‐3 years 0.003 ‐0.008 0.004 ‐0.003 0.004 ‐0.005 0.004 ‐0.004 0.001 ‐0.012 ‐0.002 ‐0.011
Parents Education: 4‐8 years ‐0.002 0.001 ‐0.002 0.000 ‐0.004 0.000 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Parents Education: more than 8 years 0.135*** 0.053 0.140*** 0.053 0.159*** 0.049 0.166*** 0.045 0.115* 0.049 0.127** 0.047
One Parent Absent ‐0.011 ‐0.002 ‐0.011 ‐0.005 ­0.025* ‐0.006 ­0.030** ‐0.001 0.006 ‐0.003 0.003 ‐0.001
Both Parents Absent ‐0.002 ‐0.007 ‐0.002 ‐0.007 0.000 ‐0.005 0.000 ‐0.009 ‐0.005 ‐0.010 ‐0.005 ‐0.012
Household Characteristics
Number of household members 0.015 0.003 0.016 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.009 0.006 0.014 0.004 0.012 ‐0.001
Number of siblings living at home ‐0.022 0.002 ‐0.027 0.003 0.000 0.035 ‐0.009 0.038 ‐0.042 ‐0.041 ‐0.023 ‐0.038
Wealth Index 0.206*** 0.275*** 0.198*** 0.311*** 0.125* 0.305*** 0.065 0.337*** 0.270*** 0.236*** 0.313*** 0.230***
Observations 1316 1388 1316 1388 714 747 714 747 602 641 602 641
IVOLS IVOLS IV
All Children Males Females
OLS
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Table 3.6a - PPVT Score Decomposition between Rural and Urban Children, Older Cohort (Round 2 – 12-year-olds, Round 3 – 15-year-
olds) 
 
 
 
 
Notes : 
 
R : Raw differential 
E : Raw differential due to endowments 
C: Raw differential due to coefficients 
CE: Raw differential due to interaction 
D: Matrix of weights. For the case presented here D = 0 
R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3
Decomposition:
Mean Test Score (Urban) 0.544 0.548 0.544 0.548 0.531 0.610 0.531 0.610 0.557 0.488 0.557 0.488
Mean Test Score (Rural) ‐0.411 ‐0.389 ‐0.411 ‐0.389 ‐0.362 ‐0.300 ‐0.362 ‐0.300 ‐0.463 ‐0.487 ‐0.463 ‐0.487
Raw differential (R) {Urban‐Rural}: 0.955 0.937 0.955 0.937 0.892 0.910 0.892 0.910 1.021 0.974 1.021 0.974
‐ due to endowments (E): 0.269 0.695 0.588 1.532 0.212 0.813 0.592 1.162 0.249 0.695 0.169 1.046
‐ due to coefficients (C): 0.289 0.521 0.330 0.524 0.371 0.533 0.422 0.539 0.337 0.541 0.332 0.552
‐ due to interaction (CE): 0.398 ‐0.279 0.038 ‐1.118 0.309 ‐0.436 ‐0.122 ‐0.792 0.434 ‐0.262 0.519 ‐0.625
Unexplained (U){C+(1‐D)CE}: 0.686 0.242 0.367 ‐0.595 0.680 0.097 0.300 ‐0.253 0.771 0.279 0.851 ‐0.072
Explained (V) {E+D*CE}: 0.269 0.695 0.588 1.532 0.212 0.813 0.592 1.162 0.249 0.695 0.169 1.046
% unexplained {U/R}: 71.9 25.8 38.4 ‐63.5 76.2 10.6 33.6 ‐27.8 75.6 28.7 83.4 ‐7.4
% explained (V/R): 28.1 74.2 61.6 163.5 23.8 89.4 66.4 127.8 24.4 71.3 16.6 107.4
Endowments:
Child's Charactristics 0.171 0.158 0.520 1.671 0.191 0.204 0.643 0.826 0.101 0.134 ‐0.028 0.636
Parents' Characteristics 0.045 0.180 0.061 0.247 ‐0.008 0.118 0.020 0.196 0.146 0.278 0.161 0.208
Household Characteristics 0.142 0.447 0.067 ‐0.095 0.030 0.492 ‐0.023 0.241 0.127 0.372 0.162 0.254
Region Fixed Effects ‐0.089 ‐0.089 ‐0.060 ‐0.291 ‐0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.047 ‐0.101 ‐0.124 ‐0.089 ‐0.126 ‐0.051
Observations 728 728 728 728 368 370 368 370 360 358 360 358
IV
Females
OLS IVOLS IV
All Children Males
OLS
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Table 3.6b – Endowment Contributions to the PPVT Score Decomposition, Older Cohort (Round 2 – 12-year-olds, Round 3 – 15-year-
olds) 
 
 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3
Endowments:
Child's Charactristics
Female ‐0.005 ‐0.009 ‐0.006 ‐0.037
Age in Months 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.019 ‐0.010 0.007 ‐0.008 0.011 0.020 ‐0.017 0.020 ‐0.017
Total hours of domestic work 0.003 0.018 0.012 0.265 ‐0.020 0.000 ‐0.043 ‐0.005 ‐0.003 0.094* ‐0.019 0.385*
Total hours of market work 0.168*** 0.144*** 0.510* 1.423** 0.222*** 0.197*** 0.693** 0.820** 0.083** 0.057** ‐0.029 0.268*
Parents' Characteristics
Parents Education: 1‐3 years 0.000 0.000 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
Parents Education: 4‐8 years 0.007 0.035** 0.015 0.037 ‐0.001 0.019 0.012 0.029 0.021 0.053* 0.021 0.039
Parents Education: more than 8 years 0.043 0.133** 0.043 0.153 0.015 0.079 0.021 0.106 0.131 0.213 0.151 0.145
One Parent Absent 0.003 0.019 0.009 0.057 0.013 0.037 0.012 0.053 ‐0.006 0.013 ‐0.010 0.027
Both Parents Absent ‐0.008 ‐0.007 ‐0.007 0.001 ‐0.034 ‐0.018 ‐0.025 0.008 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.002
Household Characteristics
Number of household members ‐0.028 0.022 ‐0.042 ‐0.010 ‐0.072 0.031 ­0.113* 0.001 0.030 0.008 0.028 0.021
Number of siblings living at home 0.039 0.054 0.042 ‐0.007 0.089 0.077 0.112* 0.061 ‐0.038 0.011 ‐0.027 ‐0.027
Wealth Index 0.130 0.372*** 0.067 ‐0.078 0.014 0.385*** ‐0.022 0.179 0.135 0.353** 0.161 0.260
Observations 728 728 728 728 368 370 368 370 360 358 360 358
IV
Females
OLS IVOLS IV
All Children Males
OLS
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Table 3.7a – Mathematics Test Score Decomposition between Rural and Urban Children, Older Cohort (Round 2 – 12-year-olds, Round 3 
– 15-year-olds) 
 
 
 
Notes : 
 
R : Raw differential 
E : Raw differential due to endowments 
C: Raw differential due to coefficients 
CE: Raw differential due to interaction 
D: Matrix of weights. For the case presented here D = 0 
 
R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3
Decomposition:
Mean Test Score (Urban) 0.309 0.354 0.309 0.354 0.359 0.499 0.359 0.499 0.261 0.215 0.261 0.215
Mean Test Score (Rural) ‐0.169 ‐0.236 ‐0.169 ‐0.236 ‐0.107 ‐0.082 ‐0.107 ‐0.082 ‐0.229 ‐0.389 ‐0.229 ‐0.389
Raw differential (R) {Urban‐Rural}: 0.478 0.591 0.478 0.591 0.466 0.581 0.466 0.581 0.490 0.604 0.490 0.604
‐ due to endowments (E): 0.302 0.239 ‐0.032 0.499 0.364 0.091 0.344 0.413 0.239 0.173 0.232 0.199
‐ due to coefficients (C): ‐0.152 0.020 ‐0.127 0.062 ‐0.022 0.097 ‐0.062 0.179 ‐0.419 ‐0.109 ‐0.283 ‐0.070
‐ due to interaction (CE): 0.328 0.332 0.637 0.029 0.125 0.393 0.185 ‐0.011 0.670 0.539 0.542 0.475
Unexplained (U){C+(1‐D)CE}: 0.176 0.352 0.510 0.091 0.102 0.49 0.123 0.168 0.251 0.431 0.259 0.405
Explained (V) {E+D*CE}: 0.302 0.239 ‐0.032 0.499 0.364 0.091 0.344 0.413 0.239 0.173 0.232 0.199
% unexplained {U/R}: 36.8 59.6 106.7 15.4 22 84.3 26.3 28.9 51.2 71.4 52.8 67.1
% explained (V/R): 63.2 40.4 ‐6.7 84.6 78 15.7 73.7 71.1 48.8 28.6 47.2 32.9
Endowments:
Child's Charactristics 0.032 0.148 ‐0.280 0.533 0.160 0.244 0.125 0.764 ‐0.067 0.070 ‐0.046 0.150
Parents' Characteristics 0.082 ‐0.021 0.009 ‐0.006 0.123 0.081 0.117 0.137 ‐0.015 ‐0.313 ‐0.022 ‐0.312
Household Characteristics 0.211 0.125 0.267 0.009 0.095 ‐0.131 0.100 ‐0.310 0.373 0.383 0.376 0.381
Region Fixed Effects ‐0.022 ‐0.014 ‐0.028 ‐0.036 ‐0.014 ‐0.102 0.001 ‐0.177 ‐0.052 0.034 ‐0.076 ‐0.021
Observations 714 713 714 713 352 353 352 353 362 360 362 360
OLS IV
All Children
OLS IV
Females
OLS IV
Males
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Table 3.7b – Endowment Contributions to the Mathematics Test Score Decomposition, Older Cohort (Round 2 – 12-year-olds, Round 3 – 
15-year-olds) 
 
 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3
Endowments:
Child's Charactristics
Female 0.000 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.004
Age in Months 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.008 ‐0.006 0.002 ‐0.006 0.002 0.004 ‐0.006 0.003 ‐0.006
Total hours of domestic work 0.000 0.028* ‐0.007 0.093 ‐0.016 ‐0.004 ‐0.009 ‐0.011 ‐0.007 0.032 ‐0.020 0.111
Total hours of market work 0.031 0.116*** ‐0.272 0.435 0.182* 0.247*** 0.141 0.772** ‐0.064 0.044** ‐0.029 0.045
Parents' Characteristics
Parents Education: 1‐3 years ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 ‐0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 ‐0.005 ‐0.002 ‐0.004 ‐0.002
Parents Education: 4‐8 years ‐0.005 ‐0.008 ‐0.027 ‐0.003 ‐0.007 ‐0.012 ‐0.009 0.005 0.000 0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.005
Parents Education: more than 8 years 0.084 ‐0.014 0.029 ‐0.017 0.080 0.056 0.077 0.066 0.000 ­0.309** ‐0.007 ­0.299**
One Parent Absent 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.026 0.048 0.035 0.049 0.064* ‐0.007 ‐0.002 ‐0.006 ‐0.002
Both Parents Absent ‐0.008 ‐0.010 ‐0.002 ‐0.012 ­ 0.000 0.000 0.000 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.003
Household Characteristics
Number of household members ‐0.035 0.022 ‐0.036 0.021 ‐0.067 ‐0.013 ‐0.065 ‐0.029 ‐0.031 0.021 ‐0.031 0.026
Number of siblings living at home 0.030 ‐0.027 0.016 ‐0.052 0.062 0.028 0.061 ‐0.005 0.035 ‐0.037 0.029 ‐0.055
Wealth Index 0.216** 0.130 0.287** 0.041 0.100 ‐0.146 0.104 ­0.275* 0.369** 0.399** 0.378** 0.410***
Observations 714 713 714 713 352 353 352 353 362 360 362 360
IV
Females
OLS IV
Males
OLSOLS IV
All Children
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Chapter 4  
The Effects of Health Insurance on 
Investment Portfolios: Evidence from 
Seguro Popular in Mexico, 2008 to 201257 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Health insurance and the public provision of health services have been important topics 
of study in the development economics literature. Improving the health status of the 
population and reducing the risks that it faces from health problems can potentially 
increase welfare, as well as productivity. In recent years, support for the expansion of 
universal health coverage has combined two main goals in the health provision agenda: 
provision of health services and financial protection from high out-of-pocket health care 
costs. 
Research findings in this area suggest that the provision of public health services 
improves the overall health status of the population; and in particular, publicly funded 
health insurance reduces the risks faced by households (Escobar, Griffin and Shaw, 2011; 
Barros, 2008; Grogger et al., 2014). Other important findings in this area show that 
access to health insurance increases employment levels and wages in a developed country 
setting (Gruber and Hanratty, 1995), while public health insurance programs can 
                                                            
57 This Chapter was written in collaboration with Santiago Bazdresch, Research Economist, Banco de 
México. 
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contribute to decrease informal employment in developing countries (Aterido et al., 2011; 
Bosch et al., 2010; Camacho et al., 2009). 
The effects of public and private health insurance on savings have been 
extensively studied, framed into the precautionary savings literature.58 Bai and Wu 
(2014) show that the implementation of the New Cooperative Medical Scheme in rural 
China increased the nonmedical-related consumption of the households by five percent. 
Chou et al. (2003) estimated that the National Health Insurance Program in Taiwan 
decreased household's savings by 8.6-13.7 percent.59. Kirdruang and Glewwe (2017) 
found no evidence of a decrease in savings with the introduction of the Universal 
Healthcare Coverage Scheme in Thailand. However, she estimated positive effects of the 
program on savings in the long run. 
In a developed country setting, Starr-McCluer (1996) analyzed the impact of 
private health insurance in the U.S. on savings and found evidence that contradicted the 
argument that there is a decrease in savings when households have access to health 
insurance. She found a positive and significant relationship between wealth (measured as 
liquid or financial assets)60 and insurance coverage. 
While a large body of literature studies the impact of different health insurance 
systems on households’ savings, this Chapter aims to look into the question of long term 
effects of these policies by studying changes in the investment behavior of households 
benefited from these programs. Intuitively, access to health insurance changes the profile 
                                                            
58 In general, precautionary savings are defined to be the savings that an agent makes in order to smooth out 
the uncertainty around expected future income or expenditure. In standard economic theory, the agent 
engages in precautionary savings because he or she cannot directly buy insurance that will protect him or 
her from shocks at a reasonably low price. In these standard models, a reduction in the riskiness of net 
income, which would result from the introduction, ceteris paribus, of retirement insurance or health 
insurance, leads to a reduction in precautionary savings. Carroll and Kimball (2008) provided a recent 
summary of the state of the literature.  
Theoretical studies on precautionary savings include Leland (1968), Kotlikoff (1989) and Kimball (1990), 
among others.  
59 The National Health Insurance Program in Taiwan is the only health insurance option in the country. 
60 The liquid assets measured include cash, checking accounts, savings accounts, and savings bonds, among 
others; the financial assets measured include liquid assets plus stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and retirement 
accounts, among others. The latter measure requires a well-developed financial market. 
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of risks that households face, and therefore changes how much savings they will need to 
self-insure and also what types of investments they allocate their savings to. In particular, 
access to insurance potentially allows households to allocate their savings to ‘better’ 
investments. To the extent that these investments have high returns such as investments 
in education, the provision of public health insurance can have a potentially large impact 
on long run economic development. 
In particular, this Chapter estimates the effect on households of receiving access 
to a publically funded health insurance system on the type of investments they allocate 
their savings to. The Chapter characterizes a number of household’s expenditures as 
being liquid investments, useful for insurance purposes, and other, less liquid 
investments. The main hypothesis of the Chapter is that, upon obtaining access to public 
health insurance, households will decrease(increase) the fraction of their savings that they 
allocate to liquid(illiquid) assets. Following the finance literature on liquidity, in this 
Chapter liquid assets correspond to low return assets and illiquid assets to high return 
assets.61 
With this classification, this Chapter studies whether there is a measurable effect 
of the introduction of Seguro Popular, a large subsidized health insurance program, on 
the allocation of savings to different types of investment by using income and 
expenditure data from Mexico’s ENIGH household survey from 2008 to 2012. This 
research has advantages and disadvantages. ENIGH includes tens of thousands of 
observations in each round, which allows parsing the sample in multiple ways. However, 
ENIGH is not a panel, therefore this Chapter uses logistic regressions to infer the 
household participation in different health insurance categories over time in order to 
apply a difference in differences empirical strategy. The results suggest that there is a 
statistically and economically significant change in the allocation of investment from 
liquid, low return investments to illiquid, high return investments (especially human 
                                                            
61 For example, rates or return to investment in education are estimated to be on the order of 25 percent 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004) in some cases, while, considering inflation and the risk of theft or 
other physical loss imply that the return to savings in cash is likely to be a negative number. 
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capital investment) for households that enrolled in Seguro Popular, compared to 
uninsured households. 
The rest of this Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the Seguro 
Popular program in the context of Mexico’s health care system. Section 4.3 develops a 
model of consumption under uncertainty that will be used to interpret the empirical 
results. Section 4.4 describes the bi-annual survey data used in the Chapter. Section 4.5 
explains the empirical procedure, focusing in particular on how the change in status from 
non-participation to enrollment in Seguro Popular is inferred. Section 4.6 presents the 
results of the Chapter. Section 4.7 describes what can be concluded from the results of 
the study, and under which assumptions. 
4.2 Background on Mexico’s Health Care System 
 
The right to receive medical treatment is guaranteed by the Mexican Constitution (Article 
4),62 and medical care is regulated by the Ley General de la Salud (General Health Law). 
Consequently, the Mexican population is entitled, by law, to have access to health 
services, and the state has to provide health care. In 2000, 58.6 percent of the Mexican 
population was uninsured. Two years later, in 2002, the government started a pilot 
program of a subsidized health insurance program called Seguro Popular. In 2004 the 
program was established as national policy and by 2006 the program was present in all 
Mexican states. By 2013, 45 percent of the population was covered by this universal 
health insurance program, while 21.5 percent remained uninsured. 
In 2000, access to health care was unequal, not only geographically but also 
socioeconomically. In 2002, federal health spending was 45 percent of all health care 
spending in Mexico. Out-of-pocket payments accounted for an additional 52 percent of 
                                                            
62 “Every person has a right to receive medical treatment when deemed as necessary. The law shall not 
only define the guiding criteria regulating the access to health services but also establish concurrent 
activities to be carried out by the federation and the states in organizing public health services under 
article 73, paragraph XVI of this Constitution.” 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf 
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health care spending; the remaining three percent came from private health insurance 
(Secretaría de Salud, 2005).  
The World Health Report 2000 identified a major problem in Mexico regarding 
catastrophic health spending (Gakidou et al, 2006). In 2002, the out-of-pocket health 
payments of low income households averaged 6.8 percent of their income, while for high 
income households it represented 2.2 percent of their income (Secretaría de Salud, 2005). 
The lack of access to health care, the inequality of access, and the aim to protect the 
population against catastrophic health expenditures, led the government to establish the 
System for Social Protection in Health in November 2002 (Sistema de Protección Social 
en Salud); Seguro Popular is one of its components.  
In 2002, Seguro Popular started as a pilot in 26 municipalities in five states: 
Aguascalientes, Campeche, Colima, Jalisco, and Tabasco. Through a reform of the 
General Health Law in 2004, Seguro Popular was established as a national policy. 
Geographic coverage across the country and the inclusion of different socioeconomic 
groups was gradually incorporated. By 2006, the program was present in all the Mexican 
states (1,584 out of 2,454 municipalities). 
The goal of the program was to provide health insurance to the population that 
was not previously covered by the Social Security system by 2012. Coverage of Seguro 
Popular has increased dramatically over time (Figure 4.1). When the pilot program ended 
in December 2003, it covered 2.2 million people. By the end of 2013, as a national policy 
with voluntary enrollment, it covered 55.6 million people of all income levels (45 percent 
of the population). On the other hand, 21.5 percent of the population remained uninsured.  
In order to be eligible for Seguro Popular, families cannot receive any other 
health insurance benefits provided by the Social Security system. Affiliation to Seguro 
Popular is requested by the head of the household and it is granted for one year to 
families in the highest income deciles, for the case of families from low income deciles, 
affiliation is granted for a three-year period (CONEVAL, 2014). In addition, Seguro 
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Popular has extended coverage of young adults and the elderly compared to other 
insurance programs provided by the Social Security system.63  
Table 4.1 shows the annual fee that each household must pay to be enrolled in Seguro 
Popular. Fees are determined by the Comisión Nacional de Protección en Salud, based 
on socioeconomic information which is used to estimate the household income level. 
From 2008 to 2012, the annual fees were kept constant. The lowest four income deciles 
do not pay a fee, while the wealthier deciles pay annual fees that range from MX$2,075 
(1.6 percent of the per capita GDP) to MX$11,374 (8.6 percent of the per capita GDP). 
Since 2012, Seguro Popular has been the main source of health insurance for 
Mexican households. According to CONEVAL (2013), 64 from 2010 to 2012 the 
proportion of households covered by Seguro Popular increased from 30.5 to 40.8 
percent, as shown in Figure 4.2.65 The other health insurance sources available in Mexico 
are: IMSS, ISSSTE, PEMEX and private health insurance; ISSSTE, ISSSTE-Estatal and 
PEMEX are types of health insurance for public workers. Despite the effort of the 
government to make health insurance available to all Mexican households, as of 2012, 
21.5 percent of the population was still not covered by any type of health insurance. 66 
According to the World Development Indicators, real health expenditure per 
capita in Mexico has increased by more than 80 percent in one decade, from US$ 584.2 
                                                            
63 While the Social Security system covers children up to 16, or up to 25 if disabled or studying, Seguro 
Popular’s coverage extends to children under 18, or up to 25 if single, students, or economically dependent 
and living in the same dwelling. Seguro Popular also covers the parents (65 or older) of the head of the 
household or of his or her spouse if they are economically dependent and living in the same dwelling 
(Aterido et al., 2011) 
64http://www.coneval.gob.mx/rw/resource/coneval/med_pobreza/Acceso_a_los_servicios_de_salud_Censo
_2010/Carencia_a_los_servicios_de_salud_2010.pdf 
65 Measuring the proportion of the population covered by Seguro Popular varies by institutions. For the 
case of the number of persons and households participating in Seguro Popular reported in Figure 4.1, 
administrative records from Seguro Popular were used. On the other hand, CONEVAL measures 
enrollment using the section of socioeconomic characteristics of ENIGH. 
66 As discussed in the latest results report of the National Health and Nutrition Survey (ENSANUT), a new 
challenge will be to increase coverage targeting the young adults not attending school who have not been 
able to enter the formal labor market, given that they lose the right of coverage through their parents 
(Gutiérrez et al., 2012). 
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in 2002 to US$1,061.9 in 2012. 67 Total health expenditure is around six percent of the 
GDP, but public health expenditure as a proportion of total health expenditure has 
increased from 43.8 percent in 2002, to 51.8 percent in 2012. During this time, private 
health expenditure has remained constant at around 3.2 percent of the GDP. Seguro 
Popular currently represents 60 percent of the federal government's expenditure on health 
(around 0.5 percent of the GDP in 2014). 
In summary, Mexico has spent a significant amount of resources to provide access 
to health care to the population that was uninsured before 2000. In 2002, the pilot of 
Seguro Popular was launched in five states; by 2005, the program was a national policy 
and was present in all states in Mexico. Since 2012, Seguro Popular has been the single 
largest source of health insurance in Mexico, with more than 55 million people affiliated.  
4.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
This Chapter studies the household’s investment decisions subject to uncertainty, in terms 
of their choice to invest in liquid, low return assets, or illiquid, high return assets. This 
section describes a simple, two period model of consumption and investment that serves 
as a conceptual framework. The objective of this section is to present the problem of a 
risk averse, financially constrained agent who faces uncertainty about the shock he or she 
will face in the short run, i.e. period 1.  
Our agent makes investment decisions in period 0 and consumes in two periods: 
period 1 which stands for the short run, and period 2 which stands for the long run. The 
agent is endowed with wealth W in period 0 and has access to two investment 
technologies to transfer this wealth into periods 1 and 2 for consumption. She invests AL 
on a liquid type of investment (e.g. cash), which she can use for consumption in period 1. 
She invests the rest, AI = W-AL, in an illiquid type of investment (e.g. education), which 
she can use only in period 2. The liquid investment pays her returns RL=0, the illiquid 
asset pays her higher returns RI>RL. Crucially, the agent is financially constrained, in the 
                                                            
67 Values in constant 2005 international dollars. 
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sense that she cannot borrow in period 1 using her income from her AI investment to pay 
back the loan (e.g. while she is a student, she cannot consume out of the returns of her 
investment in education). 
The agent faces an income shock ξ in period 1 (eg. anything from a negative 
shock like a costly medical emergency to a positive shock like obtaining an improved 
treatment for a chronic condition). The shock has mean zero (0) and variance σ and we 
denote its distribution with F. When the shock is negative (ξ <0) the agent has more 
expenses than she expected. When the shock is positive (ξ >0) the agent has more wealth 
than she expected. Because the agent is credit constrained, her consumption in period 1 is 
limited by her investment in liquid assets plus the income shock: ܥଵ ൑ ܣ௅ ൅ ξ. For 
simplicity it is assumed that, in period 1, the agent consumes all the liquid assets 
available in that period, i.e. ܥଵ ൌ ܣ௅ ൅ ξ.  (e.g. while she is a student, the agent doesn’t 
save cash for the future). 
Analytically, the agent’s problem is to maximize the expected value of the sum of 
the first and second period utilities: 
max஺ಽ,஺಺ ܸ ൌ ܧకሾܷሺܥଵሻ ൅ ߚܷሺܥଶሻሿ,     (4.1) 
where it is assumed that U is strictly increasing and concave, and 0 ൏ ߚ ൏ 1 is the 
discount factor that reflects the passage of time. The agent maximizes this expected 
utility subject to the following constraints: 
ܹ ൌ ܣ௅ ൅ ܣூ       (4.2) 
ܥଵ ൌ ܣ௅ ൅ ξ, with ξ  ~ ܨሺ0, ߪሻ    (4.3) 
ܥଶ ൌ  ܴு כ ܣூ        (4.4) 
ܣ௅ ൒ 0, ܣூ ൒ 0       (4.5) 
The first constraint describes the fact that the agent has a limited amount of 
resources to invest for the future. She splits her wealth between the two possible 
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investments AL and AI. The second constraint describes the simplification that the agent’s 
consumption in period 1 is equal to the sum of the liquid investment which she can 
dispose of and the income shock. The third row describes consumption in period 2 as the 
income that the agent receives from her illiquid investment, and the last constraint 
describes the idea that the agent cannot have a negative investment in any of the two 
periods.  
To solve the model, we assume a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) 
utility function, with γ > 0: 
ܷሺܥሻ ൌ െ݁ݔ݌ିఊ஼      (4.6) 
As the shock ξ is distributed as a normal with mean 0 and variance ߪ, the expected value 
of the agent’s utility can be expressed as: 
ܧሾܷሺܥଵሻሿ ൌ ܧൣെ݁ݔ݌ିఊሺ஺ಽାஞሻ൧    (4.7) 
ൌ െ݁ݔ݌ିఊ஺ಽ݁ݔ݌ିఊఓାଵଶఊమఙమ 
Given that U(C2) does not depend on the shock, the initial budget constraint can be used 
to rewrite the agent’s problem as: 
max஺ಽ ܸ ൌ െ݁ݔ݌
ିఊ஺ಽ݁ݔ݌ାభమఊమఙమ െ ߚ݁ݔ݌ିఊሺோಹሺௐି஺ಽሻሻ (4.8) 
 
The first order condition with respect to AL can be expressed as: 
డ௎
డ஺ಽ ൌ ߛ݁ݔ݌
ିఊ஺ಽ݁ݔ݌ାభమఊమఙమ െ ߚߛܴு݁ݔ݌ିఊ൫ோಹሺௐି஺ಽሻ൯ ൌ 0, (4.9) 
which is equivalent to:  
െߛܣ௅ ൅ ଵଶ ߛଶߪଶ ൌ ݈݊ሺߚܴுሻ െ ߛሺܴுሺܹ െ ܣ௅ሻሻ  (4.10) 
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Finally, the optimal level of investment in liquid assets (AL*) is given by: 
ܣ௅כ ൌ
భ
మఊఙమି
భ
ം௅௡ሺఉோಹሻାோಹௐ
ଵାோಹ      (4.11) 
Our interest lies on the effect of the volatility of the shock on the fraction of 
income invested in the liquid assets ߙ௅ ൌ ܣ௅/ܹ. Intuitively, the agent will react to an 
increase in income risk in a period by allocating more savings for consumption in that 
period. We can show this by differentiating AL* with respect to σ2, which gives us the 
direction of the effect: 
డ஺ಽ
డఙమ ൌ
భ
మఊ
ௐሺଵାோಹሻ ൐ 0      (4.12) 
The agent’s investment in liquid assets depends positively on the amount of risk 
she faces in period 1. Therefore, in response to higher period 1 volatility, the agent 
protects herself by allocating more of his consumption to that period, saving less at the 
high-return rate along the way. 
The intuition is related to the precautionary savings motive.  In this case it is a 
precautionary motive for liquidity as described originally by Keynes (1936)68. Utility 
functions that have the property that increased riskiness in a period’s consumption leads 
the agent to increase the savings that she allocates to that period, are said to exhibit 
“prudence”. It can be described analytically as a convex marginal utility, or equivalently 
as a positive third order derivative of utility. A convex marginal utility implies that the 
expected marginal utility of a risky consumption level is higher than the marginal utility 
of the expected consumption, and therefore in any setting where the agent is equalizing 
marginal utilities across periods, an increase in riskiness of consumption in a period will 
lead to an increase on the optimal allocation of consumption to that period. 
                                                            
68 The original text reads that one of the motives for holding money is to “provide for contingencies 
requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen opportunities of advantageous purchases”, (p.196). 
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The assumption of a utility function that displays prudence is relatively weak in 
the sense that both CARA and CRRA utility functions exhibit this property. Indeed, any 
increasing and concave utility function with decreasing absolute risk aversion displays 
prudence since   
ௗቀିೠᇲᇲೠᇲ ቁ
ௗ௖ ൏ 0 ฻ െ
௨ᇲᇲᇲ
௨ᇲᇲ ൐ െ
௨ᇲᇲ
௨ᇲ , but െ
௨ᇲᇲ
௨ᇲ ൐ 0 by assumption. 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Mexican National Household Income and Expenditure Surveys 
 
This Chapter uses two rounds of the Mexican National Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys (abbreviated as ENIGH for its name in Spanish), Mexico’s main 
household survey of income and expenditure, which has been implemented since 1984 by 
the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). The survey is conducted 
every two years and is representative at the national level. It includes three units of 
analysis: dwellings, households, and persons. The different sections of the questionnaire 
provide detailed information about household income and expenditure, dwelling 
characteristics, and demographic variables and information on income and social security 
contributions for each household member. See Appendix 2 for details and sections of the 
survey. 
A new methodology for the ENIGH was introduced in 2008, which includes a 
health module for each household member. Questions regarding enrollment in Seguro 
Popular were introduced in 2006, but additional questions about other health insurance 
alternatives and medical attention were added in 2008. This analysis uses two rounds of 
ENIGH: 2008 and 2012. ENIGHs are repeated cross-sections rather than a panel, and the 
number of households surveyed varies from year to year: 24,468 households in 2008, and 
9,002 in 2012. 69  
 
                                                            
69 The number of households surveyed in 2012 is smaller because in previous years the sample was 
expanded to make it representative at the state level. See Appendix 2 for more details. 
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4.4.2 Health Insurance Measures 
 
Different measures of access to health insurance were computed from the ENIGH 
data. Enrollment in Seguro Popular is measured at the household level. For this purpose, 
the proportion of household members enrolled in Seguro Popular was computed. Then, 
to identify households with other types of health insurance, or uninsured households, we 
used the question regarding enrollment in another health care provider; the options 
included IMSS, ISSSTE, PEMEX, and others. This information was used to calculate the 
proportion of household members enrolled in other types of health insurance.  
Then households were classified as beneficiaries of the program if more than half 
of the members of the household were enrolled in Seguro Popular. In contrast, when 
more than half of the household members were enrolled with any of the other health 
insurance providers, the household was considered as receiving other types of health 
insurance.  
Table 4.2 shows the evolution of the proportion of households classified in the 
different types of health insurance by year and income level. From now on, low-income 
households are defined as those households in the first four expenditure deciles. This 
definition takes into account the fact that households in this group do not have to pay an 
annual fee to be enrolled in Seguro Popular. It is evident that Seguro Popular has 
expanded during the period. In 2008, 17.5 percent of the households were enrolled in 
Seguro Popular, while by 2012 that number reached 38.7 percent. In the case of low 
income households, the proportion of households enrolled in Seguro Popular increased 
form 27.2 percent in 2008 to 55.2 percent in 2012.  
On the other hand, the proportion of households with different types of health 
insurance and uninsured households decreased during the 2008-2012 period. In 2008, 
households with other state-funded or private health insurance represented 43.5 percent, 
while by 2012 that number decreased to 37.4 percent. The proportion of low income 
households receiving other types of health insurance decreased from 25.6 percent in 2008 
to 19.6 in 2012. From 2008 to 2012, the proportion of uninsured households of all income 
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levels decreased from 39.1 percent to 23.9 percent; the percentage of uninsured low-
income households decreased from 47.2 percent to 25.2 percent in the same period.  
4.4.3 Investment Measures 
 
This section describes the assumptions about liquid/low return and illiquid/high 
return assets of households used in this Chapter. The expenditure variables included in 
the ENIGH could be reported daily, monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, or annually; for 
comparability purposes, all investment and savings measures were annualized. 
Household expenditures on assets are classified as illiquid when the acquired 
assets cannot be easily transformed into cash. Investment in human capital, durable 
assets, and high return savings are included in this category. Human capital investment 
consists of expenditures on education, which includes expenses on tuition, fees, 
educational materials, education services, and uniforms. For example, this Chapter deems 
all human capital investments as illiquid. It is difficult to cash in a high-school degree or 
other education credentials to pay for an unexpected health event. Investment in durable 
assets includes mortgage payments and acquisition of vehicles; for these assets this 
Chapter assumes that it is difficult to transform construction improvements, past 
mortgage payments or small business investments into cash. Finally, high return savings 
consist of payments of debts and credit card debts. 
On the other hand, household expenditures are classified as liquid by assessing 
which assets can be easily transformed into cash to pay for an unexpected health event. 
Consumer durable goods, expenses targeted to strengthen networks, and low return 
savings are included in this category. Consumer durable goods investment consists of 
expenses on a list of domestic appliances70 that can be considered to be liquid assets, as 
they can be easily sold or given to a pawn shop. Different types of investments targeted 
to strengthen the household’s network are included in the liquid investment category such 
                                                            
70 Includes expenses on various items such as: fan, telephone, AC units, sewing machine, stove, 
refrigerator, blender, mixer, iron, juicer, microwave, washing machine, vacuum, water heater, lamps, 
toasters, beds, dining tables, chairs, carpets, rugs, book shelves, and bicycles, among others. 
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as expenditures on community events and gifts and loans to friends and family. A strong 
network could support the household in the eventuality of a medical emergency in 
different ways: company, taking care of children and elders, and lending money, among 
others. Expenditures in this category can also be thought of as a form of social insurance. 
Finally, low return savings includes deposits at formal and informal institutions. 
The total level of investment is defined as the sum of all the investment and 
savings measures for each household. Our interest lies in how the proportion of different 
types of investment changes when households gain access to Seguro Popular. For this 
purpose, the proportion of each type of investment or savings relative to the total level of 
investment of each household is defined as:  
ܲݎ݋݌ܫ݊ݒ௜ ൌ ூ௡௩೔∑ ூ௡௩ೕ೙ೕసభ        (4.13) 
where i refers to a specific type of investment and j stands for the different types of 
investments and savings. 
Table 4.3 shows the evolution of the proportion of each type of investment or 
savings for the all households and for low income households. Regarding the illiquid 
investments, human capital is the main form of investment of Mexican households for all 
periods. It represents around 40 percent of total investment, and it represents a larger 
proportion of the total investment for low income households. Investment in durable 
assets, such as buying a house or a car, represents around five percent of the total 
investment for all households and less than two percent for low income households. The 
high return savings represents around eleven percent of the total level of investment for 
all households throughout the period, and fluctuates between 6.2 and 7.4 percent for low 
income households. 
On the other hand, illiquid investment measures represented less than 48 percent 
in all periods and for both groups. The main form of investment in this category is 
strengthening the household network, which decreased from 17.9 percent in 2008 to 16.2 
percent in 2012 for all households and from 22.1 percent to 18.6 percent for low income 
 
102 
households. The proportion of investment in consumer durable goods fluctuates around 
11.5 percent for all households, while it represents around 14 percent of the total 
investment of low income households. Finally, the measure of low return savings 
increased for both groups during the analyzed period. It increased from 9.5 percent in 
2008 to 15.9 percent in 2012 for all households and from 7.2 percent to 14.9 percent for 
low income households 
4.4.4 Individual and Household Characteristics 
 
Table 4.4 presents summary statistics of the household and individual variables 
used in the analysis. The first set of variables includes characteristics of the head of the 
household. In 2012, the household heads of households with Seguro Popular were the 
youngest and with the lowest levels of educational attainment, compared to uninsured 
households and households with other types of health insurance. In contrast, the largest 
proportion of female household heads was found in the uninsured group.  
A second set of variables are related to the household characteristics, which 
include: composition of the household, geographic location, 71 labor markets, educational 
characteristics, and participation in Oportunidades.72 The first group of variables is 
related to the composition of the household. In 2012, households enrolled in Seguro 
Popular were larger (4.56 members on average) and had more children under the age of 
18 than households with other types of health insurance or uninsured households. In 
contrast, households with other types of health insurance had more household members 
aged 65 years or more, than households receiving Seguro Popular or uninsured 
households. 
In 2012, most households with other types of health insurance, or uninsured 
resided in urban areas (93 and 84 percent, respectively), while just 63 percent of 
                                                            
71 According to INEGI, a household is classified as urban if it resides in cities with more than 2,500 
inhabitants; otherwise it is classified as rural. 
72 Oportunidades is the main anti-poverty program of the Mexican government. We identify households 
with Oportunidades through the education questions. The survey asked children who were enrolled in 
school, if the received a scholarship; if so, they identify which institution gave them the scholarship. 
Oportunidades was the main sponsor of education scholarships during the analyzed period. 
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households enrolled in Seguro Popular lived in urban areas. Households with other types 
of health insurance have the largest proportion of formal workers (52 percent), followed 
by uninsured households (16 percent) and households enrolled in Seguro Popular (9 
percent).  
The proportion of children enrolled in school was largest for households with 
other types of health insurance (76 percent) than for households enrolled with Seguro 
Popular (71 percent) and uninsured households (67 percent). In contrast, participation in 
Oportunidades differed between households receiving Seguro Popular (24 percent) and 
households with other types of health insurance (2 percent) or uninsured households (5 
percent).  
In addition to the head of the household and household characteristics, this 
Chapter used expenditure data for each year to classify each household into deciles.73 
4.5 Empirical Strategy 
 
To estimate the effect of Seguro Popular on household investment and savings decisions, 
the ideal dataset would be a panel with baseline data before the implementation of the 
program. A dataset with these characteristics allows for differences-in-differences 
analysis, and does not require strong assumptions regarding which households self-select 
into the program (selection on unobservable characteristics). Unfortunately, this type of 
data does not exist. 74 
As mentioned before, the most comprehensive income and expenditure household 
survey in Mexico is ENIGH. The question in this survey regarding affiliation with Seguro 
Popular was introduced in 2006, and the questions about other types of health insurance 
were introduced in 2008. Therefore, our analysis will be restricted to the period from 
                                                            
73 The expenditure deciles were computed for each survey year using the total and per capita income and 
expenditure values. 
74 Another comprehensive dataset is the Mexican Family Life Survey (MXFLS) which has information of 
the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the Mexican families, as well as data on health, 
health insurance options, and expenditure. Unfortunately, it does not have detailed information regarding 
savings flows. 
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2008 to 2012. Although Seguro Popular was an existing and functional program in 2008, 
the number of persons enrolled in Seguro Popular doubled during the period of interest; 
increasing from 27.2 million persons enrolled in 2008 to 52.9 million persons in 2012.  
4.5.1. Effects of Seguro Popular on Investment and Savings using Ordinary Least 
Squares Analysis 
 
This Chapter first estimates the effect of Seguro Popular on different types of 
investment and savings. To do this, we use the following specification: 
ܲݎ݋݌ܫ݊ݒ௜௝௞௧ ൌ ߴ଴ ൅ ߚଵܲݎ݋݌ܵ ௝ܲ௞௧ ൅ ߚଶܲݎ݋݌ܱܪܫ௝௞௧ ൅ ∑ ߩଵ ௟ܺ௝௞௧௡௟ୀଵ ൅ ߬௞ ൅ ߝ௜௝௞௧ (4.14) 
where i indexes the type of investment, j indexes the household, k indexes the geographic 
region, and t indexes the year.  
The dependent variable, PropInv, corresponds to one of the i types of investment 
which are measured as a proportion of total investment. The ܲݎ݋݌ܵܲ variable represents 
the proportion of household members enrolled in Seguro Popular. Similarly, PropOHI 
represents the proportion of household members receiving other types of health 
insurance; households without health insurance are the reference category. X is a vector 
of characteristics of the head of the household and of the household, such us gender, age, 
educational attainment and employment status of the head of the household, urban status 
of the household, number of household members, proportion of income earners who are 
informal workers, participation in Oportunidades, and dummy variables for the type of 
household: one-person household, nuclear family household, or extended family 
household. The variable ߬௞ allows for state-specific fixed effects and ߝ௜௝௞௧ is an error 
term. 
The coefficient of interest is ߚଵ, which captures the effect of an increase of the 
coverage of Seguro Popular on investment and savings (relative to households without 
insurance). The model developed in section 4.3 suggests that households facing less risk 
will allocate a smaller proportion of their investments into liquid assets (consumer 
durable goods, networks, and low return savings); while the effect for the case of high 
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return, illiquid assets is expected to be positive (human capital, durable assets, and high 
return savings). 
4.5.2. Effects of Seguro Popular on Investment and Savings using Difference in 
Difference Analysis 
 
The gradual introduction of Seguro Popular in Mexico allows one to exploit the 
variation of prior lacks health insurance to understand the immediate effects of this health 
policy on household investment and saving behaviors. For this purpose, the difference-in-
differences (DID) framework is used.  
We tested the parallel trends assumption using data from 2000, 2002, and 2004. 
The results suggest that there were no significant differences in the changes in investment 
and savings measures within uninsured groups of households before Seguro Popular was 
established. We excluded insured households, which correspond to those households 
whose head of the households or working-age adults had health insurance as one of the 
benefits from his/her job. The compared groups were: agricultural vs. non-agricultural 
workers, and self-employed vs. employed households. Traditionally, the agricultural 
sector lack of social security and health insurance. The investment measures used for this 
test are the same as the ones described in section 4.4.3. See Appendix 3 for a graphic 
representation of the process. 
Changes in the behavior of the control group capture any systematic factors 
unrelated to the program, while changes in the treatment group capture both those some 
systematic factors and the impact of Seguro Popular. The following equation will be 
estimated for each PropInv: 
ܲݎ݋݌ܫ݊ݒ௜௝௞௧ ൌ ߴ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܪܫ௝௞ ൅ ߚଶܵ ௝ܲ௞ ൅ ߚଷܰ݁ݓܵ ௝ܲ௞ ൅ ߛܶ ൅ ߜܰ݁ݓܵ ௝ܲ௞௧ כ ܶ ൅
∑ ߩଵ௡௟ୀଵ ௟ܺ௝௞௧ ൅ ߬௞ ൅ ߝ௜௝௞௧      (4.15) 
where i indexes the type of investment, j indexes the household, k indexes the geographic 
region and t indexes the year. OHI is a dummy variable to identify households with other 
types of health insurance and SP is a dummy variable to identify households that 
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participated in Seguro Popular during the whole period. NewSP is a dummy variable that 
identifies households in the treatment group, those that were uninsured in 2008 and by 
2012 were enrolled in Seguro Popular. Households that were uninsured during the 2008-
2012 period are the reference category. A dummy variable for the year 2012 is 
represented by T. The dependent variable, PropInv, the additional controls (X) and the 
state fixed effects are described in subsection 4.5.1.  ߝ௜௝௞௧ is an error term. 
The interaction between NewSP and T captures the early impact of access to 
Seguro Popular. Thus, the coefficient of interest is ߜ, which captures the program effect. 
Following the results of the model developed in section 4.3, it is expected that ߜ would 
be negative when analyzing the low return investment measures. On the other hand, when 
analyzing the effects of access to Seguro Popular on human capital, durable assets, or 
high return savings, the sign of ߜ is expected to be positive.  
4.5.3. Identification of the Treatment and Control Groups 
 
In order to perform the DID analysis in equation (14), it is necessary to classify 
the households into treatment and control groups. This section describes the procedure 
carried out to classify households into these groups. 
The first step performed was to classify the sample into two groups: households 
that were the potential target of Seguro Popular and those households that had other 
types of health insurance. This Chapter assumes that the quality of the other health 
insurance options available in Mexico was better than the quality of Seguro Popular 
services75, thus it is not expected for households to switch from other types of health 
insurance to be enrolled with Seguro Popular. 
In the ENIGH data, it is possible to observe whether each household was 
affiliated with Seguro Popular, other healthcare institutions, or was uninsured. 
                                                            
75 A recent report from CONEVAL shows that although the number of beneficiaries of Seguro Popular has 
increased in the past years, the infrastructure, number of doctors and supplies has not increased at the same 
rate (see Table 7, pp34. in the report). In addition, the proportion of persons that did not get medical care 
when needed is higher for persons affiliated to Seguro Popular than for those with other types of health 
insurance (Figure 12, pp56.). (CONEVAL, 2014) 
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Households affiliated with Seguro Popular and uninsured households are defined as the 
potential targets of Seguro Popular, as shown in Figure 4.3a. 
The second step was to classify households into permanently uninsured 
households (U), new to Seguro Popular (NewSP), and permanently affiliated to Seguro 
Popular (SP). This is a challenge in this setting because the data is not a panel. It does not 
follow households over time. Therefore, it is necessary to infer for the uninsured 
households in 2008, whether they were affiliated to Seguro Popular in 2012 (Figure 
4.3b), and for households affiliated with Seguro Popular in 2012, whether they were 
uninsured in 2008 (Figure 4.3c). 
To estimate the coefficients, we use logistic regressions which are described in detailed in 
the following sections. 
4.5.3.1. Identification of Potential Participants in 2008 
 
In order to identify the pool of potential participants in the 2008 sample, a logistic 
regression predicting the probability of participation in Seguro Popular in 2012 was 
estimated. Then, the predicted probabilities of participation for 2008 were used to classify 
the group of uninsured households in 2008 into: i) always uninsured and ii) new to 
Seguro Popular, as shown in Figure 4.3b. 
Assuming that by 2012 all of the eligible households that wanted to participate in 
Seguro Popular were already affiliated, a logistic model was estimated to predict the 
probability of participation in Seguro Popular in 2012. In the sample, households with 
other types of health insurances were excluded. The set of control variables includes 
characteristics of the head of the household such as gender, age, educational attainment, 
and labor market characteristics (informality or self-employment) and household 
composition variables such as number of household members, women of childbearing 
age, household members (17 or 18 years old), number of children enrolled in school, 
proportion of informal workers in the household, participation in Oportunidades, a 
dichotomous variable identifying one-person households, and the proportion of 
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household members with other types of health insurance. The results of the logistic model 
are reported in Appendix 4, Table A.8. 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܲܽݎݐ.ௌ௉ ሻ෣  is the predicted probability of enrollment in Seguro Popular, 
using the 2012 characteristics. Using this predicted probability in the 2008 sample of 
uninsured households, households were classified into two categories: households that 
were always uninsured, and households that were potential participants of Seguro 
Popular. The selected threshold value corresponds to the predicted probability that 
maintains a constant proportion of uninsured households in 2008 and 2012 (27.2 percent). 
In summary, households in the 2008 sample were classified into three groups: i) 
households that always had Seguro Popular (households classified as been enrolled in 
Seguro Popular are the ones in this group), ii) potential participants in Seguro Popular 
(the group of households that were uninsured in 2008 but were probably enrolled in 
Seguro Popular by 2012), and iii) always uninsured households (the group of households 
that were uninsured in 2008 and probably remained uninsured in 2012). Households with 
other types of health insurance remained classified as such. 
4.5.3.2. Identification of Permanent Participants of Seguro Popular in 2012 
 
In order to identify the households enrolled in Seguro Popular during the whole 
period, a logistic regression predicting the probability of participation in Seguro Popular 
in 2008 was estimated. Then, the predicted probabilities of participation in the 2012 
sample were used to classify households with Seguro Popular in 2012 into households 
with permanent access to Seguro Popular and households new to Seguro Popular.   
This logistic regression was estimated for the group of households that from the 
results of the previous section were classified as potential participants and households 
enrolled in Seguro Popular in 2008, as shown in Figure 4.3c. The set of control variables 
used in the analysis is the same as the one described in section 4.5.3.1 in addition to state 
fixed effects (with Mexico City as the reference category). The results of the logistic 
regression are reported in Appendix 4, Table A.7. 
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ܲݎ݋ܾሺܲ݁ݎ݉ௌ௉ሻ෣  is the predicted probability of enrollment in Seguro Popular, 
using the 2008 characteristics. Using this predicted probability in the sample of 
households enrolled in Seguro Popular in 2012, households were classified into two 
categories: households with permanent affiliation with Seguro Popular, and households 
that entered Seguro Popular between 2008 and 2012. The selected threshold value 
corresponds to the predicted probability that let us maintain a constant proportion of 
households with permanent access to Seguro Popular in 2008 and 2012 (16.9 percent). 
By using the logistic model, we were able to classify the households into three 
groups: i) households that always had Seguro Popular (the group of households that were 
probably enrolled in Seguro Popular in 2008 and remained enrolled in 2012) , ii) new 
participants in Seguro Popular (the group of households that were uninsured and 
potential participants in 2008 and were enrolled in Seguro Popular by 2012), and iii) 
always uninsured households (households classified as uninsured in 2012 are the ones in 
this group). Households with other types of health insurance remained classified as such. 
In summary, these two logistic specifications allow us to classify households into 
four categories: i) households with other types of health insurance (OHI), ii) households 
that were uninsured throughout the period (U), iii) households affiliated with Seguro 
Popular throughout the period (SP), and iv) households that entered Seguro Popular 
between 2008 and 2012 (NewSP), as shown in Figure 4.3d. 
The same procedure was implemented excluding households that participate in 
Oportunidades, given that most of those households are enrolled with Seguro Popular as 
part of the program benefits. The results of the logistic regression for this subsample are 
reported in Appendix 4, Tables A.6 and A.9, and column 2.76 
 
                                                            
76 In order to perform sensitivity analysis, the same procedure was carried out but using an alternative 
definition of household enrollment to Seguro Popular. In this case the affiliation to Seguro Popular, other 
types of health insurance or uninsured was taken from the head of the household’s health insurance 
affiliation status. 
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4.6 Results 
 
The results suggest that households enrolled in Seguro Popular between 2008 and 2012 
reduced the proportion of their investment in liquid, low return investments, compared to 
uninsured households. Low return investments include: consumer durable goods, 
expenses targeted to strengthen networks, and low return savings (which are described in 
detail in section 4.4.3). Additional estimation excluding households participating in 
Oportunidades were performed too, the results show that this decrease in liquid 
investment translates into a larger proportion of total investment in human capital. The 
empirical analysis is restricted to households whose head was between 25 to 65 years and 
had not yet retired.  
4.6.1 OLS Estimates of the Effect of Enrollment in Seguro Popular on Investment and 
Savings 
 
The OLS estimates of equation (13), which measure the effect of a change in the 
proportion of household members enrolled in Seguro Popular on the different investment 
and savings measures, are presented in Tables 4.5a.and 4.5b. The tables report the 
coefficients of the effect of increasing the proportion of the household members affiliated 
with Seguro Popular on the different types of investment, for three different groups: all 
households, low income households, and rural households. Table 4.5a summarizes the 
coefficients of interest for the whole sample, while the results summarized in Table 4.5b 
exclude households participating in Oportunidades. 
The OLS estimates indicate that Seguro Popular negatively affects investment in 
liquid, low return assets. Moreover, the trade-off between low and high return assets is 
mainly explained by a decrease in the proportion of the investment allocated to social 
capital, low return savings or human capital. An increase in the proportion of household 
members enrolled in Seguro Popular decreases the proportion of the investment allocated 
to low return assets by 1.11 percent in both specifications. The effect is larger for low 
income and rural households, with an estimated significant decrease of 3.35 percent for 
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low income households in the whole sample and 4.38 percent for low income households 
excluding households participating in Oportunidades.  
Investment in the household network and low return savings is negatively related 
to the proportion of members of the households enrolled in Seguro Popular. The effect in 
strengthening networks investment is negative and significant for low income 
households. The effect is larger when excluding households participating in 
Oportunidades (-2.12 percent vs. -1.79 percent). On the other hand, the effect of Seguro 
Popular on low return savings is negative and significant when analyzing all households. 
For this measure, the effect is also larger when excluding households participating in 
Oportunidades (-1.16 percent vs. -1.07 percent). The effect on consumer durable goods is 
ambiguous. 
The effects on the illiquid, high return investments show a positive relationship 
between the proportion of household members enrolled in Seguro Popular and 
investment in human capital. Within the illiquid investments, the direction of the effect in 
investment in durable assets and high return savings is not the one expected, but the 
effect of Seguro Popular on human capital investment is positive and significant. An 
increase in the proportion of household members enrolled in Seguro Popular increases 
the proportion of the investment allocated to human capital by 2.55 percent for all 
households in the whole sample and 2.77 percent when excluding households 
participating in Oportunidades. The effect is larger for low income and rural households 
in both specifications. In the case of low income households the effect for the whole 
sample reflects an increase of 3.82 percent when increasing the proportion of household 
members with Seguro Popular, and when excluding households participating in 
Oportunidades the effect is 5.12 percent. For rural households the effect is 2.30 percent 
for the whole sample and 3.18 percent when excluding households participating in 
Oportunidades. 
The results suggest that an increase in the proportion of household members 
enrolled in Seguro Popular has significant effects on the reallocation of liquid 
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investments to human capital. The results are robust to different specifications, and the 
effects are larger when excluding households participating in Oportunidades. 
4.6.2 DID Estimates of the Effect of Access to Seguro Popular on Investment and 
Savings 
 
The DID estimates of equation (14) measure the effect of beginning to receive 
Seguro Popular in the analyzed period (with respect to uninsured households) on the 
different investment and savings measures. The results are summarized in Tables 4.6a 
and 4.6b. As in the OLS specification, the results were estimated for all households, low 
income households and rural households. Table 4.6a summarizes the coefficients of 
interest for the whole sample, while the results summarized in Table 4.6b exclude 
households participating in Oportunidades. 
The results for the whole sample show no significant evidence of an early effect 
Seguro Popular on most of the investment and savings measures, although the sign of the 
coefficient for liquid investments aggregate is negative. The only significant effect is 
found on high return savings measure for all households; gaining access to Seguro 
Popular increased the proportion of investment allocated into high return savings in 2.25 
percent compared to uninsured households.  
In contrast, when excluding households participating in Oportunidades, the 
results are in line with the OLS findings. As shown in Table 4.6b, the DID estimates 
indicate that Seguro Popular negatively affects investment in liquid, low return assets. 
Gaining access to Seguro Popular decreases the proportion of the investment allocated to 
low return assets in 2.88 for all households, as well as for low income and rural 
households (2.89 percent and 6.70 percent, respectively). The effect is significant for the 
aggregate level of liquid investments, but within the group of low return investments, the 
effect is not significant.  
The effects on the illiquid, high return investments show a positive relationship 
between the gaining access to Seguro Popular and investment in human capital. Similar 
to the OLS results, within the illiquid investments, the direction of the effect in 
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investment in durable assets and high return savings is not the one expected, but the 
effect of Seguro Popular on human capital investment are positive and significant.  
Gaining access to Seguro Popular increases the proportion of the investment 
allocated to human capital by 3.71 percent for all households and 3.62 percent for low 
income households. The effect is larger for rural households, with an increase of 8.56 
percent when comparing households that are new to Seguro Popular and uninsured 
households. 
The results suggest that households that were new to Seguro Popular and were 
not participating in Oportunidades, have significant effects on the reallocation of liquid 
investments to human capital.  
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The investment decisions of the households in an economy are potentially one of 
the most important determinants of its long-term growth. This Chapter studies the effect 
of access to public health benefits on the allocation of households’ savings to different 
types of investment.  
First, it shows in a simple model where a household faces financial constraints, 
the quantity of short term income risk affecting the household's optimal allocation of its 
savings into liquid assets. The larger the short-term risk that a household faces, the larger 
the savings that it will devote to liquid assets which can be used to face those risks. 
Second, using the introduction of a large public health system in Mexico, Seguro 
Popular, the Chapter estimates the effect of obtaining access to a public health on the 
investment allocations of households.  
The estimations suggest that there is a statistically and economically significant 
change in the allocation of savings to illiquid, high return investments, relative to liquid, 
low return investments for households that obtain access to the Seguro Popular program 
compared to uninsured households. Households invest more of their savings in illiquid, 
high return assets than they did before. In particular, the results suggest that households 
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invested more of their savings in the development of their human capital than before. 
This result is in line with the findings of Alcaraz et al. (2016), that found that Seguro 
Popular had positive effects on school enrollment rates and on standardized test scores. 
These results are limited to the population that does not have alternative insurance nor 
participates in Oportunidades, and is subject to a set of assumptions, most importantly, 
that the logistic regressions that identify the treatment and control groups are accurate. 
These results suggest that, beyond improving the health and welfare of the 
population, the provision of public health benefits or health insurance has the potential to 
increase the long-term growth of the economy by allowing credit constrained agents to 
invest their savings in high return assets.  
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4.8 Figures 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Number of persons and households enrolled in Seguro Popular 
 
  
Data: Seguro Popular administrative records 
The years when the program was a pilot are marked with an asterisk *. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Types of health insurance – Percentage of the population 
 
 
Source: CONEVAL, 2013.  
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Figure 4.3a – Observed Health Insurance Categories in ENIGH 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3b – Identification of Potential Participants in Seguro Popular in 2008 
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Figure 4.3c – Identification of Permanent Participants in Seguro Popular in 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3d – Resulting Health Insurance Categories for the Statistical Analysis 
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4.9 Tables 
 
Table 4.1 – Seguro Popular Annual Fee 2013 
 
 
Source: Author's estimates based on Ley General de la 
Salud, Capitulo 5 and World Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 – Proportion of Households with Different Types of Health Insurance 
  
 
Income 
Decile
Annual Fee in 
Mexican Pesos
Annual Fee as a 
percentage of the 
GDP per capita
I, II, III, IV ‐                               ‐                              
V $2,074.97 1.6%
VI $2,833.56 2.2%
VII $3,647.93 2.8%
VIII $5,650.38 4.3%
IX $7,518.97 5.7%
X $11,378.86 8.6%
2008 2012
All Households
Seguro Popular 17.5 38.7
Other Health Insurance 43.5 37.4
Uninsured 39.1 23.9
Low Income Households
Seguro Popular 27.2 55.2
Other Health Insurance 25.6 19.6
Uninsured 47.2 25.2
Source: Authors' estimates using ENIGH.
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Table 4.3 –Different Types of Investment as a Proportion of Total Investment 
  
2008 2012 2008 2012
Human Capital 0.437 0.405 0.475 0.444
Durable Assets 0.051 0.049 0.018 0.013
Savings High Rtr. 0.117 0.109 0.062 0.064
Productive Capital 0.121 0.116 0.152 0.144
Social Capital 0.179 0.162 0.221 0.186
Savings Low Rtr. 0.095 0.159 0.072 0.149
Source: Authors' estimates using ENIGH.
All Households Low Income Households
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Table 4.4 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Head of the Household
Age 46.28 14.41 46.91 14.90 43.76 13.71 44.96 14.73
Female 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41
Educational AttaintmentA 2.79 1.76 2.55 2.06 1.97 1.27 1.74 1.63
Household
Number of household members 4.21 1.97 4.08 1.96 4.80 1.95 4.56 2.10
Children aged 0 to 5 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.70 0.68 0.84 0.57 0.77
Children aged 5 to 18 1.33 1.31 1.15 1.23 1.89 1.43 1.51 1.33
Adults 65+ 0.20 0.50 0.22 0.53 0.16 0.44 0.20 0.51
Number of women of chilbearing age (15 to 49 years) 1.28 0.88 1.23 0.90 1.36 0.84 1.32 0.87
Live in urban area 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40 0.53 0.50 0.63 0.48
Proportion of informal workers 0.29 0.38 0.27 0.38 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.22
Number of income earners 2.43 1.35 2.50 1.40 2.93 1.57 2.86 1.61
Maximun educational attaintnment 3.74 1.53 3.71 1.70 2.98 1.08 3.01 1.37
Proportion of children enrolled in school 0.72 0.37 0.71 0.39 0.73 0.35 0.71 0.37
Oportunidades 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.37 0.48 0.24 0.43
All Households Households with Seguro Popular
A: Educational Attaintment is classified into the following groups: 0 = No elementary Education 1 = Incomplete Elementary Education 2 = Complete Elementary 
Education 3 = Incomplete Secondary Education 4 = Complete Secondary Education 5 = Some Higher Education 6 = Complete Higher Education 7 = Post‐Graduate 
Education
2008 2012 2008 2012
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Table 4.4 – Descriptive Statistics, continued 
 
  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Head of the Household
Age 46.91 14.40 48.37 15.06 46.63 14.59 47.49 14.61
Female 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44 0.27 0.44
Educational Attaintment 3.40 1.79 3.37 2.09 2.44 1.65 2.50 2.09
Household
Number of household members 3.90 1.73 3.68 1.71 4.32 2.16 4.01 1.98
Children aged 0 to 5 0.38 0.65 0.33 0.61 0.48 0.76 0.39 0.69
Children aged 5 to 18 1.09 1.12 0.89 1.06 1.37 1.38 1.02 1.18
Adults 65+ 0.22 0.52 0.25 0.56 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50
Number of women of chilbearing age (15 to 49 years) 1.22 0.84 1.14 0.89 1.31 0.93 1.23 0.95
Live in urban area 0.94 0.24 0.93 0.26 0.79 0.41 0.84 0.37
Proportion of informal workers 0.52 0.39 0.52 0.42 0.12 0.26 0.16 0.29
Number of income earners 2.27 1.18 2.25 1.15 2.40 1.38 2.36 1.30
Maximun educational attaintnment 4.27 1.55 4.36 1.72 3.46 1.46 3.71 1.70
Proportion of children enrolled in school 0.77 0.36 0.76 0.39 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.41
Oportunidades 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.22
A: Educational Attaintment is classified into the following groups: 0 = No elementary Education 1 = Incomplete Elementary Education 2 = Complete Elementary 
Education 3 = Incomplete Secondary Education 4 = Complete Secondary Education 5 = Some Higher Education 6 = Complete Higher Education 7 = Post‐Graduate 
Education
2008 2012 2008 2012
Households with Other Types of Health 
Insurance Uninsured Households
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Table 4.5a - – Summary of the Effects of Enrollment in Seguro Popular on Types of 
Investment (proportions) using OLS 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: All Households Low Income Households
Rural 
Households
Liquid Assets ‐ Aggregateda ‐0.0115 ‐0.0335*** ‐0.0143
(0.0077) (0.0119) (0.0140)
Consumer durable goods 0.0035 ‐0.0080 ‐0.0022
(0.0056) (0.0085) (0.0097)
Networks ‐0.0043 ‐0.0179* ‐0.0082
(0.0061) (0.0095) (0.0121)
Savings Low Rtr. ‐0.0107** ‐0.0075 ‐0.0039
(0.0052) (0.0077) (0.0091)
Human Capital 0.0255*** 0.0382*** 0.0230*
(0.0077) (0.0118) (0.0139)
Durable Assets ‐0.0140*** ‐0.0047* ‐0.0087**
(0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0036)
Savings High Rtr. 0.0053 ‐0.0780 ‐0.0525
(0.0877) (0.0921) (0.1282)
Observations 32,667 10,223 7,531
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: Liquid assets aggregated is the sum of investments in consumer durable goods, networks, and low return 
savings as the proportion of total investment.
Note: the sets of covariates include: 
Characteristics of the Head of the Household: gender, age, educational attainment, and employment status.
Characteristics of the Household: urban status, number of household members, proportion of informal workers 
out of the income earners of the household, participation in Oportunidades , and dummy variables for the type 
of household: one‐person household, single family household, and extended family household.
State fixed effects
 
123 
 
Table 4.5b - – Summary of the Effects of Enrollment in Seguro Popular on Types of 
Investment (proportions) - Excluding households in the Oportunidades program using OLS 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: All Households Low Income Households
Rural 
Households
Liquid Assets ‐ Aggregateda ‐0.0113 ‐0.0438*** ‐0.0183
(0.0087) (0.0137) (0.0170)
Consumer durable goods 0.0025 ‐0.0116 ‐0.0055
(0.0065) (0.0108) (0.0136)
Networks ‐0.0022 ‐0.0212* ‐0.0048
(0.0069) (0.0111) (0.0157)
Savings Low Rtr. ‐0.0116** ‐0.0110 ‐0.0080
(0.0057) (0.0089) (0.0117)
Human Capital 0.0277*** 0.0512*** 0.0318*
(0.0085) (0.0135) (0.0168)
Durable Assets ‐0.0164*** ‐0.0074** ‐0.0135**
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0054)
Savings High Rtr. ‐0.0163 ‐0.1390 ‐0.1361
(0.1093) (0.1173) (0.1678)
Observations 28,216 7,547 4,643
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: Liquid assets aggregated is the sum of investments in consumer durable goods, networks, and low return 
savings as the proportion of total investment.
Note: the sets of covariates include: 
Characteristics of the Head of the Household: gender, age, educational attainment, and employment status.
Characteristics of the Household: urban status, number of household members, proportion of informal workers 
out of the income earners of the household,  and dummy variables for the type of household: one‐person 
household, single family household, and extended family household.
State fixed effects
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Table 4.6a – Summary of the Effects of the Enrollment in Seguro Popular on Types of 
Investment (proportions) using Difference-in-Difference 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: All Households Low Income Households
Rural 
Households
Liquid Assets ‐ Aggregateda ‐0.0098 ‐0.0083 ‐0.0261
(0.0209) (0.0249) (0.0332)
Consumer durable goods ‐0.0125 ‐0.0118 ‐0.0196
(0.0091) (0.0157) (0.0165)
Networks ‐0.0117 ‐0.0127 ‐0.0175
(0.0129) (0.0217) (0.0196)
Savings Low Rtr. 0.0144 0.0162 0.0110
(0.0177) (0.0218) (0.0218)
Human Capital ‐0.0121 0.0020 0.0345
(0.0229) (0.0279) (0.0316)
Durable Assets ‐0.0006 ‐0.0011 0.0010
(0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0054)
Savings High Rtr. 0.0225** 0.0074 ‐0.0094
(0.0086) (0.0115) (0.0152)
Observations 23,681 7,206 5,572
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: Liquid assets aggregated is the sum of investments in consumer durable goods, networks, and low return 
savings as the proportion of total investment.
Note: the sets of covariates include: 
Characteristics of the Head of the Household: gender, age, educational attainment, and employment status.
Characteristics of the Household: urban status, number of household members, proportion of informal workers 
out of the income earners of the household, participation in Oportunidades , and dummy variables for the type of 
household: one‐person household, single family household, and extended family household.
State fixed effects
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Table 4.6b – Summary of the Effects of Enrollment in Seguro Popular on Types of 
Investment (proportions) - Excluding households in the Oportunidades program using 
Difference-in-Difference 
 
  
 
 
  
Dependent variable: All Households Low Income Households
Rural 
Households
Liquid Assets ‐ Aggregateda ‐0.0288* ‐0.0289 ‐0.0670*
(0.0154) (0.0406) (0.0383)
Consumer durable goods ‐0.0096 ‐0.0045 ‐0.0004
(0.0121) (0.0282) (0.0289)
Networks ‐0.0198 0.0197 ‐0.0432
(0.0153) (0.0345) (0.0344)
Savings Low Rtr. 0.0006 ‐0.0441 ‐0.0234
(0.0150) (0.0287) (0.0261)
Human Capital 0.0371** 0.0362 0.0856**
(0.0153) (0.0404) (0.0384)
Durable Assets ‐0.0083 ‐0.0073 ‐0.0186
(0.0076) (0.0088) (0.0125)
Savings High Rtr. ‐0.2540 ‐0.0801 ‐0.0234
(0.3450) (0.2932) (0.0261)
Observations 19,982 5,172 3,392
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: Liquid assets aggregated is the sum of investments in consumer durable goods, networks, and low return 
savings as the proportion of total investment.
Note: the sets of covariates include: 
Characteristics of the Head of the Household: gender, age, educational attainment, and employment status.
Characteristics of the Household: urban status, number of household members, proportion of informal 
workers out of the income earners of the household, participation in Oportunidades , and dummy variables for 
the type of household: one‐person household, single family household, and extended family household.
State fixed effects
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Chapter 5  
Conclusions 
 
Human capital skills are gained throughout a person’s life, and there are some activities, 
conditions, and policies that can either boost or reduce human capital investments. In this 
dissertation, I showed that for the context of poor households in Ethiopia, child work has 
a negative effect on academic achievement (measured as test scores) and that there is a 
wide test score gap between children residing in urban and rural areas of the country. In 
the case of Mexico, when households gain access to the Seguro Popular program, they 
adjust their investment decisions. Households invest more of their savings in illiquid, 
high return assets than they did before, especially human capital investments (schooling).  
The results of Chapter 2 confirm that child work negatively affects vocabulary 
skills and that it has no effect on mathematics test scores. Child work was analyzed 
paying particular attention to two types of child work: domestic and market work. As 
children grow, the effects of child work on academic performance get larger. In the case 
of domestic work, I found negative and statistically significant effects for vocabulary 
skills for girls: -0.144 standard deviations for 8-year-old girls and -0.323 standard 
deviations for 15-year-old girls. Market work has a large effect for 12-year-old boys and 
girls in both cohorts, with effects ranging from -0.193 to -0.373 standard deviations. 
The effect of the different types of child work on mathematics test scores was also 
explored in Chapter 2. But the direction of the effect of child work on the mathematics 
test scores was not as clear and exhibited less statistical significance when compared to 
the effects on vocabulary skills. An additional hour of domestic work results in declines 
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of -0.128 standard deviations for 8-year-old girls, and -0.145 standard deviations for 12-
year-old boys, from the younger cohort. One positive and statistically significant effect 
was found in the analysis, an additional hour of market work increased the mathematics 
test score by 0.173 standard deviation for all 12-year-old children of the older cohort. The 
empirical analysis included in Chapter 2 had 36 different estimations, 15 of which are 
statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level, so the evidence strongly suggests 
that the effect of child labor is generally negative; therefore, finding one positive and 
significant effect out of 35 could be due to random chance.  
Chapter 2 also contributes to the existing literature by presenting new evidence 
that domestic work can also have negative effects on learning, especially in vocabulary 
skills. It also confirms that when correcting for endogeneity in the child work variables, 
the estimated impacts are more negative when using instrumental variables; therefore, the 
OLS specifications appear to underestimate the effects of child work on school 
performance.  
Chapter 3 first measures and then decomposes the test score gap between children 
residing in urban areas and children residing in rural areas of Ethiopia by using the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method, in combination with the instrumental variables 
approach developed in Chapter 2. The decomposition considered child, parent, and 
household characteristics. The test score gap is generally around one standard deviation, 
and it widens as children grow.  
The explained portion (differences in endowments) of the vocabulary test score 
explains more than 50 percent of the test score gap. For the mathematics test score, the 
explained portion contributes more than 40 percent of the test score gap, with the 
exception for 12-year-olds in the older cohort, where the explained portion of the gap was 
-6.7 percent. In general, the explained portion of the gap is higher for boys than for girls. 
The variables that significantly contribute to the explained portion of the test score gap 
were: hours of child work, highest level of education attained by the parents, and the 
socioeconomic status of the family. Unfortunately, the analysis included in Chapter 3 
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could not incorporate school and teacher’s characteristics given the small sub-sample of 
children that had the variables available; these variables could have helped to identify 
areas in which the education authorities might improve educational services in rural 
areas.  
The results from Chapters 2 and 3 show that child work has negative effects on 
student academic achievement and that it significantly contributes to the urban-rural test 
score gap, but test scores are just one dimension of the child’s development. It is also 
worth noting that policies prohibiting work for children during their school years could 
be harmful for those children’s future. On one hand, the activities that children perform 
outside of school can prepare them for the economic and cultural environment of their 
communities, and on the other hand, some children work to be able to pay for the costs of 
attending school. A longer-term analysis of the effects of child work in the Ethiopian 
context is needed to propose policies that could enhance both student academic 
achievement and the acquisition of additional skills that will be useful for those children 
in the future. Policies such as Conditional Cash Transfers programs could reduce the 
number of child work hours, especially in rural areas where children spend twice as much 
time as their urban counterparts performing domestic and market work. In fact, a recent 
evaluation of the Social Cash Transfer Pilot Programme in the Tigray region (Berhane et 
al. 2015), found that this program increased the likelihood of enrollment by 13.3 
percentage points and grade attainment by half of a grade.  
Chapter 4 shows how households’ investment decisions are affected by gaining 
access to public health insurance. First, a simple model where a household faces financial 
constraints was developed. The model shows the relationship between the magnitude of 
the short-term income risk and the household's optimal allocation of its savings into 
liquid assets. The larger the short-term risk faced by a household, the more its savings 
will be devoted to liquid assets (which could be used to mitigate the effects of those 
risks). Second, the effects of gaining access to health insurance on the investment 
allocations of households were estimated by using the expansion of a large public health 
system in Mexico, Seguro Popular.  
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The results of Chapter 4 suggest that there is a statistically significant change in 
the allocation of savings to illiquid, high return investments, relative to liquid, low return 
investments for households that gained access to Seguro Popular compared to uninsured 
households. Households invested more of their savings in illiquid, high return assets than 
they did before. The results suggest that households invested more of their savings in the 
development of their human capital than before. These results were limited to the 
Mexican population that does not have health insurance alternatives or does not 
participate in the Conditional Cash Transfer program, Oportunidades. These results 
suggest that, beyond improving the health and welfare of the population, the provision of 
publicly funded health insurance has the potential to increase the long-term outcomes by 
allowing credit constrained agents to invest their savings in high return assets. 
The results in this dissertation show that in the context of poor households in 
Ethiopia some activities (child work) and conditions (residing in rural areas) have a 
negative effect on human capital formation for school-aged children. However, the 
results presented in this dissertation are only a small subset of the incidence of child work 
on human capital formation given that I analyzed the short-run effects on the academic 
achievement dimension. In addition, this dissertation also shows that policies targeted to 
improve other dimensions of well-being could have a positive impact on investments in 
human capital. In the context of Mexican households, gaining access to health insurance 
had a positive effect on their investment decisions and boosted household human capital 
investments.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A.1 – First Stage Estimations for Children Aged 8 Years Old 
 
 
 
  
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male
Proportion of Older Sisters ‐0.815*** ‐1.447*** ‐0.365 ‐0.801*** ‐0.369** ‐1.162***
(0.217) (0.411) (0.240) (0.198) (0.170) (0.294)
Proportion of Younger Sisters 0.507 0.601 0.321 ‐0.222 0.142 ‐0.597*
(0.393) (0.389) (0.400) (0.280) (0.330) (0.338)
Proportion of Older Brothers ‐0.922*** ‐1.253*** ‐0.456* ‐0.279 ‐0.458 ‐0.279
(0.225) (0.333) (0.222) (0.282) (0.343) (0.362)
Proportion of Younger Brothers 0.600** 0.340 0.695** ‐0.381* ‐0.426* ‐0.242
(0.234) (0.382) (0.284) (0.186) (0.234) (0.318)
Mom Ill past 4 years ‐0.032 ‐0.053 0.080 0.225 0.171 0.119
(0.157) (0.277) (0.130) (0.198) (0.223) (0.254)
Dad Ill past 4 years 0.036 ‐0.103 0.099 0.321** 0.278** 0.413
(0.172) (0.246) (0.186) (0.139) (0.131) (0.248)
Other Ill past 4 years 0.243* 0.336* 0.168 ‐0.115 ‐0.067 ‐0.141
(0.126) (0.177) (0.175) (0.143) (0.134) (0.205)
Death in the Household past 4 years ‐0.370* ‐0.374 ‐0.297 ‐0.071 0.055 ‐0.270
(0.187) (0.237) (0.194) (0.191) (0.192) (0.373)
New Household Member past 4 years 0.189 0.676* ‐0.014 0.562*** 0.067 0.766**
(0.200) (0.341) (0.229) (0.166) (0.204) (0.304)
Drought past 4 years 0.076 0.302 ‐0.154 1.235*** 0.922*** 1.565***
(0.184) (0.215) (0.215) (0.302) (0.262) (0.388)
Flood past 4 years 0.624*** 0.580* 0.613** 0.109 ‐0.277 0.461
(0.184) (0.306) (0.230) (0.268) (0.245) (0.269)
Frost past 4 years ‐0.231 ‐0.322 ‐0.055 0.743** 1.058*** 0.460
(0.239) (0.221) (0.242) (0.271) (0.218) (0.406)
Death of Livestock past 4 years 0.157 0.474* ‐0.108 0.857*** 0.340** 1.253***
(0.161) (0.256) (0.173) (0.184) (0.134) (0.309)
Constant 2.121*** 2.648*** 1.633*** 0.690** 0.378 1.024***
(0.192) (0.284) (0.173) (0.278) (0.247) (0.346)
Observations 1,208 563 645 1,208 563 645
R‐squared 0.064 0.128 0.050 0.235 0.219 0.309
F‐test 15.53 35.53 10.86 198.9 119.4 58.42
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Hours of domestic work Hours of market work
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Table A.2 – First Stage Estimations for Children Aged 12 Years Old (Younger Cohort 
Round 4) 
 
 
 
  
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male
Proportion of Older Sisters ‐0.730** ‐1.243** ‐0.597* ‐1.266*** ‐0.680*** ‐1.558**
(0.321) (0.443) (0.317) (0.343) (0.208) (0.598)
Proportion of Younger Sisters 0.345 0.033 0.654** ‐0.910*** ‐0.200 ‐1.573***
(0.223) (0.414) (0.282) (0.257) (0.312) (0.382)
Proportion of Older Brothers ‐0.838*** ‐0.484 ‐0.629*** ‐0.926*** ‐0.692* ‐1.614***
(0.212) (0.369) (0.189) (0.299) (0.356) (0.458)
Proportion of Younger Brothers 0.054 ‐0.230 0.242 ‐0.643** ‐0.185 ‐1.086**
(0.268) (0.370) (0.231) (0.289) (0.312) (0.516)
Mom Ill past 4 years 0.137 0.087 ‐0.044 ‐0.365* ‐0.005 ‐0.525**
(0.199) (0.206) (0.198) (0.183) (0.148) (0.244)
Dad Ill past 4 years 0.045 ‐0.054 0.044 0.106 ‐0.191 0.439
(0.267) (0.268) (0.295) (0.359) (0.176) (0.455)
Other Ill past 4 years 0.008 ‐0.111 0.342 ‐0.360** ‐0.202 ‐0.691**
(0.207) (0.247) (0.215) (0.171) (0.174) (0.248)
Death in the Household past 4 years ‐0.328* ‐0.407 ‐0.142 ‐0.185 0.159 ‐0.549*
(0.170) (0.300) (0.222) (0.199) (0.250) (0.279)
New Household Member past 4 years 0.277 0.193 0.241 ‐0.408 ‐0.047 ‐0.687*
(0.289) (0.410) (0.562) (0.239) (0.202) (0.342)
Drought past 4 years ‐0.173 0.130 ‐0.278* 1.087*** 0.544** 1.391**
(0.238) (0.292) (0.159) (0.318) (0.233) (0.603)
Flood past 4 years 0.315 0.227 0.136 0.380** 0.498** 0.471
(0.209) (0.214) (0.206) (0.157) (0.216) (0.362)
Frost past 4 years ‐0.242 ‐0.170 ‐0.293** 1.174*** 1.254*** 1.085**
(0.170) (0.278) (0.120) (0.237) (0.276) (0.392)
Death of Livestock past 4 years 0.158 0.422 ‐0.235 0.758*** 0.248 1.392***
(0.244) (0.269) (0.142) (0.203) (0.175) (0.225)
Constant 2.320*** 3.036*** 1.678*** 1.479*** 0.731*** 2.174***
(0.195) (0.273) (0.154) (0.318) (0.224) (0.445)
Observations 1,208 571 637 1,208 571 637
R‐squared 0.026 0.046 0.056 0.212 0.200 0.302
F‐test 3.319 3.176 10.66 128.5 55.33 49.27
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Hours of domestic work Hours of market work
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Table A.3.a – First Stage Estimations for Children Aged 12 Years Old (Older Cohort 
Round 2) 
 
 
 
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male
Proportion of Older Sisters ‐0.683* ‐0.441 ‐0.185 0.675 ‐0.065 0.942
(0.372) (0.389) (0.497) (0.407) (0.339) (0.626)
Proportion of Younger Sisters 0.130 0.880 0.098 0.587** 0.246 0.633
(0.459) (0.653) (0.549) (0.272) (0.248) (0.605)
Proportion of Older Brothers ‐0.706** ‐0.510 ‐0.338 0.238 ‐0.233 0.431
(0.294) (0.370) (0.518) (0.255) (0.206) (0.610)
Proportion of Younger Brothers 0.345 0.876 0.420 0.215 ‐0.070 0.394
(0.415) (0.519) (0.681) (0.344) (0.459) (0.641)
Mom Ill past 4 years 0.047 0.231 0.056 ‐0.125 ‐0.267* ‐0.178
(0.152) (0.234) (0.163) (0.170) (0.151) (0.208)
Dad Ill past 4 years 0.348** 0.139 0.244 ‐0.292** ‐0.162 ‐0.137
(0.154) (0.233) (0.267) (0.131) (0.139) (0.215)
Other Ill past 4 years 0.089 ‐0.153 0.315* ‐0.288 ‐0.188 ‐0.352
(0.157) (0.200) (0.154) (0.202) (0.161) (0.327)
Death in the Household past 4 years 0.223 ‐0.074 0.358 0.019 ‐0.180 0.261
(0.220) (0.214) (0.345) (0.212) (0.207) (0.375)
New Household Member past 4 years 0.173 0.036 0.312 0.046 ‐0.352 0.396
(0.229) (0.266) (0.250) (0.274) (0.244) (0.345)
Drought past 4 years ‐0.168 ‐0.076 ‐0.422 0.805*** 0.418 1.269***
(0.272) (0.249) (0.354) (0.280) (0.314) (0.365)
Flood past 4 years 0.211 0.218 0.066 0.433 0.004 0.998***
(0.229) (0.271) (0.323) (0.282) (0.281) (0.340)
Frost past 4 years ‐0.452** ‐0.067 ‐0.173 0.604** 0.307 0.320
(0.210) (0.433) (0.295) (0.255) (0.340) (0.421)
Death of Livestock past 4 years 0.183 0.329 ‐0.087 0.418*** 0.418** 0.431**
(0.176) (0.236) (0.181) (0.145) (0.153) (0.201)
Constant 2.807*** 3.142*** 1.957*** 0.680** 0.828** 0.795
(0.322) (0.396) (0.444) (0.266) (0.331) (0.485)
Observations 781 391 390 781 391 390
R‐squared 0.051 0.083 0.057 0.104 0.068 0.191
F‐test 8.615 6.435 5.664 9.466 4.749 6.641
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Hours of domestic work Hours of market work
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Table A.3.b – Summary of Effects of Domestic and Market Work on Schooling Outcomes 
using Self-Reported Data for Children Aged 12 Years Old (Older Cohort Round 2) 
 
 
 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
PPVT Score
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.045*** ‐0.042 ‐0.036* ‐0.102 ‐0.060** ‐0.217
(0.013) (0.083) (0.019) (0.086) (0.028) (0.157)
Total hours of market work ‐0.043* ‐0.114 ‐0.042* ‐0.18 ‐0.047 ‐0.169
(0.023) (0.143) (0.022) (0.217) (0.033) (0.135)
Mathematics Test Score
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.048* 0.027 ‐0.051* ‐0.054 ‐0.054 0.133
(0.027) (0.103) (0.028) (0.118) (0.047) (0.220)
Total hours of market work ‐0.019 ‐0.05 0.004 0.229 ‐0.025 0.105
(0.025) (0.129) (0.028) (0.197) (0.031) (0.155)
Observations 782 781 391 391 391 390
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Female Male
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Table A.4.a – First Stage Estimations for Children Aged 15 Years Old 
 
 
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male
Proportion of Younger Sisters 0.426 1.287*** ‐0.085 0.4 ‐0.429 1.04
­0.341 ­0.294 ­0.381 ­0.489 ­0.424 ­0.664
Proportion of Younger Brothers 0.385 0.416 0.091 0.028 ‐0.103 0.406
­0.334 ­0.28 ­0.454 ­0.441 ­0.34 ­0.594
Mom Ill past 4 years 0.316 0.620** 0.253 0.029 ‐0.057 ‐0.051
­0.184 ­0.239 ­0.253 ­0.215 ­0.19 ­0.274
Dad Ill past 4 years 0.092 ‐0.259 ‐0.005 ‐0.211 ‐0.089 0.033
­0.237 ­0.235 ­0.314 ­0.219 ­0.217 ­0.347
Other Ill past 4 years 0.013 ‐0.052 ‐0.131 ‐0.17 ‐0.199 0.016
­0.16 ­0.158 ­0.183 ­0.165 ­0.186 ­0.275
Death in the Household past 4 years ‐0.412* ‐0.405 ‐0.485* 0.209 ‐0.329 0.839
­0.205 ­0.298 ­0.235 ­0.36 ­0.205 ­0.517
New Household Member past 4 years 0.177 0.323 0.276 0.059 ‐0.51 0.224
­0.22 ­0.331 ­0.25 ­0.428 ­0.311 ­0.489
Drought past 4 years 0.208 0.411 ‐0.408 0.884** 0.760*** 1.328***
­0.223 ­0.266 ­0.264 ­0.314 ­0.244 ­0.444
Flood past 4 years ‐0.048 ‐0.450* 0.333 0.37 0.057 0.781
­0.15 ­0.222 ­0.298 ­0.217 ­0.211 ­0.475
Frost past 4 years 0.347 0.563* 0.172 0.184 0.148 0.129
­0.264 ­0.308 ­0.354 ­0.197 ­0.225 ­0.32
Death of Livestock past 4 years 0.385* 0.829*** 0.065 0.466* 0.158 0.703**
­0.211 ­0.265 ­0.23 ­0.241 ­0.226 ­0.318
Constant 2.731*** 3.422*** 2.199*** 1.048*** 0.606*** 1.353***
­0.225 ­0.31 ­0.18 ­0.244 ­0.202 ­0.308
Observations 782 391 391 782 391 391
R‐squared 0.036 0.162 0.029 0.06 0.067 0.133
F‐test 6.342 7.723 2.608 4.957 6.239 5.397
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Hours of domestic work Hours of market work
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Table A.4.b – Summary of Effects of Domestic and Market Work on Schooling Outcomes 
using Self-Reported Data for Children Aged 15 Years Old 
 
 
  
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
PPVT Score
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.031 ‐0.287 ‐0.078** ‐0.336** 0.002 0.008
(0.019) (0.189) (0.033) (0.170) (0.033) (0.157)
Total hours of market work ‐0.035** ‐0.388 ‐0.053 ‐0.337 ‐0.024 0.026
(0.016) (0.295) (0.039) (0.210) (0.020) (0.129)
Mathematics Test Score
Total hours of domestic work ‐0.033* ‐0.317 ‐0.044* ‐0.288 ‐0.032 ‐0.105
(0.018) (0.221) (0.024) (0.182) (0.040) (0.247)
Total hours of market work ‐0.048*** ‐0.579 ‐0.039** ‐0.037 ‐0.064** ‐0.302
(0.014) (0.438) (0.017) (0.095) (0.025) (0.203)
Observations 782 782 391 391 391 391
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Female Male
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Appendix 2 
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) 
 
The main objective of ENIGH is to provide information for the statistical analysis of the 
behavior of the households’ income and expenditures. Data includes information on 
income and expenditure amounts, sources, and distribution; in addition to socio-
demographic and labor occupational characteristics of the household members and 
dwelling infrastructure.77 The households are surveyed during 7 consecutive days 
between August 21st and November 28th of the particular year.  
The ENIGH is available for the following years: 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. The new methodology for 
the ENIGH was introduced in 2008, featuring a socioeconomic conditions section which 
was designed to provide estimates of a multidimensional measure of poverty.  
The survey is representative at the national level, but for some particular years it 
is also representative at the state level for some particular States.  The 2012 ENIGH has 
fewer observations than the 2008 and 2010 ENIGHs, and it is representative only at the 
national level. In 2008 the survey was designed to be representative at the national level 
and at the state level for: Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Jalisco, México, Sonora, 
Querétaro and Yucatán. For the case of the 2010 survey, it was designed to be 
representative at the national level and at the state level for Distrito Federal, Chiapas, 
Guanajuato, México, and Yucatán.  
Sections included in the New ENIGH 
 
Six questionnaires are applied to each household surveyed in the ENIGH. We used 
information included on questionnaires 1, 3, 5, and 6. Table I.1 shows the sections within 
the different questionnaires included in our analysis and the use of the information in our 
analysis. For example, we used a particular question from the "1. Household Expenditure 
                                                            
77 http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/Proyectos/encuestas/hogares/regulares/enigh/ 
 
145 
Questionnaire, Section I – Monthly Expenditures, Subsection1.3 – Education, Culture, 
and Recreation" to estimate the household annual investment on Education. 
The new ENIGH features a health section for each household member (Questionnaires 5 
and 6); the question regarding enrollment in Seguro Popular was introduced in 2006, but 
additional questions regarding other types of health insurance and medical attention were 
added in 2008. 
 
Table A.5 – New ENIGH Questionnaires and Sections 
 
 
 
  
Qustionnaire Section Subsection Variables
1. Household Expenditure 1.3 Education, Culture, and Recreation Investment on Education
1.5 Dwelling and services Mortgage
3.1 Household Equipment and 
Dwelling Mainteinance
Household Productive Capital
3.3 Transportation Vehicle Payments
3.4 Other Expeditures Social Capital
3.5 Financial Expenditures Savings
2. Daily Expensesa
3. Household and dwelling III. Sociodemographic 
Characteristics
Relationship to the Head of 
the Household, Age, Gender, 
Educational Attainment , and 
Labor Force Participation for 
each member of the 
household
VI. Time to the Closest 
Hospital
Time, in minutes, to the 
closest hospital
4. Household businessesa
5. Persons aged 12 years old 
and above
X. Health  Affiliation with Seguro 
Popular or other Health Care 
Providers
6. Persons aged less than 12 
years old
X. Health  Affiliation with Seguro 
Popular or other Health Care 
Providers
a: Questionnaire not inlcuded in this paper.
I. Monthly Expenditures
III. Semi‐annually 
Expenditures
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Appendix 3 
Parallel Trends Tests for Agricultural Households: 2000 vs. 2002 
 
In order to test the parallel trends assumption, the following equation was estimated for 
uninsured households. In this first estimation we compared agricultural vs. non-
agricultural households. 
ܲݎ݋݌ܫ݊ݒ ൌ ߴ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ݃ݎܹ݅ݎ݇ ൅ ߛܶ ൅ ࢾ࡭ࢍ࢘࢏ࢃ࢘࢑ כ ࢀ   (A.1) 
The results suggest that there are no significant differences between the 
investments trends for agricultural and non-agricultural uninsured households. Table A.6 
summarizes the coefficients for the interaction term of equation A.1, the standard error, 
and the t-statistic. 
Table A.6– Parallel Trends Test: Agricultural vs. Non-Agricultural Unisured Households: 
2000 vs. 2002 
 
 
Parallel Trends Tests for Self­Employed Households: 2000 vs. 2004 
 
Additionally, another parallel trend test was estimated for another classification of the 
uninsured household. In this second estimation we compared self-employed vs. employed 
households. 
ܲݎ݋݌ܫ݊ݒ ൌ ߴ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݂ܵ݁ܧ݉݌ܹݎ݇ ൅ ߛܶ ൅ ࢾࡿࢋ࢒ࢌࡱ࢓࢖ࢃ࢘࢑ כ ࢀ  (A.2) 
Coeff SE t
All households
Education ‐0.033 0.025 ­1.324
Durable Assets ‐0.290 0.186 ­1.557
Productive Capital 0.013 0.019 0.655
Social Capital 0.038 0.038 0.997
Savings 0.023 0.021 1.096
Low Income Households
Education 0.036 0.030 1.230
Durable Assets ‐0.081 0.276 ­0.294
Productive Capital 0.005 0.024 0.215
Social Capital 0.017 0.051 0.324
Savings ‐0.025 0.024 ­1.028
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The results suggest that there are no significant differences between the 
investments trends for self-employed and employed uninsured households, with the 
exception of investments in networks. Note that 2004 was a local election year, therefore 
part of this significant difference could relate to the context of the particular electoral 
year. Table A.7 summarizes the coefficients for the interaction term of equation A.1, the 
standard error, and the t-statistic. 
Table A.7– Parallel Trends Test: Self-Employed vs. Employed Uninsured Households: 2000 
vs. 2004 
 
 
  
Coeff SE t
All households
Education 0.006 0.015 0.373
Durable Assets ‐0.037 0.043 ­0.856
Productive Capital 0.015 0.011 1.297
Social Capital 0.046 0.021 2.175
Savings 0.002 0.012 0.163
Low Income Households
Education 0.024 0.022 1.096
Durable Assets 0.126 0.169 0.744
Productive Capital 0.030 0.017 1.733
Social Capital 0.122 0.036 3.370
Savings ‐0.032 0.018 ­1.784
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Appendix 4 
Logistic Regressions 
 
A. 2012 – Potential Participants of Seguro Popular 
 
Table A.8 shows the results for the logistic regression that estimates the probability of 
affiliation to Seguro Popular in 2012.  
Table A.8– Logistic regression, Affiliation to Seguro Popular in 2012 
 
 
Dependent variable: Household enrollment in Seguro Popular
One person household ‐0.7567*** ‐0.6409***
(0.2142) (0.2140)
Proportion of formal workers in the household 0.1627 0.2496
(0.2517) (0.2846)
Proportion of household members with other types of health insurance ‐6.3124*** ‐6.2506***
(0.2011) (0.1894)
Formality status of the head of the household 0.4986* 0.3803
(0.2723) (0.3075)
Self‐employed status of the head of the household ‐0.1317 ‐0.2134
(0.1367) (0.1398)
Female head of the household ‐0.174 ‐0.2099
(0.1676) (0.1771)
Age of the head of the household ‐0.0079 ‐0.0078
(0.0068) (0.0074)
Educational attainment of the head of the household ‐0.1617*** ‐0.1648***
(0.0341) (0.0353)
Number of household members 0.0404 0.0572
(0.0427) (0.0444)
Number of household members (5 to 25 years old) enrolled in school 0.1251** 0.1306**
(0.0560) (0.0519)
Number of household members (19 to 25 years old) enrolled in school ‐0.4222*** ‐0.4424***
(0.1540) (0.1564)
Number of women of childbearing age (15 to 54 years old) in the household 0.0227 0.0202
(0.0767) (0.0753)
Number of household members (17 to 18 years old) 0.0965 0.1422
(0.2061) (0.2216)
Oportunidades 0.9484***
(0.1661)
Size of the city 0.2512*** 0.2978***
(0.0515) (0.0515)
Constant 0.4904 0.3426
(0.4021) (0.4108)
Observations 5,321 4,309
Pseudo ‐ R2 0.461 0.426
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Whole Sample
Exluding 
households 
with 
Oportunidades
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B. 2008 – Permanent Participants of Seguro Popular 
 
Table A.9 shows the results for the logistic regression that estimates the probability of 
affiliation to Seguro Popular in 2008, for those households classified as potential 
participants of Seguro Popular.  
Table A.9– Logistic regression, Affiliation to Seguro Popular for Potential Participants in 
2008 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Household enrollment in Seguro Popular
Proportion of formal workers in the household ‐0.9162** ‐0.9030**
(0.3697) (0.3698)
Proportion of household members with other types of health insurance 6.8353*** 13.3263***
(1.3270) (1.3924)
Formality status of the head of the household ‐0.1467 ‐0.4833*
(0.2763) (0.2612)
Self‐employed status of the head of the household 0.1313 0.4432**
(0.1190) (0.1857)
Female head of the household 0.1357 0.4171***
(0.1548) (0.1330)
Age of the head of the household 0.0076 0.0127**
(0.0051) (0.0059)
Educational attainment of the head of the household 0.3366*** 0.4566***
(0.0362) (0.0570)
Number of household members ‐0.1864*** ‐0.1471***
(0.0569) (0.0461)
Number of household members (5 to 25 years old) enrolled in school ‐0.0192 ‐0.2390***
(0.0581) (0.0649)
Number of household members (19 to 25 years old) enrolled in school 0.4994** 1.2378***
(0.2530) (0.3076)
Number of women of childbearing age (15 to 54 years old) in the household 0.1354 0.0928
(0.1091) (0.0953)
Number of household members (17 to 18 years old) ‐0.1315 ‐0.4200***
(0.1054) (0.1148)
Number of household members (0 to 5 years old) 0.2804*** 0.2425**
(0.0891) (0.0984)
Oportunidades 1.0672***
(0.1274)
Expenditure decile ‐0.0511** ‐0.0992***
(0.0210) (0.0225)
Constant 0.8861*** 1.2307***
(0.2289) (0.3255)
State Dummies YES YES
Observations 5,362 3,410
Pseudo ‐ R2 0.147 0.221
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Whole Sample
Exluding 
households 
with 
Oportunidades
